PERSPECTIVES IN ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY

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PERSPECTIVES IN ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY

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To
Professor Edwin O. Stene
With Affectionate Regards

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Administrative Change and Administrative Theory—A Forestatement

Ramesh K. Arora

WITH the evolution of a series of 'modern' approaches to the study of administrative systems, a tendency is sometimes found among scholars to decry the 'traditional' theories on the plea that these theories lack the 'desirable' norms of scientific rigour and the capacity to explain the contemporary complex socio-administrative reality. A more rational viewpoint, however, would be to look at specific administrative theories from an environmental perspective—for, undoubtedly, the nature of the environment with which public administrative thinkers deal and in which they work influences the manner in which they conceptualize their observations. Accordingly, environment must be of central importance in any assessment of the evolution of administrative thought. An underemphasis on this aspect of administrative analysis has resulted into largely disparaging or negative assessments of the contribution of the early administrative theorists.

The early American administrative thought developed at a time when the industrial revolution was entering its age of maturity. Large scale complex organizations were responding and adjusting to the demands for increasing production in a rapidly moving competitive world. The goals of these organizations appeared to be survival and development in the changing and challenging environment. Thus, the purposes or goals for which administrative organizations were created were assumed to be clearly agreed upon. The achievement of these purposes or goals depended largely on an organization's capacity, and it was primarily the building of such capacity that became the focus of early American administrative theory. This emphasis on capacity was reflected in the prominence accorded to the concepts of efficiency and economy.

Contemporaneously with the evolution of early American administrative theory was developing a set of administrative ideas in the continental Europe, particularly in Germany and France. The former took the lead through the historical-sociological analysis of

bureaucracies by Max Weber, while in France, the writings of Henı Fayol had made a notable impact on of administrative analysis.

Even though Weber's bureaucratic theory developed indepen dently of the American administrative thought, it shared man premises with the latter. Weber worked on his analysis of bureau cracy at a time when bureaucracy was an extremely influentia institution in the German politico-administrative system, and it structure was characterized by considerable hierarchy, specialization and careerism. To Weber, the bureaucracy seemed to be a vast new base of social power and naturally, therefore, his analysis sought to capture the essence of its evident awesome capacity.

Weber stressed the importance of rationality in administration in order to achieve the implicit goal of efficiency in the solution of complex and specialized problems. A combination of these elements of rationality, specialization, and efficiency appeared to fit appropriately Weber's concept of an administrative State.

Likewise, in the United States, the climate of the commercial world considerably influenced the thinking in the government sector which also embraced the values of economy and efficiency. Limited resources and growing demands for public services led to pressure for economic operations. With an implicit consensus among administrative theories on the instrumental goals of implementing the authoritatively determined public policy, much of the discussion on administrative theory centred on the more immediate means to achieve such goals. Interestingly, the same concern is today dominant in the public administrative systems of developing countries which are facing the challenge of achieving maximum results from their limited resources. As a consequence, most of the so-called 'traditional' theories of administration can be considered as relevant and valid to the understanding of the administrative systems of contemporary developing societies. No wonder that even the most recent commissions and committees on administrative reforms (e.g., the Administrative Reforms Commission of India) have primarily laid stress on the changes in structure of the administrative system and sub-system at different levels.

The Human Relations Movement of the 1940's and 1950's developed largely because of the wide shortage of labour. It had become necessary to devise new ways to increase the workers' productivity particularly with a view to meeting the growing demands of goals and services during and after World War II. The Human Relationists, like the Classicalists, assumed that the organizational objectives were "given" in the form of broader policies and, therefore,

the emphasis even in this school was on the means to achieve organizational goals. The 'human' element in administration was considered to be an additional variable that influenced thel evel of productivity of an organization.

Is it not interesting to note that in the contemporary developing societies where one rarely finds a shortage of labour, the relevance of the Human Relations approach appears to be less striking. However, with regard to the skilled labour and specialists, which are scarce in developing countries, the Human Relations approach becomes relatively more pertinent.

During the late 1930's and mid-1940's, with the introduction of 'decisional' elements in the conceptual constructs of Chester Barnard, Edwin Stene, and Herbert Simon, the process of goal-setting was recognized as problematic. Yet, even in these explanations, the study of goals was not clearly related to the external environmental structure of the organization. Thus, the pre-Barnard American Administrative theory responded to the management-oriented environment in which it developed, and it did not explore extensively the interaction between the administrative system and its social environment, for this seemed unnecessary. The emphasis, once again, was on the 'structure' of the administrative system, for it was assumed that planned change in organizational structure could lead to an increased capacity for more effective decision-making. Further, the organizational structure was seen as the most immediate and potent influence on the human behaviour in an administrative setting.

A battery of management techniques and tools of qualification, developed in the last two decades or so, have helped make public policies and decisions in certain specific sectors more 'rational' but still a very big area of the governmental decisional system remains influenced by 'values', 'intended rationality' and the 'satisficing' attitude of the decision-makers. A host of external environmental factors—political, social and cultural—impedes the free play of rationality in the public decisional system. It is no wonder, therefore, that one finds the coexistence of administrative models which are fact-oriented and those which are value-oriented: the behavioural and the post-behavioural movements testify to this complex state of administrative theory-building.

The problem-orientation and the instrumental perspective of contemporary theories of administration are reflected in the development of two similar foci, viz., New Public Administration and Development Administration—the latter having a chicken and egg

causative relationship with the phenomenon of Administrative Development. Concerned with the phenomenological approach, conceptually, and with a humanistic orientation, motivationally, the major thrust of the New Public Administration appears to be on enhancing the role and capacity of public administration to meet the challenges of, and to direct, social change. The notion of 'temporary society' with its concomitant focus on Organization Development, Organizational Change, etc., shares its basic concerns with New Public Administration as well as with Development Administration: All the three foci highlight the problems relating to administration-environment interaction and to socio-administrative change in this interactional context.

Interestingly, the growing significance of the interactional approaches (the ecological, systems, and structural-functional approaches, to name a few) has further underscored the importance of internal environmental context of administrative systems. Organization theorists, and more particularly the sociologists and social psychologists, have continued their search for strategic variables which influence the human behaviour in organizational context. This, in turn, has led to a phenomenal growth of concepts, models, theories and conclusions pertaining to leadership, motivation, role, communication, power, conflict, and other related integral components of an organizational situation. An incessant process of experimentation, testing and verification through a series of empirical studies in cross-institutional, cross-national and cross-cultural settings has produced rich data that help strengthen the scientific foundations of administrative theories. Unmistakably, the goal is not to arrive at a theory of administration, but to formulate a series and set of theories and models which can aid the process of better understanding of the complex administrative 'reality' in a variety of settings—institutional, national, cultural and temporal. Such a pragmatic approach is bound to lead to—in fact has already led to—a proliferation of concept, operations, methods of observation and measurements, assumptions and explanations. The contemporary 'poly-paradigmatic' state of administrative sciences represents perhaps the most stimulating phase of the growth of administrative thought. The present volume is only a specimen of the contemporary scholarship in the multi-disciplinary area of administrative sciences. Hopefully, the essays contained in the volume, will serve a heuristic purpose by promoting the cause of 'poly-paradigmatism' in the study of administration. Naturally, when the administrative reality is altogether complex, why should its explanations not be so?

1
Is POSDCORB Passe?

Edwin O. Stene

IN 1936 Luther Gulick wrote a paper designed to serve as background for the studies and report of President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management. The paper was published with other essays in *Papers on the Science of Administration*, edited by Gulick and Lyndall Urwick.[1] In that essay Gulick coined the term POSDCORB to symbolize the functions of the executive. The term represented the first letters of the words, Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Coordinating (first two letters), Reporting, and Budgeting. They signified the responsibility of the executive for planning the programmes to be administered, organizing for the effective execution of those plans, selecting and assigning necessary personnel, discussing directives necessary to carry out the work, seeing that specialized tasks and sub-agencies are coordinated into a coherent unity, receiving and issuing reports for the evaluation of the activities performed, and allocating available resources in order to assure efficient and effective performance.

Gulick went on to point out that to perform the tasks necessary to the fulfilment of these responsibilities the executive of any large organization must be provided with a staff, that members of this staff must be specialized along the lines indicated by the functions he enumerated. Thus we had the concept of an executive staff—the eyes, ears and arms of the chief executive.

The concept of POSDCORB has often been cited as the symbol of traditional or "classical" theory of public administration, and therefore has been subjected to criticism by exponents of more recent schools of thought, ranging from behavioural scientists and decision theorists to policy analysts and systems theorists. In fact an introductory disavowance and criticism of the policy-administration dichotomy and the concern for efficiency which supposedly characterized traditional theory is often considered necessary to legitimize a discourse on new ideas of administration.

CONTINUITY OF THE TRADITION

Yet the traditional guidelines remain central to the studies and recommendations of administrative organizations at all levels of government. In the United States of America the council-manager type of city government, strongly supported by the administrative reformers of the 1920s, continues to expand; recommendations of survey committees for the reorganization of state governments consistently follow the patterns advocated by President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management and by state commissions in the decade before that committee's report; and plans for improvement of the national administration display little that is new to the standards of organization. Recommendations of American technical advisers to developing nations followed the same guidelines; and although these plans met with relatively little success and were severely criticized by academic researchers in the field of comparative administration, no other administrative system can lay claim to greater success in promoting improved operations.

The persistence of traditional ideas of administration arises largely from the fact that attention was directed toward the organization of government—the central concern of the typical committee established to promote administrative reform. The more recent schools of organization theory tend to focus on the management of on-going organizations rather than on the creation or revision of organizational structures. Some of them have suffered from attempts to avoid value judgments; others have been concerned with the measurement and analysis of 'what is' rather than with improved performance; and still others tend to be overly theoretical and abstract. The benefits derived from these newer studies relate to the training of managers and the development of capacities for group decision making. They supplement the traditional ideas rather than supplanting them.

Gulick's notes and the other essays published in the same volume can justify a rating of the *Papers* as the beginning of new approaches to the study of public administration as well as the high point of the traditional structural orientation. Gulick noted the shortcomings of the idea of organization by function by pointing out that the primary consideration may be purpose, process, geography, clientele or material. Other papers by Mary Parker Follett, and by Elton Mayo and associates, emphasized the importance of considering human attitudes and resulting behaviours. Without doubt that publication stimulated many political scientists to look for new

approaches to the study of administration and to become more critical of earlier accepted propositions. However, the later critics often overlook the fact that theoretical generalization about social systems can be understood only in relation to the historical setting that brought about their development. This kind of evaluation can be applied not only to the traditional theory of the early twentieth century but to more recent schools of thought as well.[2]

GOVERNMENTAL REFORM MOVEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY

Traditional theory in America was the product of practical reform movements designed to overcome corruption and ineffective governmental systems that were glaringly obvious at the turn of the century. The deficiencies, in turn, became apparent because of the changing role of government in the direction of large scale services and regulations. It is significant, for example, that Woodrow Wilson's well known article[3] was published in the decade that saw the enactment of the United States civil service law and the creation of the Inter-State Commerce Commission to regulate railway services. City bosses and machines were becoming powerful and self-centred, and state governments organized for a strictly rural society were faced with the need to provide new and expanded services. The rapidly changing character of American society explains in large part the fact that literature on the subject of public administration was and still is overwhelmingly American in origin.

Early criticism of traditional theory also was largely practical in origin, although the leading spokesmen came from the field of business administration. The basic features of administrative structure advocated by government reformers had been well established in business corporations by 1920, and so the shortcomings of the system and the need for new approaches became more apparent to alert leaders and observers. The famous Hawthorne experiments of the late 1920s had their origin in an attempt to study the effects of lighting on work output, but soon brought to light the importance of informal aspects of organized behaviour and the limitations of command authority.[4] In the next two decades the rise of labour unions and the war-time shortage of manpower made it necessary for management to rely on willing cooperation rather than resort to threats of disciplinary action to maintain operating productivity. Thus developed the human relations school of management theory and a resulting decline in concern for formal structure. Academicians who had

turned to government service during World War II likewise saw the consideration of human behaviour as equal or greater in importance than formalized structures and procedures.[5]

After the War, academic researchers, especially in the fields of sociology and psychology, entered the field of research, and literary output on the general subject of organizational behaviour began a major expansion. The shift of leadership from experienced practitioners to academicians quite naturally resulted in a new emphasis on scientific methodology, which related variables in quantitative terms[6] and the construction of abstract 'models' as guides to research analysis.[7] In general the researches were conducted within the framework of traditional administrative structures, and emphasis was placed upon job satisfaction and management-employee relations.[8] Other researchers dealt with decision making processes, communications systems, and small group behaviours. At the same time a number of writers were developing rational classifications and new definitions to facilitate the explanation of behaviours observed. Also, just as the efficiency experts were reaping benefits from Taylorism in earlier times, consultants on organizational development, sensitivity training and transactional analysis sought to apply research findings and generalizations for the improvement of management techniques.

LIMITATIONS OF MODERN APPROACHES

Much has been learned from the behavioural science researches and new managerial techniques have been adopted by many organizations, both public and private. Yet the studies have exhibited fallacies as serious as and sometimes more serious than the fallacies of the strict policy-administration dichotomy and the over-emphasis on routine operating efficiency. New dichotomies have been expounded, such as the fact-value dichotomy[9] in decision making and McGregor's 'Theory X' and 'Theory Y' dichotomy of management styles.[10] Like other schools of thought, the behavioural scientists sometimes use definitions and selective categorizations as bases for reaching conclusions. More serious, however, is the tendency to assume that conclusions based upon evidence drawn from a limited range of variations are equally true of wider variations. Thus, a researcher might assume that findings drawn from a small group experiment are equally applicable to large organizations, or that if greater worker-satisfaction and greater productivity accompany a minor increase in participative decision making, the same trend will be applicable with further expansion of participation. Yet these

researches would be quick to recognize that if workers are more comfortable at 70° Fahrenheit than at 60°, we cannot conclude that they will be still more comfortable at 80°.

Behavioural science researches and related studies have made significant contributions to our understanding of organizations and administrative management, and certainly their methodologies need to be applied and refined. But these studies have disproved little that was expounded by the earlier traditional theorists, and one may question whether their contributions to an understanding of public administration have been as great.

POSDCORB AND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

More recent theoretical discourses have involved an emphasis on systems analysis and systems theory. The systems approach sought the broad perspective of whole systems in their ecological setting. This approach parallels the ecological approach to the study of comparative administration. Systems analysis emphasized the input, internal transactions, and output of organization, and controls through feedback and homeostasis. Thus systems theory encompassed and integrated much that had been developed by the traditional, the human relations, the behavioural and other related approaches.

In some ways systems theory revitalized much that was symbolized by POSDCORB. Productivity and efficiency were again brought into serious consideration through the relationships of input and output. Systems analysis called for the clarification of goals, the development of programmes and intermediate objectives designed to achieve organizational goals, and the establishment of feedback and control systems. The relationship of systems analysis to POSDCORB is suggested by the following parallel tables of 'functions' and elements of dynamic systems.

Table 1

Related Approaches

POSDCORB	*Systems Analysis and Procedures*
Planning	Enunciation and clarification of goals and objectives.
Organizing	Development of programmes and procedures to transform inputs into outputs.
Staffing	Provisions for competence of personnel and appropriate distribution of tasks.

Directing	Decision making and communication of decisions.
Coordi-nating	Unifying approach to combine a variety of operations into an integrated system.
Reporting	Feedback, both internal and from environment; also a symbolic output.
Budgeting	Allocation of available resources (support input) in relation to output (responses to demand input).

CONCLUSION

An examination of the above table suggests that POSDCORB is very much with us, not as a research tool but as a set of responsibilities of leaders in public organizations. These responsibilities are especially important in highly complex administrative systems with a multiplicity of goals that can often be in conflict with one another.

The fact that POSDCORB is still viable also serves as evidence that academicians as well as administrators may find it advisable to seek re-adaptation of established patterns and standards rather than hasten to cast them aside as being outmoded or irrelvant. Traditional standards remain today the most useful guidelines to the organization of governmental administrations. The human relations studies of the 1930s and 40s provide basic guidelines for administrators and supervisors in their leadership and direction of working personnel. Behavioural science is especially useful to the researcher and the training consultant. And systems analysis provides the integrated tools for the application of a variety of more specialized schools of thought.

Programmes of comparative public administration and administrative development likewise need to be based upon an integrated application of a variety of analytical and theoretical approaches. The concept of developmental administration, for example, becomes useful only when it is studied in terms of the essential features of development and the application of those features within the cultural setting of the nation concerned. Perhaps a combination of the POSDCORB philosophy and systems analysis will provide basic elements of a developmental approach. A few initial considerations should always be kept in mind.

First, while a clarification of goals is highly useful, and perhaps essential, it should be remembered that wherever there is a multiplicity of goals—as there is in any general government—there will be conflict among those goals, not only in their direct application

but also because of the inevitable competition for available resources. It is necessary, therefore, not only to enumerate goals, but also to decide upon priorities among them and to recognize conflicts that will arise. Priorities are never static. A constant review and re-ordering is necessary. Likewise, when conflicts arise among goals, policies must be flexible in order to adapt to changing priorities.

A second essential of development is the establishment of organizational structures and programmes needed for a high degree of programme attainment. Developing administrations are constantly in danger of institutional rigidity and stagnation that result in unproductive goal-displacement or even no-goal routinization. Perhaps the most important cause of non-development in administrative systems is the failure to build and maintain operating systems that are clearly and consciously directed toward the goals set forth in national plans and similar grand programmes of growth.

Leaders in developing nations would do well to become highly practical and goal-conscious in their studies of administrative organization, procedures and behaviours. In doing so they may find the traditional American standards symbolized by POSDCORB to be some of the most useful guidelines to research and consultative service available to them.

Notes and References

1. New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937.
2. This is what Ramesh K. Arora refers to as the "ecology of ideas." See his *Comparative Public Administration: An Ecological Perspective* (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1972).
3. "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, *II* (Jan. 1887), reprinted in *Political Science Quarterly*, LVI (Dec. 1941), 481-506.
4. For a survey of these researches, see, Fritz Roethlisberger and William Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939).
5. For some reflections on this point, see, Fritz Mortsein Marx ed., *The Elements of Public Administration* (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1946).
6. See, among others, Rensis Likert, *The Human Organization* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).
7. See, for instance, Herbert Simon and James March, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958).
8. Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957) provides example of such researches.
9. For a classical statement on this point, see, Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1947).
10. Refer, Douglas McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

2

Comparative Public Administration: What and Why?

Jon S.T. Quah

IN his pioneering article, "The Study of Administration," published in 1887, Woodrow Wilson stressed the need for comparative studies of administration.[1] In 1947, Robert A. Dahl, in his much-quoted essay, "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems," repeated Wilson's call for more research on comparative public administration (CPA).[2] Approximately, five years later, the first Conference on Comparative Administration was held at Princeton University in the United States in September, 1952 under the auspices of the Public Administration Clearing House. Nimrod Raphaeli has identified this conference as the starting point of the study of CPA in the United States since "systematic research and teaching methods in comparative public administration were first conceived" at this conference.[3] Since then, however, many conferences have been held on CPA especially those sponsored by the former Comparative Administration Group (CAG) of the American Society for Public Administration. Also a voluminous amount of research focussing on various aspects of CPA has been completed since World War II.[4]

The aim of this paper is not to provide a review of the literature on CPA as this has already been done by other scholars.[5] Rather, my purpose here is to pose two fundamental questions concerning the study of CPA in not only the United States and the "developed" countries but also in the new states of Asia and Africa. The first question focuses on the content of CPA and asks: "*What* is CPA?" In order to provide an adequate answer to this question, it is necessary to define CPA as well as delineate its major characteristics. The second question that logically follows from the first is the *Why* aspect of CPA, i.e., "*Why* do scholars need to compare in the study of public administration?" The answer to this question will identify the rationale or *raison d'etre* of CPA.

INTERRELATED QUESTIONS

These two questions are important ones to ask because it is essential for students of CPA to know what it is they are studying and why they are studying it. Apart from the content and rationale of CPA, beginning students of CPA should also be familiar with the various problems encountered as well as the different approaches in the field. However, this article focuses only on the *What* and *Why* of CPA because the other two aspects—approaches and problems—have already been dealt with elsewhere.[6] The answers to the two questions posed here will provide guidelines for those scholars engaged in research on CPA as well as those planning to embark on research projects in the same field with regard to the content and aim of CPA. In other words, a discussion of the *What* and *Why* aspects of CPA will help researchers in the field in the selection of their research problems and in the formulation of the aims of their research projects. This implies that scholars in CPA will have to ensure that the selection of their research topics and the objectives of their research will be consonant with the *What* and *Why* of CPA.

In short, the purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to identify the meaning and major features of CPA; and second, to explicate the *raison d'etre* of CPA. The following sections of the paper deal respectively with these two aspects of CPA.

WHAT IS COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION?

What does CPA mean? One way of answering this question is to begin by defining the two component terms "comparative" and "public administration" as Robert H. Jackson has done.[7] However, a more satisfactory method is to examine some of the definitions offered by scholars in the field in order to select the most useful definition for the purposes of this paper.

Not surprisingly, definitions of CPA abound but space limitations allow us to consider some of the more important ones that have been formulated. Before proceeding to discuss these definitions, it would be in order to specify the criteria for accepting a definition of CPA as the most useful one here. It should be noted here that the comparative study of administration has a dual focus: it can either focus on public or private organizations; and it can emphasize either inter-cultural or intra-cultural comparison. The definition of CPA to be adopted here should focus on public organizations rather than private ones, and should emphasize inter-cultural comparison rather than intra-cultural comparison.[8]

After reviewing the literature on CPA in some detail, Nimrod Raphaeli provided the following definition of CPA: "As is apparent, comparative public administration is a study of public administration on a comparative basis."[9] Apart from being tautological, this definition is vague and does not tell us anything about the meaning or content of CPA. Another definition is offered by Fred W. Riggs, who has restricted comparative studies in public administration to those studies that are empirical, nomothetic and ecological.[10] Riggs's definition is also not very useful, as it is too narrow and excludes from CPA quite a large number of normative and idiographic studies. A more satisfactory definition is that formulated by the former CAG, which referred to CPA as "the theory of public administration as applied to diverse cultures and national settings" and "the body of factual data, by which it can be expanded and tested."[11] However, this definition satisfies only one of the two criteria specified above: it emphasizes inter-cultural or cross-cultural comparison but is not explicit about its focus on public organizations.

If public administration is defined as a sub-field of the discipline of political science, then CPA is one of the four areas of specialization of the former, the other three areas being administrative theory, public personnel administration, and government budgeting.[12] In contrast to CPA, the other areas have not, until recently, focused on comparison and, accordingly, have been labelled "non-comparative U.S. culture" public administration by Keith M. Henderson.[13] More specifically, CPA can be defined as "that facet of the study of public administration which is concerned with making rigorous cross-cultural comparisons of the structures and processes involved in the activity of administering public affairs."[14] This definition of CPA by Robert H Jackson is adopted because it focuses on public organizations and not private ones, and it involves cross-cultural comparison rather than intra-cultural comparison.

POST-WAR EVOLUTION

Having defined CPA, my next task is to identify the major characteristics of CPA. It should be noted here that the following list of five main features of CPA is not an exhaustive one but is an attempt on my part to delineate the most important characteristics of the field.[15]

The first feature of CPA is its "youth". It is a relatively new field of study in the sense that it only emerged after World War II. In the words of Raphaeli, "comparative public administration is a newcomer to the community of academic instruction

and research."[16] As stated earlier, he has traced the origins of CPA to the 1952 Conference on Administration held at Princeton University. This means that CPA has just come of age, having attained its twenty-fifth year only recently.

Why did CPA emerge only after World War II? Four reasons can be adduced to explain the post-war rise of CPA. In the first place, CPA became important as an academic field of study soon after the "outbreak" of the so-called behavioural revolution in political science. Henderson has argued that "the intellectual roots of comparative public administration theory lie in American behavioural science," and he is correct for the behavioural revolution in political science has been the source of CPA's concern with developing rigorous methods for the scientific study of public administration.[17]

Related to the above point was the dissatisfaction on the part of scholars in the field with the parochial nature of traditional approaches to public administration. James Heaphey has referred to the "dissatisfaction with reliance upon American experience as the sole basis of an administrative science," while as we have seen earlier, Woodrow Wilson, writing in 1887, was the first American scholar to stress the need for more data on administration in other countries by using the comparative method.[18] Although Wilson's plea for more comparative research in public administration was reiterated some sixty years later by Robert Dahl, it should be noted that unlike Wilson, Dahl was more emphatic with regard to the parochial nature of traditional public administration research, and more explicit concerning the importance of comparison as a prerequisite for the development of a science of public administration.[19]

A third reason for the emergence of CPA after World War II was the mushrooming of new States in Africa, Asia and the Middle East during the same period. These countries, by and large, are underdeveloped in varying degrees in the social, economic and political spheres.[20] As such, their main goals are nation-building and socio-economic development. Given the infancy of these States it is not surprising that a great deal of research remains to be done if the existing fund of knowledge on such societies is to increase. The field of CPA is thus an attempt to intensify the collection of data on the nature of public administration in the developing countries.

The final reason for the birth of CPA after World War II was the post-war concern with technical assistance on the part of the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Nations.

Indeed, United States' technical assistance efforts in the new States reinforced the importance of CPA in that such efforts made Americans, especially those experts involved in these programmes, aware that administrative structures or principles applicable in the United States were not necessarily suitable in the developing countries. In this context, William J. Siffin has observed that "administrative experts became acutely aware of a need for something more than a homespun approach to public administration in consequence of their mandated efforts to teach, evaluate, and adjust public administration in foreign settings."[21] Moreover, research efforts in CPA at that time received a tremendous boost from the generous financial support provided by aid-giving agencies in the United States, such as the Agency for International Development and the Ford Foundation for example, which needed to know more about the recipient countries.

PRE-PARADIGMATIC STAGE

CPA's second feature is that it is, to use Thomas S. Kuhn's term, in a "pre-paradigmatic" stage, which is characterized by a diversity of approaches and the absence of a dominant model or paradigm. Kuhn's book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, is concerned with the development of the natural sciences. He argues that one of the hallmarks of science is the presence of a paradigm or a universally recognized scientific achievement which guides the research efforts of the entire scientific community. When a paradigm is no longer able to provide solutions to the problems facing the scientific community, it will be replaced by another that is capable of solving the problems that led its predecessor to a crisis. This process of replacement of an older paradigm by a new one is called a scientific revolution. The development of the natural sciences has been marked by the occurrence of several scientific revolutions, the most notable of which have been the scientific revolutions of Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier and Einstein.[22]

If Kuhn's analysis is applied to the development of the social sciences, it can be seen that the latter is still in a pre-paradigmatic stage. CPA, like its parent discipline, political science, is in the same boat and does not have any paradigm yet. As such, there exists a plethora of competing approaches in the field. These approaches have been classified by Fred W. Riggs in 1962 as normative, empirical, nomothetic, idiographic, non-ecological and ecological approaches.[23]

EMPIRICAL, NOMOTHETIC AND ECOLOGICAL EMPHASIS

Third, CPA, according to Riggs, is characterized by the following three trends: (a) a shift from normative to empirical approaches; (b) within the empirical category, there has been a change in emphasis from idiographic to nomothetic studies; and (c) a shift in focus from non-ecological to ecological approaches. In 1962, when Riggs first described these trends, he noted that the trend was fairly clear, but not the second and third trends which were only beginning to develop.[24] The second and third trends have since then become more dominant in CPA as can be seen in the emphasis given to nomothetic and ecological approaches in the field. However, this does not mean that normative concerns (which were neglected as a result of the first trend) are not important in CPA anymore. Indeed, it can be argued that there has been a resurgence of normative concerns in public administration in general and CPA in particular especially with the emergence of the "new public administration" movement which arose from the post-behavioural revolution in political science.[25] In short, the field of CPA today is not only dominated by nomothetic and ecological approaches but is also witnessing a resurrection of its traditional normative concerns by some of the younger scholars.

THE AMERICAN SCHOLARSHIP

Fourth, the field of CPA has been dominated until recently by American scholars on public administration in general and members of the CAG in particular. Lynton K. Caldwell has pointed out the necessity for distinguishing between the CPA enterprise or movement and the study of CPA. The CPA enterprise consists of those political scientists and students of public administration who have contributed to the movement for CPA in United States universities from 1952 onwards. The CAG, according to Caldwell, is the formal expression of the CPA movement and its leadership.[26] The origins of the CAG "can be traced to the concern of a group of teachers and practitioners . . . who feared that academic public administration was lagging behind the social sciences and was losing touch with emergent problems in public affairs."[27] With the financial assistance of the Ford Foundation, the CAG was created with the threefold purpose of increasing the volume of research, improving teaching materials and methods, and stimulating the formulation and implementation of more effective public policies in the field of development administration.

Ever since its inception, the CAG has been especially concerned with the various administrative problems encountered by the new

states, and the different strategies or non-strategies employed by them to solve these problems given the constraints imposed by the ecological factors. The CAG made a tremendous contribution to the study of public administration in general and CPA in particular through the sponsorship of research seminars and conferences, and its prodigious output of publications, which included a newsletter, seminar reports, teaching materials, occasional papers and the various volumes in the CAG Series published by Duke University Press.[28] The CAG no longer exists as it has been superseded by the Section on International and Comparative Administration (SICA) of the American Society for Public Administration, which is now responsible for publishing the *SICA Newsletter*.[29]

One unfortunate and perhaps also unexpected consequence of the American dominance in the field of CPA has been conscious or unconscious employment by American scholars of their own American values and standards as the criteria for evolution and as the basis for making recommendations in their research studies on public administration in the new states. However, as a result of United States' technical assistance programmes in the form of the establishment of institutes of public administration and the training of foreign nationals in American universities, the efforts of the CAG in the past and the SICA at present in promoting or increasing knowledge on CPA have been increasingly supplemented by those of the local scholars, who are busily engaged in research on various aspects of public administration in their own countries.[30]

Moreover, the formation of the South-East Asian Development Administration Group (SEADAG) by the Asia Society of New York, the establishment of the Asian Centre for Development Administration (ACDA) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, by the member governments of the ESCAP countries and the United Nations; and the formation of the Latin American Development Administration Committee (LADAC) by the former CAG, have provided scholars from these regions with further avenues of cooperating among themselves or with other scholars in joint research projects designed to improve both the quality and quantity of public administration research in the developing countries.

CONCERN FOR THEORY BUILDING

The fifth and final feature of CPA is its emphasis on two primary "motivational concerns": theory-building and development administration.[31] This concern for theory[32] has been recognized by most

scholars in the field, especially by Heady, Heaphey and Raphaeli for example.[33] Heaphey describes this feature as "academic analysis" in which administrative behaviour is symbiotically related with theory. By this he means that although "theory is established independently from the *reality* of administrative behaviour," it nevertheless relies on the latter for its survival.[34]

Why is there such an undue emphasis on theory-building in CPA? Firstly, theories or models perform a very important function in the development of a new field of inquiry by organizing the data collected by various scholars into some form of framework. Moreover, the prohibitive cost of field work and the shortage of research funds, especially in recent years, have compelled researchers to eschew empirical research and to concentrate instead on model-building. In other words, there is a great deal of emphasis on theory-building in CPA mainly because it is cheap and offers "a tempting substitute for the tedious and time-consuming work of empirical research."[35]

Theory-building efforts in CPA have so far concentrated on two types of theories: general and middle-range theories. Examples of general theories are Fred W. Riggs's macro-models of Agraria and Industria, and his theory of prismatic society.[36] John T. Dorsey's information-energy model, which is based on equilibrium theory, is another general theory that has been applied by him to analyze political development in Vietnam.[37] The best example of a middle-range theory in CPA is Max Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy, which has been critically reviewed by Alfred Diamant, and tested in Egypt by Morroe Berger and in Turkey by Robert Presthus.[38]

In recent years, there has been a shift in emphasis from general theories to middle-range theories in CPA. The reason for this change is that general theories, such as Riggs's prismatic model for example, are unduly comprehensive, all-inclusive and abstract. To be empirically useful, macro-models such as Riggs's models of Agraria and Industria must be reduced in both time and space. In this context, Presthus has urged the use of "middle-range theory" in the study of "smaller chunks of reality" because such theory is concerned with the explanation of "a restricted set of relationships" and not with the entire social system.[39] In the same vein, Subramaniam has called for the employment of middle-range models in CPA because they provide "an immediately useful framework for actual comparisons."[40] Unlike Riggs's macro-models, the small number of variables considered by the middle-range model does not deter a researcher from field work. Indeed, a scholar's task has been made more

manageable given the reduced number of variables to be considered by him; and he can also conduct empirical research to ascertain the relationships among the selected variables.[41]

FOCUS ON DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

The focus on the second primary motivational concern—development administration—is closely connected with the post-war emergence of CPA. The creation of new States in Asia and Africa and their concomitant entry into the world concert of nations as underdeveloped or developing countries have engendered an unprecedented focus on development in these areas on the part of the more advanced or developed nations. Many reasons have been given for this concern for the new States, but the most important one seems to be the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for the diplomatic support of these new States, since each of these States has one vote in the United Nations General Assembly.[42] Both the Americans and Russians have cultivated support for their respective foreign policies in the United Nations by, *inter alia*, dispensing technical assistance to willing recipient countries.

Technical assistance programmes in public administration, especially those sponsored by the United States, have contributed among other things to the development of institutes of public administration in several South-East Asian countries. But, perhaps the most significant consequence of such programmes has been the increased attention to development administration as a new problem area and focus for research.[43] Indeed, according to a Special Committee of the CAG, development administration:

"emerged, as practitioners and scholars working overseas increasingly recognized the inadequacy of existing knowledge, theories and techniques, for coping with the administrative difficulties encountered in underdeveloped countries, especially in technical assistance, national planning, and programme-oriented developmental activities."[44]

As in the case of CPA, the emphasis on development administration was further reinforced by other factors. In the first place, the scarcity of research studies in the new States as well as the attraction such countries have had for Western scholars contributed in large measure to the focus on development administration. Secondly, donor countries like the United States wanted to know more about those countries requesting technical assistance from them. Finally,

the provision of travel and research grants by such organizations as the Ford Foundation and the Agency for International Development enabled scholars to contribute toward the attainment of the above objectives of reducing the research gap and increasing data bank in the developing countries.

Development administration is a concept that conveys a number of meanings in many different contexts. As this paper is concerned with CPA and not with development administration *per se*, it is not necessary to consider the various meanings of the latter term. Suffice it to say that development administration, as used in this paper, refers to "the administration of developmental programmes designed to promote nation-building and socio-economic development and the concomitant development of administrative practices and institutions necessary for the implementation of such programmes."[45]

Earlier, development administration was identified as one of the two primary motivational concerns of CPA. This implies that there is a close relationship and much overlapping between development administration and CPA, as indeed there is; but the statement ignores the possibility of development administration being an independent and competing orientation with CPA. To be sure, such a possibility threatens the very survival of CPA as a field of study as it can only survive if it is not dominated by development administration. This dilemma of CPA has been noted by Lynton K. Caldwell more than a decade ago:

"If it [CPA] concentrates its focus on development administration to the exclusion of all else, its purview will in fact cease to be comparative public administration. It will have transformed itself into a development administration effort in which the use of comparative methods would be secondary to a substantive objective—to understand the development process."[46]

In other words, development administration is just one facet, albeit an important facet, of the study of CPA and should be seen as such. Its importance should not be exaggerated nor underestimated.

Having identified and described the five major features of CPA in the preceding paragraphs, it only remains for me to deal with the second question posed in this paper: Why do scholars need to compare when studying public administration?

WHY COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION?

Perhaps the best way to answer the above question is to review the relevant literature on public administration in order to see what various scholars have said regarding this aspect. More specifically,

the reasons given by five public administration scholars, viz., Wilson, Dahl, Tickner, Heady and Raphaeli, for undertaking comparison in the study of public administration will be considered first. All these reasons will then be classified into two categories in order to provide a complete discussion of the *raison d'etre* of CPA.

It is perhaps in order to begin with Woodrow Wilson's seminal essay, "The Study of Administration," because the latter marks the symbolic beginning of the study of public administration in the United States.[47] A more important reason is that Wilson was the first scholar in the United States to emphasize the need for more data on administration in other countries by using the comparative method. He gave two reasons for undertaking such comparative studies: (1) to see whether administrative practices in the United States were relevant or applicable to other countries; and (2) to see whether any foreign administrative institutions or practices could be transplanted to the United States. This second aim was possible because the politics-administration dichotomy made the comparative method "so safe in the field of administration." Wilson argued thus:

"When we study the administrative systems of France and Germany, knowing that we are not in search of *political* principles, we need not care a peppercorn for the constitutional or political reasons which Frenchmen or Germans give for their practices when explaining them to us. If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it. . . . We can thus scrutinize the anatomy of foreign governments without fear of getting any of their diseases into our veins; dissect alien systems without apprehension of blood-poisoning."[48]

In short, Wilson's argument for introducing the comparative method in the study of public administration is more practical than theoretical in orientation: He wanted to know more about administration in other countries in order to assess the feasibility of administrative reform in these countries on the basis of the United States' experience and vice versa.

Unlike Wilson, Robert A. Dahl's concern with the need for comparison in the study of public administration constituted part of his argument that the development of a science of public administration was hindered by the existence of three major problems. According to Dahl:

"We are a long way from a science of public administration. No science of public administration is possible unless: (1) the place of normative values is made clear; (2) the nature of man in the area

of public administration is better understood and his conduct is more predictable; and (3) there is a body of comparative studies from which it may be possible to discover principles and generalities that transcend national boundaries and peculiar historical experiences."[49]

From the above quotation, it can be seen that Dahl's third requirement is the most relevant for the purposes of this paper. In other words, Dahl's argument is that comparison is a requirement for the development of a science of public administration.

A SYNTHESIS OF THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONCERNS

Needless to say, the reasons for comparison in the public administration depend to a large extent on those undertaking such comparative research. Their reasons for conducting comparative studies in public administration could be theoretical or practical in nature or a combination of both. This point was implied by F. J. Tickner when he identified the various objectives for initiating comparative research on public administration by different groups of individuals:

"The student may wish to draw comparisons in order to propose modifications or improvements in the administration of his own country; he may wish to enlarge his general thinking or academic experience. There are also practising administrators who wish to make comparisons to broaden their general approach to professional problems. Besides administrators with this broad interest, there are specialists who wish to see how their particular function of government operates in the administration of other countries. Finally, there is a growing body of experts appointed to technical aid programmes who need comparative information as a basis for the specialist advice which they will give during their assignments abroad."[50]

The list of reasons for undertaking comparative research in public administration provided by the two remaining scholars—Heady and Raphaeli—reflects a combination of both theoretical and practical concerns. In the first chapter of his book, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective*, Ferrel Heady advanced three reasons for comparison in the study of public administration. First, following Dahl, he recognized CPA as an important prerequisite for the development of a science of public administration. Secondly, comparison in the study of public administration would help to promote international cooperation as a result of the increase in knowledge and understanding of the various administrative systems in the world. Finally, CPA provided the necessary data for policy-makers in a country to consider the feasibility of adopting or adapting

certain administrative devices used in foreign countries for their own country.[51]

In his 1967 overview of CPA, Nimrod Raphaeli observed that CPA was saddled with the twin questions of purpose and methodology. His response to the first question—"Why do we need to compare?"—was as follows:

"We compare to learn the distinctive characteristics of a particular administrative system or cluster of systems: to find out what makes certain administrative features work well in one country or era while they fail dismally in another, to identify the factors—cultural, political and social—that are involved in success or failure; to explain differences in behaviour of bureaucrats and bureaucracies in different countries and cultures; and, finally, to discern what changes, if any, ought to be introduced and how they can be introduced, to improve the performance of a bureaucracy. Above all, we compare to arrive at a conceptual knowledge rather than a knowledge of details."[52]

The above review of the literature on the reasons given by five scholars for undertaking comparative research in the study of public administration can best be summarized by classifying the various reasons in terms of two categories:

1. Comparison as a prerequisite for the development of a science of public administration. This reason has been mentioned quite explicitly by Dahl and Heady and implicitly by Raphaeli. Comparative studies on public administration in various countries are superior to case studies because, unlike the latter, the former deal with more than one case. Moreover, comparison helps to facilitate explanation in the study of public administration as it enables scholars to identify the factors responsible for the success or failure of administration in a country; and also to account for the differences in bureaucratic behaviour and bureaucracies in different countries (Raphaeli).

2. Comparison for more practical reasons:

(a) to help students, practising administrators, specialists and technical assistance experts know and understand more about public administration in other countries (Tickner, Heady and Raphaeli).

(b) to consider the possibility of administrative reform in the form of transplantation of certain administrative institutions and/or practices from other countries (Wilson, Heady, Tickner and Raphaeli).

CONCLUSION

This paper has dealt at length with two aspects of CPA—its meaning and its *raison d'etre*—in the preceding paragraphs. The

answer to the question: "What is CPA?" can be given in two parts. First, CPA is one of the most recent areas of specialization in the study of administration that is concerned with comparing the various structures and processes involved in the activity of administering public affairs in different countries. Second, CPA is characterized by several features. As a relatively new field of inquiry, it is not surprising that CPA is still in a pre-paradigmatic stage of development. The traditional focus on normative concerns in CPA has been revived recently to rectify the neglect of values by the nomothetic and ecological approaches. As a result of its emphasis on theory-building and development administration, CPA has been dominated until recently by American scholars. Fortunately, the state of affairs has been rectified somewhat by the emergence of local scholars in the new states with the requisite training to conduct relevant research on public administration in their countries. The answer to the second question: "Why CPA?" is less elaborate and can be stated briefly as follows: scholars and other interested individuals undertake comparative research in their study of public administration for both theoretical and practical reasons.

Notes and References

1. Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," in *Public Administration and Policy*, ed. Peter Woll (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1966), pp. 15-41. This famous article was first published in *Political Science Quarterly*, II (June 1887), 197-222.
2. Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems," *Public Administration Review*, VII (1947), 1-11.
3. Nimrod Raphaeli, "Comparative Public Administration: An Overview," in *Readings in Comparative Public Administration*, ed. Nimrod Raphaeli (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), pp. 1-2.
4. See, for example, William J. Siffin, ed., *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Bloomington, Indiana: Department of Government, Indiana University, 1957); Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes, eds., *Papers in Comparative Public Administration* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962); and Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).
5. Prominent examples are: Raphaeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-25; Keith M. Henderson, "A New Comparative Public Administration?" in *Toward a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspectives* ed., Frank Marini (Scranton: Chandler, 1971), pp. 234-50; Ramesh K. Arora, *Comparative Public Administration: An Ecological Perspective* (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1972); Keith M. Henderson, "New Directions in Comparative Public Administration," *SICA Newsletter*, XII (March 1975), 7-11; and Jamil E. Jreisat, "Synthesis and Relevance in Comparative Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, XXXV (Nov./Dec. 1975), 663-71.
6. For articles dealing with the various approaches in CPA, see Fred W. Riggs, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, XXVIII (1962), 9-15; and Robert H. Jackson, "An Analysis of the Comparative Public Administration Movement," *Canadian Public Administration*, IX (March 1966), 108-30. Unfortunately, there is no article or book which deals specifically with the

methodological problems encountered in the study of CPA, but Robert E. Mitchell's monograph, *Survey Materials Collected in the Developing Countries: Obstacles to Comparison* (Berkeley: Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, Publication No. SRCA 55, n.d.) serves as a useful general introduction to the various methodological problems encountered in undertaking comparative research in the developing countries. Another general article that should be consulted is Gideon Sjoberg, "The Comparative Method in the Social Sciences," *Philosophy of Science*, XXII (1955), 106-17.

7. Jackson, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.
8. For a contrary view, see James D. Thompson, *et al.*, *Comparative Studies in Administration* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), p. 9.
9. Raphaeli, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
10. Riggs, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration," p. 12.
11. Quoted in Ferrel Heady, "Comparative Public Administration: Concerns and Priorities," in Heady and Stokes, eds., *op. cit.*, p. 4.
12. Political science is defined as the academic study of politics and can be divided into six subfields: political theory, public law and judicial behaviour, comparative government and politics, political processes and behaviour, public administration and organization behaviour and international relations. See Michael Hass and Henry S. Kariel, eds., *Approaches to the Study of Political Science* (Scranton: Chandler, 1970), pp. 8-13. Public administration can also be defined as the process or activity of administering public affairs. See Dwight Waldo, *The Study of Public Administration* (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 3.
13. Henderson, "A New Comparative Public Administration?" p. 236.
14. Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
15. For another discussion of the features of CPA, see James Heaphey, "Comparative Public Administration: Comments on Current Characteristics," *Public Administration Review*, XXVIII (May/June 1968), 242-49.
16. Raphaeli, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
17. Henderson, "A New Comparative Public Administration?" p. 238. 18. Wilson, *op. cit.* 19. Dahl, *op. cit.*
20. For more details about such countries, see Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas*

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Colin Leys, ed., *Politics and Change in Developing Countries* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

21. William J. Siffin, "Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration," in Siffin, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 6.
22. See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). For a critical evalution of the relevance of Kuhn's ideas to political science, see Jerone Stephens, "The Kuhnian Paradigm and Political Inquiry: An Appraisal," *American Journal of Political Science*, XVII (August, 1973), 467-88.
23. Riggs, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration," pp. 9-15. 24. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
25. See the various papers in Marini, ed., *op. cit.*
26. Lynton K. Caldwell, "Conjectures on Comparative Public Administration," in *Public Administration and Democracy: Essays in Honor of Paul H. Appleby*, ed. Roscoe C. Martin (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), pp. 230-31.
27. Milton J. Esman, "CAG and the Study of Public Administration," in *Frontiers of Development Administration*, ed. Fred W. Riggs (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971), p. 43.
28. A list of the titles in the CAG Series published by the Duke University Press can be found in Riggs, ed., *Frontiers of Development Administration*, pp. vii-viii.
29. At present SICA has over 200 members and its newsletter is edited by Professor Morton Kroll of the University of Washington, Seattle, USA.
30. See, for example, Hahn-Been Lee and Abelardo G. Samonte, eds., *Administrative Reforms in Asia* (Manila: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1970); Muneer Ahmed, *The Civil Servant in Pakistan: A Study of the Background and Attitudes of Public Servants in Lahore* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1964); K. Ankomah, "Reflections on Administrative Reform in Ghana," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, XXXVI (1970), 299-303; A.L. Adu, *The Civil Service in the New African States* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965); C.N. Bhalerao, *Public Service Commission in India: A Study* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1966); Sondang P. Siagian, "The Development and Problems of Indigenous Bureaucratic Leadership in Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1965) cited in Elyas bin Omar, "National Institute of Public Administration, Malaysia," in *Management Training for Deve-*

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31. Raphaeli, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
32. Strictly, a theory refers to "an intellectual construction that relates general statements and thus explains them." See Eugene J. Meehan, *The Theory and Method of Political Analysis* (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1965), p. 150. As such, a theory should not be equated with a model, which is an aid to understanding and may contribute only indirectly to explanation. However, for the present discussion, I will follow Simon and Newell, and use the two terms synonymously. See Herbert A. Simon and Allen Newell, "Models: Their Uses and Limitations," in *The State of the Social Sciences*, ed., Leonard D. White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 66.
33. Heady, "Comparative Public Administration. . .," p. 4; Heaphey, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-48; and Raphaeli, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
34. Heaphey, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-43.
35. Caldwell, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
36. Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in Siffin, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 23-101; and his *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964).
37. John T. Dorsey, "An Information-Energy Model," in Heady and Stokes, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 37-57; and his "The Bureaucracy and Political Development in Viet Nam," in *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, ed., Joseph La Palombara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 318-59.
38. See Morroe Berger, *Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt* (Princeton: "Princeton University Press, 1957); Rovert V. Pretshus, Weberian v. Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Society," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, VI (1961), 1-24; and

Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," in Heady and Stokes, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 59-96.

39. Robert V. Presthus, "Behaviour and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," *Public Administration Review*, XIX (Winter, 1959), 26.
40. V. Subramaniam, "Middle Range Models in Comparative Administrative Studies," *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, X (Oct.-Dec., 1964), 628.
41. For a more detailed discussion, see Jon S.T. Quah, "The Uses of Deductive Models in the Comparative Study of Public Administration—Some Limitations," *Chinese Journal of Administration*, XV(July 1970), 5-15.
42. S.E. Finer, "Development: The Political Climate," in *Development: The Western View*, ed., C.A.O. Van Nieuwenhuijze (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), p. 230.
43. See Edward W. Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research," in Heady and Stokes, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 97-115; and his edited Volume, *Development Administration in Asia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1970).
44. "Development Administration," Report by a Special Committee, CAG Occasional Paper (Bloomington: International Development Research Center, Indiana University, 1964), p. 6.
45. For a review of the various meanings of development administration and the reason for adopting this particular definition, see Quah, "Administrative Reform and Development Administration in Singapore," pp. 378-89.
46. Caldwell, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
47. For a recent review of Wilson's essay, see Richard J. Stillman, II, "Woodrow Wilson and the Study of Administration: A New Look at an Old Essay," *American Political Science Review*, LXVII (June, 1973), 582-88.
48. Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.
49. Dahl, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
50. F.J. Tickner, "A Survey and Evaluation of Comparative Research," *Public Administration Review*, XIX (Winter 1959), 19.
51. Heady, *Public Administration*, pp. 3-4.
52. Raphaeli, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

3

Comparative Public Administration: Towards an Ecological-Developmental Orientation

Ramesh K. Arora

IT is well recognized today that a cross-cultural analysis of public administration should be ecological in character, i.e., it should focus upon the interactions between an administrative system and its external environment, and also study the dynamics of socio-administrative change in the context of such interactions. Further, authors in the field of public administration, as in any other policy science, should be seen as responding to problems which they have perceived in the environmental context of their studies. Thus the emergence of an ecological focus should be related to their perception of a new set of problems in their field. In other words, while evaluating the contribution of different phases in the development of administrative thought, one should consider the environment in which particular ideas developed as a most significant variable. Thus, a historian of comparative public administration must be concerned with what might be called the "ecology of ideas," as well as with the emerging interest in the ecology of administration.

The nature of the environment with which public administration thinkers deal *and in which* they work influences the manner in which they conceptualize their observations. This also appears to be true of comparative public administration.

COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MOVEMENT

Comparative public administration is currently devoted to the task of building ecological and developmental models useful for cross-cultural analysis. In this regard, the field is designed to transcend the limitations of American administrative theory and of Weberian analysis.

The comparative public administration movement emerged in an environment which included such factors as the spread of American occupational administration during and after World War

II, the emergence of a host of developing countries, the extension of technical assistance to these countries, the involvement of academicians in the administration of this assistance, and rapid growth of behavioural sciences in general and comparative politics in particular. Because of the interest of Ford Foundation—the institution which financed the CAG for about a decade—in the problems of the developing countries, and the resultant involvement of scholars in the administrative systems of such countries, a geographical division of labour has emerged between the American public administration and comparative public administration, the latter being interested primarily in the continents of Africa, Latin America, and particularly Asia. This interest in the study of societies with highly differing cultures has stimulated new thinking in the field. Scholars in comparative public administration, led by Riggs, have been in search of new concepts to explain the dynamic and developmental aspects of administrative systems seen from a cross-cultural perspective. These scholars are striving to build truly ecological constructs, i.e., those capable of explaining the impact of environment on the administrative system, and *vice versa*.[1]

ECOLOGICAL V. ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVES

However, such efforts to construct models containing elements of reciprocity have not had entirely satisfactory results to date. For example, the dominant concern of Riggs's prismatic model has apparently been with the impact of social environment on the administrative system. In his analysis the treatment of bureaucracy's influence on the environment has been relatively weak, and he has not been able to develop a truly balanced interactional analysis. This is despite his criticism of scholars who treat the word "ecology" as a synonym for "environment" and reinforce the view that administrative institutions can best be studied as dependent variables.[2] The methodological problem probably lies in the difficulty of empirically studying the influences of administration on other social institutions. On the other hand, writers on development administration have often considered administrative system as an independent variable and treated developmental goals as dependent variables.[3] Such single factor modes of analysis could fall short of the ideals of an ecological approach, for, once again, the analysis would not be truly interactional as the reciprocal influences of the environments upon administration would be neglected.

Moreover, in the literature on development administration, writers have not discussed extensively the way an administrative

system may affect the developmental process in society. Some attention, however, has been given to the problem of administrative reform, particularly its institutional aspects. It is clear that comparative administrative analysis requires dynamic models of change. Such models should contain a two-fold perspective, one which encompasses an analysis of the internal conditions that affect administrative innovation, and the ecological conditions which favour or frustrate such innovation. Such analysis must envision modal developmental sequences within diverse contexts. In a related area, the normative concern with a balance between the bureaucracy and the broader political system[4]—a continuation of the Weberian tradition—must give way to constructs which are not biased against rapid social change stimulated primarily either by the bureaucracy or by the political leadership.

CHALLENGE OF MODERNIZATION

As far as the ecology of the contemporary scholarship in comparative public administration is concerned, the most significant variables seem to be associated with the complexities of modernization and diversity, which in turn are concerned with the dynamics of social change. These complexities involve the following fundamental questions:

1. What does modernization centrally involve?
2. How do societies differ in regard to the process of modernization?
3. Are there different processes of modernization?
4. How diverse are cultures which are compatible with the concept of modernity?

Administration, and particularly public administration, is intimately involved in the entire process of modernization. Thus, the above questions are of greatest concern to the students of comparative public administration. Only by treating public administration with reference to all the four dimensions suggested (ecological, goal-orientation, developmental, and cross-cultural comparability) can all of the above questions be delat with. In other words, conceptual constructs in comparative public administration should have the following elements in order to respond to the challenges of modernization:

1. cross-cultural comparability: allowing broad comparisons among administrative systems in Western as well as different non-Western settings;

2. developmental dimensions: giving comparison a broad linkage with the question of modernization;

3. ecological perspective—studying the interactions between the administrative systems and their environment: an ecological perspective would suggest diverse developmental models rooted in particular sets of somewhat similar systems, and standing between discrete non-comparative approaches and those seeking universal comparative categories;

4. goal-orientation: stressing unique goals of particular cultures in relation to their administrative systems.

Incorporation of these elements in the conceptual constructs in comparative public administration would permit analyses of "comparable" as well as diverse administrative systems from the ecological-developmental and goal-orientation angles. In brief, then, the elements of ecology, development, goal-orientation, and cross-cultural comparability have to be tied together in comparative administrative analysis, as any one element stripped of others may prove to be less than meaningful.

STRENGTHENING "NOMOTHETIC" ELEMENTS

Presently, comparative administrative analysis has developed, for the most part, on the macro and "middle range" levels. A collection of broad generalizations and hypotheses is developing, while the empirical testing of these propositions is being left for the future. Thus, in the area of empirical analysis, comparative public administration is far behind American public administration. Nevertheless, in some other areas the comparative theory can contribute to the American administrative theory, for example, by way of providing certain propositions like those dealing with prismatic elements in a diffracted society and with positive formalism. Likewise, comparative public administration can use the rich collection of propositions developed in recent years by American administrative theory and test the extent to which such propositions are culture bound. With the growth of large scale complex organizations in developing nations, it may be expected that in the future even the early American administrative theory could serve a heuristic purpose by suggesting certain propositions on the internal organizational operations in comparative context. The notions of economy and efficiency could be of great relevance to the emergent nations, which, out of necessity, are dedicated to the modernization tasks needing maximum results with severely limited resources. Similar relevance could hold true for writings on human relations.

NEW FRONTIERS

As we move along in the late 1970's, "New" public administration is gaining favour among scholars.[5] Concerned with phenomenological approach, conceptually, and with humanistic orientation, motivationally, the major thrust of the "New" public administration appears to be on enhancing the roles and capacity of public administration to meet the challenges of, and to direct, social change. In addition, there is another new focus in organization theory. Students of "temporary society," such as Warren Bennis and Philip Slater, are talking of certain desirable changes in organizational structure and internal environment in response to the challenges of the changing social environment.[6] Both of these foci—"New" public administration and of "temporary society"—are concerned with the problems relating to administration-environment interaction, and to socio-administrative change in this interactional context. In other words, both possess an ecological-developmental orientation, though with differing emphases. It appears, therefore, that comparative public administration and the contemporary American administrative theory share some common major concerns. In the foreseeable future, comparative public administration is likely to strengthen its own identity, although, eventually, a desirable course would be a gradual convergence of American public administration and its comparative counterpart.

Notes and References

1. Riggs has observed that "truly" comparative administrative studies have necessarily to be ecological in character. See his, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, XXVIII (1962), pp. 9-15.
2. See Riggs, "The Idea of Development Administration," in Edward Weidner, ed., *Development Administration in Asia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), p. 29.
3. See, for example, Weidner, "The Elements of Development Administration," in Weidner, *Ibid.*, p. 24.
4. For an illustration of this approach, see Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, I (1969), pp. 5-38.
5. For a variety of themes in this area, see Frank Marini, ed., *Toward a New Public Administration* (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971), and Dwight Waldo (ed.), *Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence* (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1971).
6. For ideas of Warren Bennis on the inevitable demise of bureaucracy, see his, *Beyond Bureaucracy: Essays on the Development and Evolution of Human Organization* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973).

   For further support to Bennis's theory and the impending rise of "ad-hocracy," see Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1970), pp. 119-43.

4

Bureaucracy and the Political System: The Weberian Perspective

Ramesh K. Arora

CONTEMPORARY scholarship in comparative public administration has assigned considerable importance to the exploration and analysis of the underlying factors that determine the relationship between the public bureaucracy and the political system of which it is a part. A major reason for this emphasis appears to be the fact that despite being only one among the subsystems of the political system, bureaucracy, quite often, through its own mechanism or that of its external environment, becomes autonomous and powerful to such an extent that it seems to override all other subsystems of the polity. On the other hand, by "aligning" itself with other subsystems of the polity, it can cause the creation of something like a formidable monopolistic politico-administrative system which, in turn, can threaten the autonomy of the rest of the society.

Although certain crucial issues pertaining to the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political system were discussed even by the early political and administrative thinkers, it should be underscored that most of the contemporary scholars in comparative administrative analysis, including Fred Riggs, appear to have been greatly influenced by the writings of Max Weber. It is in this context that this short paper is designed to examine some of the basic premises of Weber's analysis on the theme of bureaucracy's interaction with the political system.

It may be stressed that the analytical distinction made in the following analysis between the bureaucracy and the political system should not be taken to imply that bureaucracy is being considered "outside" the political system. Thus, in general, the relationship discussed will be that between the administrative system and other components of the political system.

NEUTRAL COMPETENCE

According to Max Weber, the scope of the respective functions of the politicians and the bureaucrats should be well defined. While

politicians were expected to concentrate on electoral and legislative functions, bureaucrats should devote themselves to administrative tasks, i.e., to the implementation of public policies determined by the political leadership. In his view, bureaucrats ought to remain "neutral" and impartial in the execution of the policies formulated by the politicians, even though there might be some disagreement between the two over the policy or sub-policy issues involved. The public responsibility for the goals of administrative action should, therefore, devolve on the politicians and not on the administrators. Thus, like Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow, Weber appeared to subscribe to a politics-administration dichotomy.

Weber also opined that in the interest of securing predictability of the decision-making process, the administrative hierarchy should consist of professionals only; for the non-professionals were apt to subvert the administrative process. This view springs from his skepticism of the ability of the elected officials to attain the high standards of technical and administrative competence expected of a bureaucracy.[1] Thus, the accent on the role of an administrator in Weber's analysis is due to a strong interest in what might be called "neutral competence". In practice, neutral competence involves the capacity to execute the work of the government expertly, and do it according to explicit objective standards without regard to personal partisanship or other obligations and loyalties.[2] The emphasis on the neutral competence of bureaucrats by Weber led some American scholars to suggest that Weber's theory needed modification in its application to the American scene where bureaucracy was not passive and neutral.[3] However, such an interpretation may be valid only when we think of 'ought' in Weber's analysis rather than the 'is'. Aware of dysfunctions of the possible excesses of both bureaucrats and political leaders, Weber rather favoured a balance of power between the politicians and the bureaucrats even though as a keen student of bureaucracy's functioning, he recognized that such a balance was difficult to achieve. Further, Weber's analysis has to be viewed in the context of his ideal-type construct of bureaucracy, whose features lead logically to a concept of neutral competence. Nevertheless, this peculiar conjunction of the ideal-type's characteristics and Weber's "preference" for a "balanced polity" should not, in any way, lead to the view that for Weber, some ideal-type characteristics had normative implications.

BUREAUCRACY AS POWER INSTRUMENT

Although Weber made an analytical distinction between the role of the politicians and that of the public officials, he recognized that

every problem, despite its seemingly technical nature, can assume political significance, and its solutions are influenced by political considerations. From this perspective, which suggests an ongoing interaction between politics and administration, Weber could visualize a continuing competition for power. He described bureaucracy as a "power instrument of the first order for one who controls the bureaucratic apparatus."[4] He discerned that under "normal" conditions, the power position of a "fully developed" bureaucracy is always "overtowering".[5] The primary factor leading to such a situation is the technical superiority and expertise of administrators as against the "dilettante" politicians. Moreover, "[B]ureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of 'secret sessions'; in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action from criticism."[6] If bureaucrats are successful in concealing important premises of decisions and in avoiding inspection of and control over their functioning, bureaucratic absolutism might result, as it did in imperial Germany under Bismarck.[7] Weber recognized that such an absolutism, perpetuated behind closed doors and without any possibility of effective control, promoted the evils of personal influence and personal struggle. And in this context, he comprehended how difficult it was to control bureaucracy effectively. He observed that in a modern State, day-to-day administration was in the hands of the bureaucracy, and this enhanced specialized knowledge, which, coupled with the secretive character of administrative functioning, made the accountability of bureaucrats extremely difficult.

CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY

This recognition of the power potential of bureaucracy led Weber to advise politicians to resist bureaucratic efforts to gain control over the administrative machinery. He even warned that a nation "which believes that the conduct of State affairs is a matter of 'administration' and that 'politics' is nothing but the part-time occupation of amateurs or a secondary task of bureaucrats might as well forget about playing a role in world affairs. . . ."[8] This statement clearly reflects the great importance Weber attached to the control of the bureaucracy by the politicians.

One of the important methods of political control over bureaucracy, according to Weber, was parliamentary control over the administrative activities of the government. He contended that such parliamentary control over bureaucracy can be effective only when parliament may conduct inquiries and cross-examine administration

before commissions of inquiry. In this connection, he commended the British practice of holding parliamentary inquiries. He also recognized that parliamentary committees provide an opportunity for politicians to become more educated about administration. In addition, these committees increase parliamentary control over administration through public disclosures.[9] Inherent in this analysis is Weber's interest in the problem of limiting bureaucracy's role in a democracy.

THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY

Weber's analysis of democracy is subsumed under his discussion of legal order, although, of course, a legal order is not necessarily democratic.[10]

Weber noted that democratic movements demanding equality before law and protection against arbitrary excess of legal and administrative authority have helped the development of bureaucracy. Such movements have demanded recruitment and promotion to public posts on the basis of technical qualifications rather than personal or political considerations. These demands upon bureaucracy have had a levelling effect. This process has involved the recognition of a formal equality between the officials and the people over whom they exercise authority under the law. Similarly, the emphasis on technical qualifications rather than inherited status in recruitment and advancement in bureaucracy was considered by Weber to be another stimulus for this levelling of status differences.[11] However, such an equality is "formal" because bureaucrats, by virtue of their educational qualifications and diplomas, can become a privileged class.[12] Likewise, officials appointed for life-time careers are in a position to misuse their office and expand their authority. Thus, the measures designed to protect a bureaucracy against the abuse of authority and encroachment of privileges—appointments on qualifications, promotion on merit or seniority, pensions provisions, and formal supervision and appeals procedures—may also promote bureaucratic power. Weber noted that " 'democracy' as such is opposed to the 'rule' of bureaucracy, in spite and perhaps because of, its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of bureaucratization."[13] Thus he recognized that bureaucracy concentrates power in the hands of those who are in charge of bureaucratic machinery and that such a concentration of power is against the basic premises of democracy,[14] particularly so when experts or technocrats are removed from the influence of popular public sentiments. But he also recognized that without a civil service class, democracy could be plagued by a spoils-system, public waste, irregularities and lack of

technical efficiency. "Thus," he concluded, democracy has to promote what reason demands and democratic sentiment hates."[15]

BLAU'S CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION

The preceding discussion indicates Weber's deep insights into the problem of interaction between democracy and the bureaucratic system. However, Peter Blau has opined that Weber could have made a more systematic analytical distinction between 'democracy' and 'bureaucracy'. Blau himself has attempted such a distinction on the basis of the two basic purposes for which men organize themselves.[16] One of these purposes is "to settle on common courses of actions, on objectives to be collectively pursued." Another purpose may be "to implement decisions already agreed upon or accepted, to work together on attaining given objectives." A democratic organization is the one created for the achievement of the first purpose and the one which reaches common agreements by some form of majority rule. Such an organization is characterized by "freedom of dissent". On the other hand, an organization created for the purpose of "realizing specific objectives," already determined or specified, such as winning a war or collecting taxes, is a bureaucratic organization. This type of organization is an efficiency-oriented organization. In sum, Blau's differentiating criteria between democracy and bureaucracy hinge upon "... whether the organization's purpose is to settle on common objectives or to accomplish given objectives, and whether the government principle of organization social action is majority rule rooted in freedom of dissent or administrative efficiency."[17]

THE OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION

It is apparent that Blau's distinction between democracy and bureaucracy is purely analytical, for most, if not all, organizations in the empirical world are engaged in both types of purposes noted by Blau, i.e., deciding on collective goals and then implementing them. In his distinction, Blau appears to be supporting Weber's ideal-type dichotimization between the roles of the politicians and of the administrators. It has been noted, however, that Weber himself recognized that to separate in practice administrative questions from political ones is extremely difficult. Likewise, it would be problematic to separate the process of determining goals from that of implementing them.

It appears, therefore, that in his bureaucratic model, Weber was primarily concerned with the 'rule application' function of

bureaucracy, he seemed to recognize that bureaucracy may also operate as an important 'interest group' in a polity, even without formal channels of interest-articulation. However, Weber's analysis of the political role of bureaucracy seems to be less detailed in his treatment than some of his other subjects such as economy and religion. For this seeming underemphasis, two reasons may be hypothesized. First, Weber did not complete his analysis of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political system before his death, and, secondly, as Bendix has noted, many of his writings on the subject are not available in English.[18] In spite of these limitations, Weber's ideas on the relationship between the political system and its bureaucracy has served an important heuristic purpose in comparative public administration.

CONCLUSION

Weber's analysis of the international patterns between the political system and its bureaucracy should be viewed in the context of the time when Weber wrote his ideas. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Prussian bureaucracy had a dominating influence on the politico-administrative system. Weber always appeared to prefer a political system which would not be monopolized by any one particular group, but instead would be regulated by some patterns of checks and balances among various components of the system. It is in this perspective that his analysis of an apparent dichotomy between the role of the politicians and of the bureaucrats should be studied. Nevertheless, Weber showed great awareness of the difficulty of dichotomizing politics and administration in empirical situations, and recognized that constant competition among the politicians and the bureaucrats was a common feature of a polity with a legal rational character.

Further, Weber recognized that while a democracy needed an efficient bureaucracy, it could still be threatened by this bureaucracy. However, he also saw that bureaucracy had a levelling effect on the socio-political system by broadening the base of people's participation in government.

Notes and References

1. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethics and the Rise of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribners Sons, 1958), pp. 389-90.
2. Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrine of Public Administration," *American Political Science Review*, L (1956), p. 1060.
3. John M. Pfiffner and Robert Presthus, *Public Administration*, 5th ed., (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1967), p. 42.
4. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated, edited and with an introduction by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), hereafter cited as *Essays*, p. 228.
5. *Ibid.*, 232. Here Weber was probably talking of the empirical reality in the modern State, and not of "fully developed" in an ideal-type sense.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
7. Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), hereafter cited as *Portrait*, p. 452.
8. Quoted in Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," in Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Administration* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962), pp. 80-81.
9. Bendix, *Portrait*, pp. 456-57.
10. "This legality...may derive from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties on the relevant terms. On the other hand, it may be imposed on the basis of what is held to be a legitimate authority." Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), hereafter cited as *Theory*, p. 130.
11. *Essays*, pp. 224-28.
12. Cf. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1957).
13. *Essays*, p. 123.

14. See, *Ibid.*, pp. 232-35.
15. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, "Introduction," in *ibid.*, p. 18. It may be interesting to note that Weber, during his visit to the United States in 1904, recognized the "function" of "machine politics". As Gerth and Mills have noted, Weber appreciated the indispensability of machine politics in a modern "mass democracy"; otherwise a "leaderless democracy"; and a confusion of tongues could prevail. Machine politics, in this context, denotes the management of politics by professionals, the disciplined party organization and its organized propaganda. Such a process could facilitate the emergence of a strong leader, whether in the role of a strong president or the city manager (sic). This centralization process, according to Weber, stimulated greater rationality and efficiency in the bureaucratic machine, *Ibid.*, p. 17. Thus Weber recognized that a kind of spoils system could promote "political development" which in turn could stimulate "administrative development". For a similar view of the role of spoils in political development, see, Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 120-67.
16. The following discussion is based on Peter Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (1963), pp. 315-16.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 315.
18. Bendix, *Portrait*, p. 423.

5

Weber and Riggs: Some Comparisons

Ramesh K. Arora

IF one has to choose two scholars who have made the most distinctive and outstanding contribution to the study of comparative administrative systems, one is likely to choose Max Weber and Fred Riggs. In fact, Weber laid the foundation on which Riggs is attempting to construct the edifice of an emerging discipline of comparative administration. Perhaps, all serious students of public bureaucracies are well aware of Weber's typology of three authority systems (traditional, charismatic and legal-rational) and more particularly of his analysis of a bureaucratic system functioning in the context of a legal rational authority.[1] Likewise, Riggs's typologies of "agraria-transitia-industria" and "fused-prismatic-diffracted" societies along with his analysis of "sala" have become integral and essential parts of the lexicons of the students of public administration.[2]

Reading Riggs, one might get the impression—an erroneous one—that he has attempted to prevent an antithesis to Weber's bureaucratic theory. The fact of the matter is that despite his criticisms of Weber's bureaucratic model, Riggs has not come up with any alternative to this model, but has only tried to fill a gap which the Weberian typology appears to have left when viewed in the present context. Thus, it might be interesting to attempt some comparisons between the approaches of the two scholars in so far as they are relevant to the comparative administrative analysis.

METHODOLOGY OF IDEAL-TYPE CONSTRUCTS

It is easy to discern Weber's influence on Riggs in the construction of the typology of socio-administrative systems. Like Weber, Riggs has provided three ideal-type constructs which are deductive in character. Of course, Riggs's earlier models of agraria and industria were inductive in nature, but this is not the case with his fused, prismatic, and diffracted models, which are essentially deductive in

character. Not that Weber's ideal-type models are purely deductive. Carl Friedrich, commenting on Weber's ideal-type methodology, has observed: "... Weber ... sets forth his ideal-types as mental constructs which are neither derived by process of deductive ratiocination from higher concepts, nor built up from empirical data by relevant inference, nor demonstrably developed as working hypotheses from such data."[3]

Obviously, Friedrich, in this statement, has called for a clearly inductive or deductive analysis, while Weber has adopted a particular kind of middle-range approach which, though neither of the two, includes elements of both. To a great extent, the same could be said of Riggs's typology of fused, prismatic, and diffracted societies.

The basis of Weberian models of traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational authority systems is the type of legitimacy associated with an authority system. In a traditional authority system, "tradition" legitimizes an "order" issued by a superior to a subordinate; in a charismatic authority system, legitimacy is claimed and accepted on the basis of the "charisma" or the superhuman and supernatural qualities of the ruler; and in a legal-rational authority system, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal rules which, in turn, are justified on the basis of their rational character. Riggsian typology, on the other hand, is based on the criterion of structural differentiation. From the fused to the prismatic, and lastly to the diffracted society, there is an increasing amount of structural differentiation in social systems and subsystems.

Even with these differences of premise, the typologies of both Weber and Riggs have certain similarities in their construction as well as in impact. For example, some elements of Weber's legal-rational authority dominate in Riggs's diffracted society. More particularly, the legal-rational authority system is characterized by a relative autonomy of structures, which is a feature of the diffracted society as well. Likewise, it is obvious that Riggs's fused society has several characteristics of Weber's traditional authority system. Both these social systems have a simple, as against complex, role-differentiation. Although no exact parallel of Weber's charismatic authority system is found in Riggs's typology, some characteristics of routinized charisma are traceable in empirical "prismatic" societies, such as Indian, Nepalese, Ethiopian and Iranian. Nevertheless, empirical examples of charismatic authority are somewhat different today; most charismatic figures are obviously involved in modernizing

programmes. Since Riggs has been interested primarily in contemporary administrative systems, he has not constructed any specific category of the ideal-type charismatic leadership. Perhaps he has assumed that the fragmented administrative system in an emergent nation is not typically dominated by politicians even when there is a charismatic leader.

ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

It is clear that Weberian and Riggsian typologies differ in regard to the number of ecological elements incorporated in them. In Weber's analysis, the nature of the administrative staff is understood by reference to the character of the authority system in which it (the staff) operates. Weber linked several socio-cultural norms of the authority system with the character of the administrative staff.[4] His administrative analysis is ecological to the extent that it studies the socio-cultural and economic forces stimulating the growth of bureaucracy, and analyzes the interaction of the bureaucracy with the political system and to a lesser extent with the socio-cultural and economic system.

Riggs's analysis of the socio-cultural and economic aspects of administrative ecology is much more extensive than Weber's. He has drawn upon contemporary structural-functionalism, and hence his analysis includes a more systematic approach on societal level. The interaction between "sala" and other sub-systems of the "prismatic" society is a case in point. It may be mentioned, however, that both Weber and Riggs have paid greater attention to the study of interactional patterns between the political system and its administrative sub-system than to the analysis of interactions between the bureaucracy and the socio-economic systems.

RELATION BETWEEN BUREAUCRACY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Weber's analysis of the interactional patterns between the political system and its bureaucracy should be viewed in the context of the time when Weber wrote his ideas. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Prussian bureaucracy had a dominating influence on the politico-administrative system. Weber always appeared to prefer a political system which would not be monopolized by any one particular group, but instead would be regulated by some patterns of checks and balances among various components of the system. It is in this perspective that his analysis of an apparent dichotomy between the role of the politicians and of the bureaucrats should be studied,

for he contended that while politicians were expected to concentrate on electoral and legislative functions, bureaucrats should devote themselves to administrative tasks, i.e., to the implementation of public policy determined by the political leadership. Nevertheless, Weber showed great awareness of the difficulty of dichotomizing politics and administration in empirical situations, and recognized that constant competition between politicians and bureaucrats was a common feature of a polity with a legal-rational character. Further, Weber recognized that while a democracy needed an efficient bureaucracy, it could still be threatened by this bureaucracy. However, he also saw that bureaucracy had a levelling effect on the socio-political system by broadening the base of people's participation in government.

Much of the Weberian thinking on the relationship between the political system and its bureaucracy appears to have influenced Fred Riggs's writings on this subject. Riggs's ideas on the relationship between the political system and its bureaucracy should be seen in the context of the following three goals that he has implicitly considered as essential for a contemporary policy.

1. *Legitimacy*: For a government to operate effectively, it must be accepted and recognized by people to constitute their legitimate State.

2. *Stability* or *Balance*: A government, in order to have self-restraint and integrity, should be subjected to the discipline of countervailing powers.

3. *Capacity*: A government should have the capacity to make and implement political decisions—decisions that bring about changes of a desired (intended) type.

Riggs appears to have considered efficiency and representativeness (or pluralism) as the most significant means to achieve the above goals. This emphasis is in conformity with Weber's stress on the need to make bureaucracy capable of attaining the highest level of efficiency possible as also on controlling it effectively through the political system. Both Riggs and Weber have preferred a 'balanced' polity—where the political system and its bureaucracy have a sort of "balance of power"—to an unbalanced one.[5] This common orientation can be understood in the context of the political ecology of a democratic pluralistic order in which both the scholars have operated.

ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUB-SYSTEM

Apparently, Weber's analysis of administrative staff within a legal-rational authority (i. e. bureaucracy) is more extensive when

compared to his treatment of administrative staff in a traditional and charismatic authority system. Riggs, on the other hand, has been more interested in the working of the adminstrative system (sala) in a prismatic society; a discussion of the administrative patterns in the diffracted and the fused societies is only peripheral to his central concern of understanding the administrative problems of prismatic societies. In other words, Riggs, like Weber, has focused attention on nations at a certain stage of socio-cultural development—although he has chosen a different set of nations—and, therefore, has treated other nations only incidentally for the purpose of comparison. Thus, the crux of Weberian analysis is the legal-rational authority system and its bureaucracy, while that of Riggsian discussion is the prismatic society and its 'sala'.

DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTATION

It is generally argued that Weber treated administrative systems as 'steady state' systems. Although he studied the process of bureaucratization from a historical perspective and analysed some dimensions of the routinization of charisma, the element of change was not stressed in this analysis of bureaucracy. The primary reasons for this could be that when Weber wrote his ideas, European governments, were expected to provide the stable environment within which industrial development could take place. Thus, stability was not seen to be problematic in his administrative analysis. Moreover, during that period, there were not many 'developing' societies on the international scene. Stable empires and their more stable colonies did not provide the challenge of social change which the emerging nations provide today, and unlike the present situation a government was not expected to initiate or lead the process of large scale socio-economic development. Even in his historical analysis, Weber was not much interested in the problem of consciously stimulating development in a society. Consequently, his analysis has posed limitations for the comparative administrative analysis of the contemporary developing societies. Briefly, thus, Weber in his administrative analysis appeared to be concerned with the problem of modernization, but only from the point of view of the observer; he showed no interest in the problem of directing social change. Besides, Weber's assumption of the unilinear development of bureaucratization is not very helpful for studying the crisis of modernization.

Riggs's writings, on the other hand, have been influenced by the emergence of numerous 'new' States. However, one must

distinguish between his relatively 'less dynamic' ecological models of fused, prismatic, and diffracted societies on the one hand, and his analysis of the concepts of development administration and administrative development on the other.[6] Conceptually, a prismatic society could also be a 'static' society, although generally it is not. However, Riggs has tried to stress that his category of 'prismatic' society should not be considered as a synonym for a 'developing' society.[7] In his detailed analysis, he has not been able to maintain this neat distinction.

In the emerging field of 'development administration', Riggs's contribution has been considerable. He has intensely studied the administrative systems of developing countries such as Thailand and the Philippines,[8] and has also made profound analysis of the conceptual issues involved in the understanding of the complex processes of development administration and administrative development.

CONCLUSION

In this short paper, an attempt has been made to outline certain points of comparison between the writings of Weber and Riggs on comparative administration. Obviously, only a few important points have been touched, thus leaving a scope for a further detailed analysis of the subject.

It has been argued that Weber's writings appear to have influenced Riggs considerably. Like Weber, Riggs has used ideal-type methodology for constructing models for the understanding of different types of socio-administrative systems. While Weber's models are based on the pattern of legitimacy of authority, Riggs has developed his typology on the premise of structural differentiation in a society. Because of historical reasons, one can understand why Weber did not postulate the category of 'prismatic' society and why Riggs did not decide to study the intensively 'charismatic' authority system. Otherwise, their models have several elements in common.

It is true that Riggs's models are more ecological in character than Weber's, although both attach considerable significance to the interactional patterns between the political system and its bureaucracy. Thus, in this area ideas of Riggs converge with those of Weber more particularly because both the scholars have preferred a 'balanced' polity to an 'unbalanced' one.

As regards the development orientation, one finds that Weber's models are less capable of explaining socio-administrative change

than Riggs's. This difference can be understood in the context of the times when these models were constructed. The challenge of 'modernization'—as the term is understood today—had not become conspicuous in Weber's time, while presently, it has become the crux of the whole socio-political and economic dynamics at the international level. Naturally, therefore, Riggs has incorporated in his writings intensive analysis of development administration and administrative development.

A serious student of comparative administration can only look at Weber and Riggs as the two pioneers who have done utmost to bring the 'comparative administration movement' where it is today. The need is to improve upon what has already been done and to continue the process of modification and reformulation of conceptual constructs which are designed primarily to build an 'administrative science'.

Notes and References

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2. See, Riggs, "Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration,", in William J. Siffin (ed.), *Toward a Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1957), pp. 23-110; and Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964).
3. Friedrich, "Some Observations on Weber's Analysis of Bureaucracy", in Robert Merton, *et. al.* (eds.), *Reader in Bureaucracy* (New York: Free Press, 1952), p. 28.
4. For a synoptic view of such linkages, see, Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," in Ferrel Heady and Sybil Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Administration* (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962), pp. 88-90.
5. See, Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, I (1969), pp. 5-38.
6. See, among others, Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers of Development Administration* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970) and Riggs, "Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept", in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development-Politics, Administration, and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).
7. See, Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries*, *passim.*
8. See, for example, Riggs, *The Ecology of Public Administration* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), and Riggs, *Thailand, Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East West Press, 1969).

6
Tradition and Promise in Development Bureaucracy

E. H. Valsan

THIS paper will limit itself to the realm of what has been recognized as development administration. Bureaucracy involved in the implementation of policies for socio-economic-political development is included in the category of development bureaucracy. Essentially, our concern is with the developing nations.

The relevance of courses on bureaucracy in any university programme on public or development administration is obvious. However, the subject matter of such courses may vary according to the requirements of each programme or the specializations of its faculty. It may vary from the discussion of Merton, La Palombara, Riggs, Siffin and Crozier to the consideration of more traditional views of Kautilya or Weber.[1] Whoever be the authors and whichever be the models discussed, it is important to recognize bureaucratic traditions in different countries and also to look at the interplay of traditions and developmental ideals in the working of bureaucracies. Following is an attempt to analyse some aspects of such interplay and their outcome and to suggest the potentials and promise if any, of development bureaucracy. In the end emphasis is given to the need to conduct case studies for building up good curriculum on development bureaucracy and a potentially useful case is cited as an example for further research.

LAW AND ORDER ADMINISTRATION

It is almost a cliche to say that the traditional bureaucratic system existed mainly for the upkeep of law and order and collection of revenue whether done on behalf of a monarch[2] or a colonial power. Contrary to this negative type[3] of administration, development administration prescribes positive thinking and application of policy. Our question is, whether such dichotomization of the role of administration is realistic and even conducive to development?

It is true, developmental tasks open up new avenues for the bureaucracy. They face new challenges to their intellect and creative

abilities. The 'law and order' pattern often relied for its stability on the concept of 'precedent'. But where precedents are non-existent and demands for problem-solving great and urgent legislative interpretations of old laws or repressive measures to secure order does not help development. At the same time recent events in a number of Asian countries like India, Ceylon and the Philippines have shown that the gap between the expectations and achievements of national development programmes together with the weaknesses and dysfunctions of development administration has generated new problems of law and order threatening the very existence of several societies. And, the need for more revenue for development is obvious. As our main concern precludes a thorough discussion of this problem, it is enough to state here that development efforts, instead of undermining the need for 'law and order', have actually increased it. It calls for innovations in law and maintenance of order as well as for greater and quicker responsiveness to public demands on the part of administrators. In responding to such a situation, in most instances, the political leadership falls back on the legally trained administrators. Often in developing countries, politicians are themselves lawyers by profession and the judiciary is still considered to be conservative. In short, the development bureaucracy faces a law and order syndrom of legalistic-conservative nature in the political-judicial framework within which it operates. Exceptions are found only in countries where strict 'security' measures are in operation often suppressing fundamental freedoms of expression and collective protest. Even among them, sporadic eruptions of protests do occur, and if they are effectively suppressed, it implies more resources and greater attention given to the 'law and order' problem.

Even if we separate developmental tasks from those of keeping law and order, the fact remains till this day that in many countries both functions are carried on by the same personnel or, there is considerable transfer of personnel from revenue and routine branches to developmental departments. Besides, even during the 'traditional' administration, despite emphasis upon order and revenue, many officers used to be involved in what might have been called developmental activities.

PATERNALISM IN BUREAUCRACY

Another attribute of the traditional systems is held by the paternalistic or *Ma-Baap* (father-mother) attitude and role of the bureaucracy.[4] Much has been said about this in India and eleswhere. The father image

of the district officer was also interpreted to mean his authority over the obedient masses. It also implied fear on the part of the people in their relationship with the officer. In the colonial or authoritative systems not at all concerned about the welfare of the people, it also implied bitter enmity or at least mutual suspicion between the people and the bureaucrat.

To what extent have the legacies of dependence, obedience, fear, mutual suspicion and even enmity been operating in the context of development? While it is difficult to answer this question accurately, it can safely be said that even today, especially in the rural areas, the relationship between the masses and the bureaucracy—developmental or other type—reflects some of these traits. The enmity relationship is partly because of the fight for freedom during which the people began to look at the foreign officials and their local agents as enemies. Thus a whole generation of Indians grew up thinking only in terms of opposing the government.[5] Whereas opposition to government during colonial era was based upon the enmity with a foreign power, today it is due to the unsolved problems of the society.[6]

Paternalistic attitude of the bureaucracy and the dependence-obedience attitude of even the elected representatives of the people are visible in many places even today.[7] Expansion of development bureaucracy under such situations has helped only to inhibit what Riggs calls 'the development of effective politics'.[8] Whether we are seeking political and economic development, attitudes of the bureaucracy towards the people and their representatives and vice versa, seem to carry on several traditions of the past.

UPPER CLASS ALOOFNESS

Still another legacy of the traditional system is the upper class orientation of the higher level bureaucracy. Top level bureaucracy in India or Egypt[9] during the British days came from a particular strata of the society on the basis of their education which was dependent largely upon their social class. Upper class background kept the civil servant from the common run of the masses even when they were on circuit in the districts. The British officers, despite instructions to the contrary, "felt it essential to keep physical and social distance"[10] from the people. Native officers followed suit and in many situations continued the practice even after independence.[11]

Recently, new slogans and norms have been introduced in the developmental context. Democratization, decentralization and de-concentration of power have been attempted. New styles of adminis-

tration and bureaucratic relationship are evolving. However, the legacy of 'physical and social aloofness' of the higher-level civil service does continue at least sporadically. Such physical aloofness is not only kept from the people, but also from the lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy.[12]

While there is definite change in the class structure of the bureaucracy in many countries like India and Egypt due to encouragement for free or supported education to lower classes of population, there is also the danger of the evolving middle class imitating the upper classes in their values and styles of conducting themselves. This particular factor is visible today in the way the bureaucrats dress themselves in the countryside. In the State of Kerala in India, where people normally wear a shirt and a 'mundu' wrapped around their waist which is very convenient in a humid and often rainy climate, one notices an increasing tendency among the middle level development workers to wear 'western' style long trousers which represent the style of the higher level bureaucrats. While political leaders wear 'mundu', the civil servants including development officers of various categories have begun to wear trousers. One among the latter told this writer that wearing trousers added to his prestige in the community and helped him get greater compliance and cooperation from the subordinates and the people respectively.[13] While popular cooperation in development projects cannot be based on just one criterion like this, it is a revealing instance of the role of upper class influences and traditions in developmental modernity. Whether 'aloofness' is a virtue or hindrance for development, the practice seems to exist among the higher level officers and it is spreading at the middle level.

SHIFT IN PRESTIGE STATUS

It is pertinent to observe here that while the top level bureaucracy still continues to be influential, one significant feature of the developmental situation is the emergence and expansion of middle level bureaucracy who deal with both the lower and higher levels. The Block Development Officers in India and the Municipal Development Workers in the Philippines are the ones whom the people know in the villages besides, of course, the village level workers.[14] Their prestige is also increasing.

Again, bureaucracy at the top used to enjoy several privileges which added to their already existing prestige based on birth and education. Those in the Indian Civil Service felt during the British

days as though they almost owned the district they headed.[15] Several Egyptain civil servants told this writer that until recently the high level officers were not subject to rules of punctuality. They could go to the office at any time they liked and could spend several days in Alexandria during the summer months.

However, a scholarly member of the Indian Administrative Service laments that the successors of the I.C.S. do not enjoy all the privileges of the former administrators:

"The administrator of the yester years boasting of a well appointed personal establishment consisting of a valet, a butler, a cook, a *mali*, a *dhobi*, a maid and an *ayah* etc., is for his present day version only a figure of the fairy tale with whom he finds no resemblance."[16]

In contrast, the present officer is happy if he can give his children 'good education' and repay his loans to the government 'for the construction of a small house'.[17] Monetarily, too, the value of money has decreased and the administrators find themselves unable to compete with the standard of living of the business men and other private professionals who seem to have assumed socially higher positions. Besides the decline of material compensation, democratization has made the Ministers more powerful and thus, there has been an 'absolute decline in the status of the administrator.'[18]

As a consequence of the lowered prestige and real income, there seems to be a decline in the entry of first rate people to the higher civil services. India is a typical example of this phenomenon. Recent experience is that fewer graduates with first class marks in university examinations are applying to enter the once prestigious IAS and IFS examinations.[19] It seems that most graduates seek jobs in business.

Whereas the real income of the higher administrative class in many countries has declined as mentioned in the foregoing discussion, there still remains a considerable gap between their monetary compensations and the privileges and those of their own subordinate supervisory and clerical classes and the average citizen of the developing countries.[20] Today's administrators are servants of governments which proclaim adherence to certain types of democracy or socialism. Still there is considerable evidence to the fact that the privileges, authority and status of higher level bureaucracy have influenced their attitude towards development.[21]

GENERALIST V. SPECIALIST

Still another legacy of the traditional bureaucracy is the generalist training in contrast to the specialist background. It has been observed, however, that

"The prime need in the districts today is for technical men such as soil, irrigation or dairy expert. The 'generalist' with liberal arts background is thus in urgent need of suitable technical training as well as deep commitments to the demands of development."[22]

What is important is to be able to locate and mould such young men and not to lament over the loss of those who find other avenues. And there are signs that among those who join the I.A.S. and similar administrative classes in developing countries now, are people of middle and lower class birth and high commitment. One imperative in their training and retention must be vigilance against their absorption of upper class aristocratic values leading to a luxurious life at the expense of the common masses.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION MOVEMENT

A new phenomenon in the realm of administration in developing countries is the growth of what may be called a public administration movement. In short, this implies recognition of the need to study public administration and related subjects and to foster various institutions and methods for that purpose. Development bureaucracy in most countries is brought into the movement through membership in institutes, participation in seminars, opportunity to publish articles in periodicals specializing in public administration,[23] and through institutionalized training courses. Universities and government institutions have come closer in the past two decades in pursuing administrative studies and in helping each other in this respect. While there are many shortcomings in the public administration programmes of several universities,[24] some have been exceptionally successful in maintaining good relationship with the government and in conducting useful training programmes and academic projects. To the extent a climate of concern and cooperation for the sake of better administration has been created, it is an important development unknown to previous generations. Curriculum workshops involving both academics and the bureaucrats can contribute towards the creation of better programmes than hitherto.

Availability of literature on the administration of developing countries and the willingness of the authors to relate administrative matters to ecological factors have at least given interested bureaucracy greater faith in the possibility of "studying" administration. In the past, the administrators tended to believe that they alone know what was happening in the secluded realm of administration and the academic people also seemed to be concerned only with the structural and legal studies. The concepts like "formalism"[25] and the willingness of the scholars to appreciate aspects of administrative

ecology and culture reflect genuine efforts on their part to look at bureaucratic operations more realistically than before. Similarly, the comparative administration movement in the United States[26] and Asia[27] have further helped the academic and the bureaucrat understand similarities of problems facing development administration.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Consequent to developmental efforts and the emerging public administration movement, sustained efforts have been made for administrative reforms in most countries. These efforts are reflected in the appointment and reports of committees, commissions and study teams as well as in the creation of permanent machinery for administrative reforms. India's Administrative Reforms Commission was a unique experiment in this respect. Political, academic and bureaucratic talents worked together to produce its voluminous reports.[28] Similar attempts in different scales were made in several countries.[29]

While in the early days of administrative reforms, developing countries depended upon experts and techniques from developed countries, during the course of years they have become conscious of the role of indigenous innovation[30] in administrative development. Egypt's Central Agency for Organization and Administration and Malaysia's 'Operations Room' are examples of original institutional innovations. While none of the reports or institutions can claim perfection in attaining their objectives, the fact remains that the movement for careful, indigenous, and innovative administrative reform has taken roots in each country and the development bureaucracy has had its share in sustaining it.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND BUREAUCRACY

One major shift in the role of bureaucracy during the era of development has been the fact that the bureaucracy has been subjected to greater control and direction by emerging political leadership at all levels in each country. Before independence the bureaucracy was used by colonial rulers to suppress political leadership in the localities. Now, on the contrary, they are subjected to political control of the political leadership. This is all the more true in efforts to 'decentralize' authority. It means a new orientation and calls for tact and respect for the political system of the country on the part of the bureaucracy. In many instances they are entrusted with the task of developing political leadership to control bureaucracy.[31] This is because local level leadership is not yet ready or developed to take up the responsibilities idealized for them by the national

leadership. The fact that the measures for 'democratic decentralization' undertaken in India and several other countries are, despite several lacunae, continuing to spread, suggests that even partial success of such measures is possible only with the support and involvement of bureaucracy and to that extent, it affords a promise for success.

Closely related to the task of helping political development is the question of political neutrality under development administration. Earlier we referred to the problem of negative neutrality in highly politicized atmosphere where bureaucrats prefer to be apathetic and neutral. This apathy led to the famous call for committted bureaucracy in India.[32] The creation of an administrative cadre committed to national objectives and responsive to social need was urged. As far as development is concerned, the concept stands for a bureaucracy with a commitment to the cause of development. Various new tasks, challenges and opportunities available to the development bureaucracy, which were discussed earlier, call for a new type of civil servant. Besides commitment and dynamism which are often talked about, what are the other qualifications expected of such development administrators.

Models and typologies are available in the literature describing development bureaucracy.[33] It is easy to prescribe qualifications desired of any group of professionals. Elsewhere this writer emphasized the need for the awareness on the part of development administrator, importance of the five 'I's' (Information, Inspiration, Innovation, Introjection and Integration) besides the POSDCORB functions particularly while dealing with field administration.[34] P.R. Dubhashi in his typology of bureaucrats recommends the 'worker with a flexible mind' for creative administration.[35] Hahn-Been Lee in his typology of bureaucratic role emphasizes the need for 'developmentalist' administrators.[36] Perhaps a combination of all these high 'developmentalist' qualities mentioned in several typologies is what is expected of a development administrator. It is the task of the training institutions to create among potential and existing civil servants an awareness of these qualities and qualifications.

From the point of view of curriculum building, what we need are case studies of successful bureaucrats to supplement all traditional and developmental theories of bureaucracy. We are still very short of case studies pointing attention to bureaucratic failures and successes in development.[37] Cases can be developed as part of course assignments and through student-faculty collaboration. Several instances and personalities can be studied. Cases of successful projects and the role of bureaucratic leadership in their implementation can be sources of inspiration for administrators.

Notes and References

1. Robert K. Merton et. al., *Reader in Bureaucracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1952); Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963); Fred W. Riggs, *Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966); Michael Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1964); Kautilya, *Arthasastra*, translated by R. Ramasastry (Mysore: 1951); Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, edited by Talcott Parsons (London: Oxford University Press, 1947).
2. For instance, in Thailand, a governor was considered competent if he could maintain peace within his province; Amara Raksasataya, "Preparing Administrators for National Development: Thailand Experience", in Hahn-Been Lee and Abelardo G. Samonte (eds.), *Administrative Reforms in Asia* (Manila: EROPA, 1970), pp. 199-239.
3. A.H. Hanson, *Planning and the Politicians and other Essays* (London: Routleage & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 200.
4. For an analysis of paternalistic, but non-regulatory type of British administration in India during 1830s, see Haridwar Rai, "Politico-Administrative Base of Indian Field Administration: The Patterns of the District Officer System Under the British", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, XVI (Oct.-Dec. 1970), pp. 457-96.
5. See Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama—An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, Vol. II (New York: Pantheon, 1968), p. 897 where the author quotes Nehru's interpretation of such opposition.
6. V.A. Pai Panandikar in a recent article comments on the increasing "tensions between the citizens and the civil servants in almost all sectors of national life" in India: "What Ails Public Administration?," *Economic and Political Weekly*, VI (July 10, 1971), 1377-78.
7. See E.H. Valsan, *Community Development Programs and Rural Local Government: Comparative Case Studies of India and the Philippines* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1970), pp. 128-30.

8. Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View," in La Palombara (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 126.
9. Laila Takla, "The Ecology of Public Administration in Egypt," unpublished paper (mimeo), p. 12.
10. Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in La Palombara (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 390.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Intrabureaucratic inequalities and distances are focussed in E.H. Valsan, "Development Bureaucracy: A Tentative Model", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, XVIII (Jan.-March, 1972), 36-50.
13. Interview with a development officer.
14. B. K. Dey, "Bureaucracy and Development: Some Reflections," *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, XV (April-June, 1969), 229.
15. Ralph Braibanti gives a brief description of the privileges of the I.C.S. in *op. cit.*, 190-395.
16. P. R. Dubhashi, "Satisfaction of the Administrative Career," *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, XV (Jan.-March, 1969), 111; (*mali* is the gardener; *dhobi* the washerman; and *ayah*, the baby nurse).
17. *Ibid.* 18. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
19. *The Times of India*, Editorial, "A Mediocre Bunch?" August, 1971, p. 6, refers to this problem.
20. Ralph Braibanti, *op. cit.*, p. 392 gives the ratio of the salary of a full Secretary and his stenographer in Pakistan as 20:1.
21. Ralph Braibanti quotes Nazih-Us-Zaman to show how Pakistani community development programme was affected by the authoritative values of the law-and-order bureaucracy, *Ibid.*, p. 396.
22. *The Times of India*, Editorial, *op. cit.* For a review of the generalist-specialist controversy refer to, among others, P. D. Sharma, "The Generalist and the Specialist in Administration," in Ramesh K. Arora (ed.) *Administrative Change in India* (Delhi: Aalekh Publishers, 1974).
23. *Indian Journal of Public Administration* is a typical example. Several civil servants have established good reputation as authors of useful and thought-provoking articles in it. In 1969, thirty-seven and in 1970 thirty-five officials published articles or book reviews in this journal.
24. For a critical survey of the status of public administration in India, see V. A. Pai Panandikar, *op. cit.*
25. See Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1964)

and other writings; E. H. Valsan, "Positive Formalism: A Desideratum for Development,?" *The Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, XII (January, 1968), 3—6; and R. S. Milne, "Formalism Reconsidered;" *The Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, XIV (January, 1970), 21-30.

26. The Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration has been rendering yeomen service in this respect for more than a decade. For an introduction to its activities, see among others, Ramesh K. Arora, *Comparative Public Administration: An Ecological Perspective* (New Delhi: Associated, 1972), pp. 19-21.
27. Development Administration Group of the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration has been recently active in Asia.
28. The Commission produced twenty reports during its work during 1966 to 1970 on topics ranging from the machinery of Government of India to the problems of redress of citizens' grievances; see Administrative Reforms Commission, *Reports* (Delhi: The Manager, Publications, 1967 to 1970).
29. Hahn-Been Lee and Abelardo G. Samonte (eds.), *op. cit.* includes several articles on similar efforts. Recent Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries held at Falmer, Brighton, U. K., from October 25 to November 2, 1971, had several country reports on administrative reform.
30. See Hahn-Been Lee, "The Concept, Structure and Strategy of Administrative Reforms: An Introduction," in Lee and Samonte (eds.), *op. cit.* For a discussion of innovation and reform also, E. H. Valsan, *Community Development Programs and Rural Local Government*, pp. 402-03.
31. Bureaucracy involved in India's panchayati raj system often performs this task.
32. For a discussion of the origin of this concept, see C.P. Bhambri, *Bureaucracy and Politics in India* (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971), p. 62; P. R. Dubhashi analyses the issue in his "Committed Bureaucracy," *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, XVII (Jan.-March 1971), 32-39.
33. See P. R. Dubhashi, "Bureaucrats: An Empirical Typology," *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, X (April-June 1964), 230-234; Valsan, "Development Bureaucracy: A Tentative Model,"; Valsan, *Community Development Programs and Rural Local Government*, pp. 100-04 for a typology of development administrators in Kerala; Hahn-Been Lee, "The Role of Higher Civil Service

Under Rapid Social and Political Change," paper presented to the Development Administration Seminar, East-West Centre, Honolulu, June 13 to July 15, 1966, includes a typology of bureaucratic roles, p. 80.

34. Valsan, *Community Development Programs and Rural Local Government*, pp. 401-06.
35. Dubhashi, "Bureaucrats: An Empirical Typology," 233.
36. Hahn-Been Lee, *loc. cit.*
37. A few cases are found in: C. P. Bhambri, *op. cit.*, Raul de Guzman, ed., *Patterns in Decision-Making* (Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University of Philippines, 1963); Bureaucratic phenomena in the context of rural development are discussed in my comparative case studies of India and the Philippines, *op cit.*, and in Hassan Fathy, *Gourna: A Tale of Two Villages* (Cairo: Ministry of Culture, 1969).

7

The Politics of Development Administration: Some Hypotheses

Faisel Al-Salem

THE study of the politics of development administration may be best attempted through "descriptive" means, such as studying the common political backgrounds and trends of these countries, and through "prescriptive" means, such as the methods that "ought" to be employed in achieving political development.

The study of the political processes in low-income countries started after World War II. Hence, as Heady notes, "Knowledge of the political process in the developing world is understandably still fragmentary and tentative."[1] Despite its fragmentary nature,[2] it is possible to recognize some common features of the politics of development. Some of these features include:

(1) [A] widely shared developmental ideology . . . as the source of basic political goals; (2) a high degree of reliance on the political sector for achieving results in the society; (3) widespread incipient or actual political instability; (4) modernizing elitist leadership, accompanied by a wide 'political gap' between the rulers and the ruled; and (5) an imbalance in the growth of political institutions, with bureaucracy among those in the mature category.[3]

The government assumes central importance in low-income countries, due to the urgency of public demand, time, resources, and coordination. The national economy is generally one of social welfare, though paradoxically there is much political alienation and antipathy. Much of what Shils has termed the "oppositional" mentality is actually an extension of previous popular resentment against alien rulers and their native instruments. Hence, "Politicians are frequently thought to be timid, compromising, indecisive, dishonest, wasteful, selfish, etc."[4] Furthermore, the reliance on government for output without popular consent has led to neither the achievement of goals nor a desirable form of stability. In a survey of 83 countries, it was concluded that almost half had had successful or attempted coups.[5]

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

In his study of the political leadership, Mehden finds that these countries have experienced four types of leadership: colonial, traditional, nationalist, and economic. The preindependence type was the colonial elite, succeeded by the nationalist for a brief period after independence, and finally replaced by a "reinfusion of traditional elements into the leadership as memories of the independence struggle wane and recognition of long-term power relationships increases."[6] In the final analysis, the nationalists are absorbed by traditional values into the privileged class. The traditionalists and the nationalists finally merge into one larger group for:

"Each sees in the other something worthwhile. The traditionalists realize that the Western techniques of the modern elite may be valuable tools for maintaining their own power and that they must change lest they be overthrown by the newly educated masses. The modern elite sees the necessity of fitting its schemes and desires into the local culture, if the hoped for goals are to be attained. Thus there is developing a steady synthesis of values and techniques in the new nations."[7]

The civilian elite is usually divorced from the masses who are still bound by familial and tribal traditions. In this environment, the intellectuals who have been exposed to the values of industrial societies are, needless to say, frustrated and alienated by the lack of self-actualization, and by rigid traditions and incompetent authority.[8] Mobilization by the central government, usually through a mass party, is generally met with apathy and at times with hostility. The "telescoping" effect of sudden change have rendered instruments of interest articulation and aggregation either weak or absent. The elite, meanwhile, must either cultivate loyalty through performance, or face domination by an ever increasing military. Whereas Weber and even Riggs tend to consider the civil and the military bureaucracy as one, one must separate them in the case of low-income countries. The background, recruitment, method, and objective of these two bureaucracies differ tremendously. One would tend to associate the military more with political power and rulership rather than with day-to-day administration.

While military domination in these countries may at least bring about order and some reform, this is not sufficient; ". . . While it is relatively easy for the military to seize power in a new nation, it is

much more difficult for it to govern."[9] Hence, the military is generally forced to elicit the help of the civilian bureaucracy.

The dominant trends in low-income nations appear to be in the following terms:

1. While in most cases the institutions established during the colonial period remain, the trend has been toward the development of political processes that have left these institutions with a primarily symbolic content.

2. The trend appears to be away from organized, legal political competition and, perhaps, even from party politics.

3. The military is becoming an increasingly important part of the decision-making apparatus of the new States.

4. The trend appears to be toward longer period in power for military regimes in the developing world.

5. Economically, the developing world is not holding its own with the developed States.

6. In the political arena, perhaps the central factor hindering economic development still remains the dearth of qualified personnel at all levels of administration.[10]

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

In terms of public administration, the political environment plays a crucial role. Political factors may enhance or impede administrative efforts for national development. Weidner notes that political factors may constrain administration in at least two ways: "Political development goals may clash with a wide variety of administrative techniques and methods or they may run counter to ideas of bureaucratic professionalization or general concepts of an administrative class."[11]

In examining some of the political factors impinging on administration, Weidner offers the following "problems" and "opportunities": (1) The colonial inheritances in most of the low-income countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America has formed the base of their public administrative systems. The general pattern inherited by these countries has been one of rigid administration, centralization, a lack of local self-government, nonaction orientation except in terms of law and order, and a general preoccupation in furthering personal power through manipulation procedures and red-tape. (2) The scope of governmental activity dominates all other activities in these societies. The central government is usually the only important employer of professional, technical, and administra-

tive personnel. Hence, it tends to assume a "quasi-monopolistic" position in relation to social control. (3) The extent of political freedom has great bearing on technical assistance efforts. In authoritarian regimes, such as Turkey and Iran, public administration has had some impact; however, the visiting experts were constrained by secrecy and fear of change. In more "pluralistic" systems, such as India and the Philippines the problems were more in terms of a lack of decisiveness. While a "balance" is generally desirable between an efficient bureaucracy and a strong political system, it is not readily available. Weidner notes that technical assistance experts cannot realistically hold back their help and wait for political systems, of whatever form, to mature. (4) Effective leadership and stability in a responsible sense tend to enhance administrative capability. The relationship is not simple, however, for the former may not necessarily lead to the latter. The administrative order in low-income countries is generally much more developed than the political order. (5) The administrative systems have not been effectively opposed by any other clientele groups, such as labour, farm, and business groups. If such groups do exist at all, they are apt to be controlled by the bureaucracy itself. Some efforts to dislodge this stagnation has been attempted through the establishment of independent institutes of public administration. Such institutes stimulate citizen interests, encourage public research, and provide information. (6) The electorate, the party system, and the legislature also tend to affect the role of the bureaucracy in low-income countries. However, the impact is insufficient to control the bureaucracy, even in Costa Rica and India. Much of this apathy and fatalism is due to the colonial association, inaccessibility of all forms of communication, and the prevalence of status systems and personal politics.[12]

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

In view of the discouraging reality in low-income countries, what are the methods that "ought" to be employed in achieving political development? Weidner discredits the "cure-all approach," that administrative principles are universally applicable regardless of the form of government. He notes, however, that, "Political involvement in development administration can make it more effective and should be encouraged."[13] One would tend to agree with La Palombara's call to study the problems that confront nation-builders in particular settings and attempt solutions to these specific problems. This in general can be achieved within the context of "task orientation" and "national profiling."[14]

In surveying the literature on the politics of development, one is struck by the relative absence of genuine "task-oriented" works. Perhaps this is due to the fear of being labelled normative, or perhaps the field is too recent. One "task-oriented" framework was offered by Esman. His central question is: "Assuming nation building, what patterns of organization and action are most likely to move societies efficiently toward these twin goals?"[15] Governments in low-income countries have to deal purposefully with certain tasks in order to arrive at these overriding goals. The major tasks are generally:

(1) Establishing domestic and foreign security.

(2) Developing and keeping consensus on the legitimacy of the government.

(3) Achieving an integrated national political community.

(4) Institutionalization of new technologies and institutions.

(5) Distribution of formal power and functions between the national and local levels, and between the public and private sectors.

(6) Gradual dissolution of traditional centers of power.

(7) Propagation of psychological and material benefits.

(8) Mobilization of the finances for economic development.

(9) Planning and programming of resources.

(10) Establishing continuity by efficient management of facilities and services.

(11) Widening public participation for effective responses.

Esman notes that there are generally three major political elements concerning nation-building and socio-economic development:

"(1) a governing elite that moves and guides the modernizing process, (2) a doctrine which legitimizes in terms of programmed action, the norms, priorities, instruments and strategies of the governing elite, and (3) a series of instruments through which two-way communication is facilitated, and through which commitments to action are translated into operating programs."[16]

The governing elite in low-income nations are under constantly rising public demand for services. Many basic structural changes are necessary to relate governments and their peoples in a dynamic process. The need for a general doctrine as a unifying force is paramount in these situations, especially in the form of nationalism. Slogans, however, must be translated into action programs if they are to have some effect. Such action programs are generally characterized by social, political, and economic mobilization; a stress on social reform; and an attempt at ethnic, religious, and regional integration. Some latitude is also granted for political action and interest

articulation. Major instruments used by the governing elite are commonly political organization mass media, administrative system, and associational interest groups. The instruments must be employed deliberately and in concert to be effective.

Based on doctrine variables, Esman draws up a "heuristic" classification of most of the contemporary political regimes in low-income countries.[17] It includes (1) conservative oligarchies such as in Morocco, Iran, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia; (2) competitive interest-oriented party systems such as in Costa Rica, Malaysia and Jamaica; (3) authoritarian military reformers, such as in Burma, Thailand, and Brazil; (4) dominant mass parties, such as in Egypt, Algeria, Mexico, and India; and (5) Communist totalitarian, such as in Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea and Eastern Europe. While Esman's classification is not really new, since it is influenced by the earlier typologies of Coleman, Apter, Shils, and others, it does seem to be more relevant to the politics of development as such by indicating formal commitments. Yet, the situation in low-income countries is in such a state of flux that even the most recent literature is outdated. For example, Esman classifies Nigeria as a conservative oligarchy," the Philippines and Greece as "competitive interest-oriented party systems," and Pakistan as "authoritarian military reformers"; when in fact, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Greece now all have "authoritarian military reformers," and Pakistan has a "competitive interest-oriented party system." In fact the general political trend in low-income countries has been moving from the conservative type to the military type. Whether military rule is politically "reforming" is also subject to question. One would also question Esman's apologetic description of conservative oligarchies as cautious reformers." The fact is these feudal regimes, trapped by time and space, are simply anachronisms. These regimes are caught in a dilemma for while reform necessitates centralization of power, that in turn leads to the exclusion of the new forces produced by this reform. In the words of Huntington, "Both reform and repression are aspects of the centralization of power and the failure to expand political participation. Their logical result is revolt or revolution." It is in this context that "The future of the existing traditional monarchies is bleak."[18]

Notes and References

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8
A Dimensional Approach to the Ecology of Public Bureaucracies—An Addendum to John Forward

Ramesh K. Arora and Augusto Ferreros

'E C O L O G Y' is an 'in' word in policy sciences. However, its main application has been in the field of biology, where it suggests the interdependence between an animal species and its natural environment. Sociologists have extended the use of the term to mean a study of man's spatial relations in urban settings. In 1947, John M. Gaus in a seminal paper, emphasized the need to employ the concept of ecology in the study of public administration—namely the necessary interdependence of public bureaucracy and its environment.[1] He presented a list of factors "useful as explaining" the ebb and flow of the functions of government. They were: people, place, physical technology, social technology, wishes and ideas, catastrophe, and personality.[2] Besides leaving the problem of overlapping categories unresolved, Gaus did not elaborate these factors sufficiently, though his suggestive study did encourage other scholars to look at ecological dimensions of public administration.[3] In the same year, Robert Dahl criticized the culture-bound character of public administration literature and stressed the need for cross-cultural studies that emphasized environmental effects on administrative structure and behaviour.[4] Dahl observed that public administration cannot escape the effects of "national psychology" and political, social, and cultural environment in which it develops. He decried the almost total ignorance of the relationship between the so-called "principles of public administration" and their general setting.

In fact, Dahl was simply reflecting an emerging interest in the United States in the study of administrative pattern of the newly independent nations during the post-World War II period. The varied patterns of existing administrative systems encountered in the emerging nations stirred interest in the diverse effects of social setting upon public administration. Reflecting upon this period of growth in the discipline, Edgar Shor was correct in observing that no enlightened discussion of non-Western administration or its modernization

would neglect to acknowledge, if only perfunctorily, the relevance of environmental factors.[5] During the same period, the U.S. technical assistance programme was in its early period of growth. Considering this early development, Roscoe Martin pointed out that the vital issues were not whether, but which of these factors were significant, and what elements of Western practice were transferable.[6]

RIGGSIAN VIEW

This perspective had an implicit impact in the writings of public administration scholars during the 1950's. By 1961, Fred W. Riggs, in his ground-breaking *The Ecology of Public Administration*, had explored, from a comparative perspective, the interaction between public administration and the environment in which it develops.[7] Riggs developed his analysis in the study of public administration in the USA, ancient Siam and modern Philippines and Thailand, representing broadly his ideal type models of "refracted," "fused" and "prismatic" societies respectively. He chose only social, economic, symbolic, communication, and political variables of the environment for specific treatment, and left psychological and cognitive factors outside his purview of study. Later, he examined broadly the dimensions of geographic ecology, time, demography, national psychology, and "social technologies", of the complex process of "development" in cross-cultural settings.[8] Though the conceptual perspectives of Riggs have been insightful, his analysis has not been precise enough to permit operationalization of some of his categories in the study of the administrative ecology.

The basic premise of the ecological approach in comparative public administration is that public bureaucracy may be regarded as one of the several basic institutions in a society. Thus, in order to understand its structure and functions, it must be studied in the context of interrelationships with other institutions. In systemic terms, bureaucracy as a social institution is continually interacting with—*i.e.*, affected by and feeding back upon—the economic, political and socio-cultural sub-systems in a society. It is both a modifying influence on these systems as well as a system which is modified by their activity. It has been recognized then that the knowledge of the ecological dimensions of public administration in various settings can aid the "scientific" development of the study of public administration. Its practical importance lies in the insights it provides in the policy-formulation process in the areas of technical assistance and administrative development.[9]

One common weakness of most of the frameworks on administrative ecology is that they are based solely upon intuitive and *a priori* assumplions concerning the relationship of public bureaucracies and other societal sub-systems.[10] Thus, while these frameworks may make important contributions in terms of descriptive analysis and imaginative classificatory schemes, their contribution to explanatory theory is hampered by the absence of systematic methodology as well as an empirical base upon which to generate hypotheses.

NATURE OF PRESENT STUDY

This study attempts to provide an empirical framework for ecological studies in comparative public bureaucracies. In doing so, it builds upon the work of John Forward.[11] The attempt here will be to design a broad and general framework for comparative empirical studies in the field of public bureaucracies.

Most of the studies of ecology of public administration are of an "ideographic" character, *i.e.*, they have a single society or area orientation. The present study adopts a "nomothetic" approach which is a general theory building strategy.[12] However, both of these orientations should be considered as complementary and not competing.

HYPOTHESES AND DATA

Probably the only existent attempt to relate ecology to bureaucracy in precise quantitative terms systematically has been that of John Forward. Initially, Forward examined the interrelationships of 25 ordinally and nominally scaled variables with a nominal scale purporting to measure the "nature" of bureaucracy. These variables for 115 nations were obtained from the Banks and Textor study, *A Cross Polity Survey*.[13] Forward picked out the sub-set of independent variables that were most highly associated (via contingency coefficient analysis) with the index of the "nature" of bureaucracy. These 25 variables were: (1) Historical and significant Westernization, (2) Urbanization, (3) Interest articulation by associational groups, (4) Literacy rate, (5) Economic development status, (6) Ratio of agricultural population to total population, (7) Level of political modernization, (8) Charismatic leadership, (9) Per capita National Product, (10) Ideological orientation, (11) Newspaper circulation, (12) Toleration of autonomous groups in politics, (13) Competitiveness of electoral systems, (14) Representative character of regimes, (15) Effectiveness of legislature, (16) Government stability since World War II, (17) Frequency of interest articulation groups, (18) Linguis-

tic homogeneity, (19) Gross National Product, (20) Stability of the party system, (21) Density of population, (22) Level of sectionalism, (23) Level of political enculturation, (24) Religious homogeneity, and (25) System style.

The ordinal measure of bureaucracy used in Forward's study was identical to Banks and Textor's index of the character of bureaucracy. Although the measure is subject to an unknown degree of error in that it is based on the subjective ratings of experts in the field, and despite its ambiguous definitions, it is the only measure available.

Each polity in their sample has been classified into one of the following categories:

Modern—generally effective and responsible civil service, performing in a functionally specific, non-ascriptive social context;

Semi-modern—largely rationalized bureaucratic structure of limited efficiency because of shortage of skilled personnel, inadequate recruitment criteria, excessive intrusion of non-administrative organs, or partially non-congruent social institutions;

Transitional—largely rationalized ex-colonial bureaucratic structure in the process of personnel nationalization and adaptation to the servicing or restructuring of autochthonous social institutions; and

Traditional—largely non-rationalized bureaucratic structure performing in the context of ascriptive or deferential stratification systems.

Forward took a sub-set of 12 measures from the 25 variables and performed an unfolding scaling analysis to construct *a priori* dimensions of ecology, calling this a factor analysis procedure. He focussed on 12 particular variables because of the computational constraints involved in unfolding a 25×25 matrix of correlations. Forward then observed that he had derived four distinct factors and a fifth residual one. The four factors were: economic, communications, political, and socio-cultural.

Several problems became apparent in Forward's analysis. First, he used unfolding analysis to "factor" his ecological dimensions—a procedure quite distinct from orthodox factor analysis techniques as we know it. Also possible was a factor analysis procedure, such as the principal axes technique, or the centroid method to extract the ecological dimensions—but Forward chose not to do so. In using unfolding analysis, he used a technique more appropriate for "unfolding" ordinal preferential choice data into sets of scales.[14] His ordinal scales were based on the orderings produced by the rank order of the sizes of the contingency coefficients of the variables in relation to *a priori* defined core variables of each factor. This leads

us to Forward's main problem that he had already imposed the existence of his dimensions prior to his analysis. Factor analysis, as opposed to unfolding analysis, does not presume *a priori* notions of the latent structure of the data. Instead, it attempts to uncover latent dimensions or meaningful linear combinations that may be existent in the data.[15] In doing so, it approximates the "true" structure underlying the data in a more meaningful way than *a priori* determination of such a structure from the construction of the dimensions by ordinal scaling procedures. From this perspective, Forward's "derived factors" are of limited utility in portraying dimensions of administrative ecology.

The hypotheses of this study are based on the assumption that the ecology of public bureaucracies is multi-dimensional. Forward's findings can also be advanced as suggestive of the ecological structure of such bureaucracies.

ECOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF BUREAUCRACIES

Riggs has called our attention to the importance of the economic factor and "marketization" influences on systems of administration.[16] He has noted the effect of market principles on the personnel and fiscal systems of developing countries. The efficacy of economic facets of the administrative ecology is also underlined by Forward's findings. (His first "factor" was labeled an "economic" factor.) It can, thus, be hypothesized that an economic development factor underlies the variance in the correlation matrix of these 25 variables, and that variables, such as GNP, per capita National Product, economic development status, agricultural-total population ratio, and urbanization should have high loading on this factor.

The role of communication has long been emphasized in the literature on social organizations and public administration. John Dorsey and Fred Riggs have emphasized communication as an important component of administrative ecology. Dorsey, in fact, has sketched an information energy model for administrative systems in developing societies and has observed that low levels of development vary along with low supplies and surpluses of information and energy. Dorsey recommends that societies seeking development increase their informational intake and their information handling capacity in developing networks of transportation and communication.[17] Riggs emphasizes more specifically the importance of literacy, common language, radio, Press, and T.V. services (the media), and religion in inducing mobilization and assimilation of population and their

impact on public administration.[18] In keeping with these ideas and Forward's findings, it can be hypothesized that a communication factor is latently suggested by the 25 variables under examination. Variables that are expected to load highly on this dimension include: literacy, newspaper circulation, linguistic homogeneity, level of sectionalism and religious homogeneity.

Socio-cultural factors are likewise extremely important in the manner in which these shape administrative ecology. Riggs has noted the possible effects of such social structures as families, sects, social classes, and associational groups on administration.[19] These structures crucially affect bureaucratic recruitment, socialization, promotion and mobility. Furthermore, the role of culture and symbols in administration is also important in shaping administrative values, such as consensus and equality.[20] William Storm has also emphasized the significance of the study of the cultural factors of administrative ecology in comparative administration.[21] Michael Crozier's study has shown how the French bureaucratic behaviour is influenced considerably by the societal cultural norms in France.[22] It can, thus, be hypothesized, that a socio-cultural factor underlies the data analyzed in this article, and it is suggested that both social and cultural variables tend to interact with, and relate to, each other in a fashion that renders any distinction between these difficult, particularly in the context of developing areas. Variables that are expected to load on this factor are: Westernization, frequency of associational groups, population density, sectionalism, religious homogeneity, and linguistic homogeneity.

The political framework of administrative systems has long been emphasized in the literature of Western democratic, European Communist, and the emerging nations of Afro-Asia and Latin America.[23] The fallacy of the politics-administration dichotomy was shown by a number of scholars such as Paul H. Appelby, Harold Stein, and Morstein Marx, during the post World War II period. The emphasis on the role of political factors in administrative decision making is being restated anew by such writers as Peter Woll, Aaron Wildawski, and George Gawthrop.[24] Brzezinski and Huntington have shown how the administrative and political structures are intertwined in the Soviet Union.[25]

The political elements in administration become quite significant in the power structure of administrative systems in developing areas. Weiss observes that, in developing States, a governmental bureaucracy in a sub-system of society in general and political institutions in particular.[26] It can then be hypothesized that a politi-

cal factor is expected to be derived from the existent data and that variables loading highly on this factor consist of: interest articulation by associational groups, level of political modernization, leadership charisma, ideological orientation, group toleration, electoral competitiveness, regime character, legislative effectiveness, government stability, party system stability, level of political enculturation and system style.

Following the initial assumption of multi-dimensionality, certain hypotheses regarding the structure of ecological components underlying the data have been put forward. These propositions imply that administrative ecology consists of four basic dimensions, namely, the economic, communication, socio-cultural, and political. These components are not necessarily uncorrelated, nor do the variables hypothesized as loading highly and positively on these components, necessarily load exclusively on these. The use of factor analysis in this context is primarily that of a tool for testing hypotheses on the dimensionality of the particular domain as defined by the 25 variables. Strictly speaking, the analysis does not focus primarily on the investigation of association between variables but rather on the kinds of clusters these variables form in the space of the data. Forward's contribution that these 25 variables and its sub-set of 12 correlate highly with the nature of bureaucracy, is acceptable, although the examination here includes all the 25 variables (unlike Forward) and uses principal component factor analysis.

METHOD

The tools used in this study consist of Pearson product moment correlation analysis and principal components factor analysis, followed by an orthogonal rotation using Kaiser's normal Varimax. Nominal and ordinal scaled variables have often been subjected to interval techniques of analysis. Examples of these are the research works of Rudolph Rummel, Gregg and Banks, Nye, Powell, and Prewitt, and Michael Haas.[27] The issues surrounding the use of such scales arise from the properties of such scales and the permissible operations that are defined on these. Tufte and Willer have both emphasized that ordinal scales have interval properties and, thus, may be dealt with using interval methods without distorting the relationships inherent in the data.[28] Nye *et. al.*, have shown that a matrix of Pearsonian γ's does not differ significantly from that of a matrix of Rho's or Spearman rank coefficients. More sophisticated data analysts, such as Abelson and Tukey, have long been employing interval techniques to categorical and ordinal data.[29] Tufte observes

that several statisticians have taken the distinction between ordinal and interval measurement "very, very seriously—almost to the point of paralysis." He warns, "By sticking rigidly to the distinction between ordinal and interval levels of measurement (a distinction often difficult to make in practice), we are, in effect, censoring the data and shutting off part of what the data could tell us—if we would only let them."[30] In the face of potential gains in measurement and analysis, Tufte sees very little of the potential cost in such scale-transformations.

Principal component factor analysis is distinctly superior to unfolding, for reasons explained above in terms of drawing factors or linear combination of variables fiom a correlation matrix. It presupposes that a manifest variable X_{jl} may be described as a combination of latent factors or components, the basic model being:

$$X_{jl}=\sum_{k=1} A_{jk}C_{kl}(j=1 \ldots m;\ l=1 \ldots n)$$

where,

x=individual value,

c=component, and

a=loading.

The principal estimation problem in component factor analysis is deriving the l's and a's, under the restriction that the factor is uncorrelated. These factors may then very parsimoniously explain manifest correlations. The primary step in estimating these latent factors is the calculation of eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the correlation matrix with l's on the diagonal. From Cooley and Lahnes, the matrix equation of component factor analysis is:

$$Rak=\lambda\, k\, Ak$$ [31]

Resulting eigenvectors Ak (with corresponding values λk) can, after adjusting, be considered as columns of factor loadings—which, if the factors are uncorrelated, describe the correlation of variables with the factors.[32] The unrotated matrix is then examined to see the major patterns of variation in the data and the factors are rotated to clearly depict interpretable dimension—or a "single structure" of high positive, zero and/or high negative loading coefficients. Kaiser's normal Varimax was employed as the criterion for rotating the matrix since it maximizes the variance of the factor columns.[33] Interpretations were based on this last matrix.

RESULTS

The 25 variables were intercorrelated using Pearson product moment correlation analysis.[34] The correlation matrix with *1*'s in the main diagonal was factored using principal component analysis.[35] Since the major concern lies in the rotated factor solution, intercorrelations and unrotated matrices were treated only preliminary steps to the rotated loading matrix which presents the basic findings of this article. The initial principal components solution derived six factors from the correlations. Altogether the six factors explain a very respectable 72 per cent of the total variance in the data. Only those factors that explained more than 5 per cent of the variance were kept for rotation purposes. In this case, the same six factors met this criterion and were rotated orthogonally using Kaiser's Normal Varimax.[36] The resulting matrix is displayed in Table 1.

Instead of the four hypothesized factors, six were derived from the correlation matrix. On the basis of the variables that loaded highly on each factor, labels were assigned to each of the six factors, which were: a modernization factor, a democratization factor, a political stability factor, a cultural integration factor, an ethnic diversity factor and an ideological-systemic factor.

Factor one—modernization—explains the largest amount of the variance in the rotated solution (41.4 per cent), and contrary to initial expectations, social, communication and economic type variables as well as some political variables loaded highly on this factor. Apparently, social factors go hand in hand with communication and economic factors in the process of development—a well-established thesis in current theory in development economics.[37] The variables with loadings higher than ± 0.50 are given as follows:

Variables	
Urbanization	0.53
Agriculture/total population ratio	—0.84
Gross National Product	0.75
Per Capita National Product	0.91
Economic development status	0.84
Literacy	0.67
Newspaper circulation	0.81
Westernization	0.86
Political modernization scale	0.75
Interest articulation by associational groups	0.78
Interest articulation by institutional groups	—0.63
Leadership charisma	—0.51

Table 1

Rotated Factor Loading Matrix (25 Ecological Variables) Kaiser's Normal Vairmax Orthogonal Rotation

	Factor Loadings		*Col—Factor*		*Row—Variable*		*Index of Variables Description*	
	1	2	3	4	5	6		
1	0.4358	0.1103	—0.0615	—0.0266	—0.2115	0.4963	1	Density of Population
2	0.5357	0.0244	0.1315	0.4628	—0.2183	0.1021	2	Urbanization
3	—0.8418	—0.2389	0.0416	0.1051	0.0948	0.1102	3	Agriculture/total Population Ratio
4	0.7536	—0.0236	—0.0[illegible]07	0.0641	0.3719	0.1274	4	Gross National Product
5	0.9107	0.1381	—0.1036	—0.0132	—0.0943	—0.1400	5	Per capita National Product
6	0.8414	0.1094	—0.0493	0.0130	0.0241	—0 1733	6	Economic Development Status
7	0.6785	—0.1249	0.0663	0.3143	—0.1301	0.1802	7	Literacy Rate
8	0.8078	—0.0302	0 0063	0.3042	—0.1962	—0.0173	8	Newspaper Circulation
9	—0.0361	—0.0659	0.0890	0 8447	0.0278	0.0905	9	Religious Homogeneity
10	0.3431	0.0628	0.0411	0.5761	—0.4029	—0.0962	10	Linguistic Homogeneity
11	0.8622	0.0566	—0.0666	0.0540	—0.1504	0.0216	11	Historical or Significant Westernization
12	0.7514	0 0034	0.2231	0.3037	0.0386	—0.0206	12	The Level of Political Modernization
13	—0.3614	—0.1250	0.0459	0.0070	0 0400	0.7755	13	Ideological Orientation
14	—0.0060	—0.4650	0.0682	0.2273	0.2432	0.6031	14	System Style
15	—0.0552	—0.0694	—0.8676	—0.1469	—0.2490	—0.0405	15	Government Stability since World War II
16	0.1658	0.8044	—0.0320	0.0426	—0.1993	0.0417	16	Representative Character of Regimes
17	—0.0283	0.7430	0.1331	0.0451	0.3624	—0.2294	17	Competitiveness of Electoral Systems
18	0.0911	0.8420	0.2288	—0.1591	0.0054	—0.1044	18	Toleration of Autonomous Groups in Politics
19	0.3376	—0.3392	—0.3826	0.5212	—0.1347	0 0056	19	Level of Political Enculturation
20	—0 0570	0.0525	0.1475	—0.2928	0.7106	—0.0027	20	Level of Sectionalism
21	0.7807	0.2862	0.1219	—0.0137	—0.0795	0.0034	21	Interest Articulation by Associational Groups
22	—0.6342	—0.3447	—0.0479	0.0089	0.2322	0.2165	22	Interest Articulation by Institutional Groups
23	—0.0366	—0.1069	—0.8669	0.0231	0.1697	—0 0051	23	Party System Stability
24	—0.5110	0.0889	—0.2657	0.1636	0.5679	0 0888	24	Charismatic Leadership
25	0.2199	0.8378	—0.0234	—0.0403	0.0960	—0.0064	25	Effectiveness of Legislature

Total Contribution VP Col—Factor

1	2	3	4	5	6
7,4407	3,3127	1,9427	2,0530	1,7295	1,4867

Original Variance—25,000

Variance Explained—17,965
Per cent of Original Variance—71,86

Per cent of Original Variance — Col—Factor

1	2	3	4	5	6
29,76	13,25	7,77	8,21	6,92	5,95

Per cent of Explained Variance — Col—Factor

1	2	3	4	5	6
41.42	18.44	10.81	11.43	9.63	8.82

Modernization seems to be an appropriate label given the high positive loadings of the economic measures of GNP and economic development. High GNP rates and high degrees of economic development appear to be associated with a high level of urbanization,[38] a high literacy rate and newspaper circulation. These last three variables are important elements of Lerner's "systemic" theory of modernization.[39] Morroe Berger has noted the importance of this influence of "Westernization" on public bureaucracies in less developed countries.[40]

Modernized countries have high propensity for interest articulation by associational groups.[41] Such countries also rank high in terms of Banks and Textor's political modernization scale—a 4-point continuum ranging from advanced societies to pre-transitional societies.[42] Modernization appears to be associated with low agricultural/total population ratios, low leadership charisma[43] and a low level of interest articulation by such institutional groups as the bureaucracy, the army, church, etc. These loadings appear to be quite meaningful in terms of political development theory. The more developed countries rely less on agriculture than on industry. Leadership is de-personalized. In addition, no one autonomous institutional group, such as the army or bureaucracy, tends to dominate the power structure. Riggs's concept of "balance of power" between bureaucracy and political groups tends to operate in such situations.[44]

The second factor is primarily a "democratization" factor and explains 18.44 per cent of the variance in the rotated matrix. Of the factors derived from our analysis, this comes closest to a purely "political" factor but the substantive meaning of the loading deserves closer scrutiny. This is as follows:

Representative character of regimes	0.80
Competitiveness of electoral systems	0.74
Degree of freedom of group opposition	0.84
Legislative effectiveness	0.84

This factor seems to index those variables that measure the degree to which a system is "democratic". Dahl's work on polyarchy and political opposition bears out the importance of conditions very similar to those denoted by these measures.[45] The term "democratization" is then assigned to this factor, for want of a better label.

The third factor appears to be even more substantially interesting than the first two. This factor explains 10.8 per cent of the variance in the rotated solution, and only following two variables load highly and negatively on this factor:

Government stability	—0.87
Party system stability	—0.86

Quite obviously, this is a political instability factor, seen from the direction and magnitude of the factor loading. This factor also suggests that instability of political parties appears to be associated with the general rise and fall of governments. This contention is borne out by the original correlation of 0.63 between the two variables. The pervasive phenomenon of political instability, especially in the Afro-Asian and Latin American nations, has been treated considerably by Eisenstadt, Huntington, Almond and Powell, and Riggs.[46]

The fourth factor directly conflicts with the initial assumption that social and cultural variables are not exactly distinguishable from each other in less developed areas. The factor solution has somehow extracted an independent cultural integration dimension from the data. The three variables indexing this dimension are:

Religious homogeneity	0.84
Linguistic homogeneity	0.57
Political enculturation	0.52

This factor explains 11.4 per cent of the variance in the rotated solution and bears out the importance of the cultural integration component in administrative ecology. Furthermore, it necessarily posits a strong association between religious and linguistic homogeneity which tends to be found simultaneously with a higher level of political enculturation (the latter measured in terms of degree of opposition and absence of communalism, fractionalism and disenfranchisement or political non-assimilation).[47] High levels of political enculturation probably require high levels of religious as well as linguistic homogeneity.[48]

The fifth factor explaining 9.6 per cent of the variance has been loosely labelled an "ethnic diversity" factor. Surprisingly, variables expected to load on socio-cultural and communication factors load instead on this factor. That this factor emerged as an independent dimension—from that of the cultural integration domain—is also interesting. Development literature on the cultural pluralism phenomenon in developing countries tends to imply that ethnic diversity

forms an important element in the political culture of these nations.[49] The findings here, although not conclusive, suggest that ethnic diversity may possibly be distinct from other cultural elements, such as language and religious value systems.[50] The variables loading on this factor are:

Sectionalism	0.71
Charismatic leadership	0.57
Linguistic homogeneity	—0.40

The third variable was included in order to aid in the labelling of this factor. Although it is not quite as high as the cut-off point of ± 0.50 it does appear to be consistent with the loadings on sectionalism and charismatic leadership. Countries with high sectional cleavages also tend to be countries that are characterized by personalistic types of leadership and areas that are linguistically heterogeneous, *e.g.*, countries of Asia and Africa.

The last factor explains about 8.3 per cent of the variance. It was loosely called an "ideological-systemic" factor, primarily because of the variables loading distinctively on this factor:

Ideological orientation	0.77
System style	0.60

The first variable was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from doctrinal ideology to traditional ideology.[51] System style was measured on a 3-point scale ranging from mobilizational style to non-mobilizational style.[52] Ideology appears to be a component, independent of modernization, stability, and cultural integration and, as such, appears as an important dimension of administrative ecology.[53]

SUMMARY

A factor analysis of 25 ecological variables found to be highly related to Banks and Textor's index of the character of public bureaucracies revealed six distinct dimensions as opposed to the four originally hypothesized. These four hypothesized dimensions consisted of an economic factor, a communication factor, a socio-cultural factor and a political factor. The factors emerging from the data were: a modernization factor, a "democratization" factor, a political instability dimension, a cultural dimension, an ethnic diversity dimension, and an ideological-systemic component. Apparently, the hypothesized ecological dimensions do not adequately portray the complex

structure described by the variables under study. The findings are at variance with the original hypotheses of this study, as well as with the findings of John Forward. Political elements appear to be pervasive throughout the ecological dimensions that characterize the environment of public bureaucracies; even culture has distinctively political characteristics. The findings appear to be consistent with literature dealing with the interaction between administration and its political environment and lends credence to the idea that public administration does not operate in a vacuum but rather in the centre of complex socio-economic, cultural and political phenomena, continually interacting with them.

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9

Administrative Development: The Concept Re-Explored

Rakesh Hooja

A lot is being written now-a-days about development administration, but little efforts have been made to evolve a concept of or define, administrative development. To put it in other words, while a lot of books[1] are being written on the role of the administration in furthering development, very little thinking is available on the development of the administrative system itself.[2] A few people have also talked of Administrative Health (which is more of a static concept)[3] and Administrative Reform. But, as I intend showing, these concepts are quite different from Administrative Development.

In this article I propose to deal (in an introductory manner) with the various logically possible dimensions of the term of 'Administrative Development.' I shall start with defining "Administration" and "Development" before moving on to the different ways of looking at Administrative Development.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AS AN INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

Administrative Development can be viewed as *structural development of the administrative system, or administrative "rationalization" and institution building*. This aspect of development could be undertaken with the purpose of making the administrative system more efficient, or more effective, or more streamlined, or more innovative. Here I must point out that structural development does not imply *mere reform* in the administrative procedures and channels—but can also mean *fundamental change*; as from traditional custom-based administration to either a tightly integrated hierarchical system or a loosely-knit, pyramidal federation of semi-autonomous offices and units. Further, structural development can logically be independent of existing goals and conditions. This aspect of the concept should be looked at from the viewpoint of differentiation, both structural and sectoral.

While talking of structural development, the implication is that administrative development is an independent variable. Another way

of viewing the concept as an independent, or even causal, variable is to consider it as *such development in administration as leads to (1) political development, (2) economic growth or/and, (3) social change.* Here I intend to discuss what these three terms mean[4] and how the administrative system can, or does, gear itself to furthering one, or all, of these processes. Further I would like to point out that the efficacy of the administrative system could be determined by the scale of the operation (where a sort of law of varying proportions would function), or by "technological" changes in "administrative know-how" and the resultant adoption of new modes, or techniques, of administration.

AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Administrative Development can also be considered to be a dependent variable; *the administrative changes that are consequent to modernization and environmental transformations.* This raises the question of whether administrative development has universal characteristics or whether it differs from society to society on the basis of the level of modernization achieved. If there is more than one pattern of administrative development, then how many types are there? In this context is it even possible to develop an administrative development syndrome which would fit all contemporary situations?

Not only is there the possibility of administrative development differing according to the culture in which the administrative system exists, but administrative development may also be dependent upon the accepted ideology of the socio-political system in question. Thus administrative development can also be looked upon as *the evolution of an administrative system commensurate with societal goals.* Here again, the question whether administrative development is unlinear or multilinear, whether it is an absolute or a relative term, crops up. The problem of neutral administrators versus committed ones, and of "law and order" administration versus welfare, Socialist or Fascist administration, or even a utopian administration-less society as envisaged by some anarchists, are related to this aspect of administrative development.

THE RELATIONSHIP QUESTION

Any social system is also judged from the point of view of its capabilities; "that is the way it performs as a unit in its environment."[5] This brings up the dimension of the relationship between the administrative system and the other social systems that form its environment. Can it be suggested that one indicator of administrative development is the *degree of autonomy it has vis-a-vis other related systems?* Or does the word 'administration' by definition imply subordination

to the political system?[6] Can administrative functions be performed independently of political functions? In fact can the administrative function even be separated from the political one? If not, then administrative development becomes a mere sub-process of political development and as such it does not imply changes aimed at "freeing" administration from politics.

Earlier I said that Administrative Development is that which leads to social change, which presumably could be measured on the basis of Parson's Pattern Variables or some similar criteria. Quite similar could be to look at the administrative ethos or culture itself from the point of view of Parsonian Variables. For example, whether or not recruitment, and authority, are based on ascription on efficiency could be a determinant of the level of Administrative Development in a system.[7] This aspect, however, could, I feel, be merged with structural development, even though administrative cultural change is involved here, since the general movement in both cases is towards rationalization.

A consideration of the above-mentioned points raises certain questions. Will the adoption of any one type of government, or even administrative system *ipso facto* lead to Administrative Development? If not, which type of governmental or administrative system, if any, is more conducive to Administrative Development? Does Administrative Development depend upon the class-base of the bureaucracy? How does Administrative Development take place? It is unilinear or multi-linear? If multi-linear, as seems indicated, then how can we identify enough similar characteristics so as to evolve a satisfactory universal concept? Is continuous development involved, or are there ups and downs in the history of an administrative system? If Administrative Development cannot be depicted by a straight-line graph but by a line that goes zig-zag; then does the trend have to conform to Development, or can conditions of Administrative Decay or Administrative Status-Quo also exist? If Administrative Decay also takes place, then is a cyclical process in existence? Is Administrative Development a series of sudden major changes, or a slow continuous process; that is, can one construct a continuum model or a stages one to explain Administrative Development? Is it a dependent, independent or intervening variable, or even a catalytic agent?

Before one can answer these questions satisfactorily one shall have to try and develop a specific and precise concept of Administrative Development, a careful amalgam of the points raised above and the views of Riggs,[8] they being the only available ones on the subject.

THE CONCEPT OF 'DEVELOPMENT'

Let me start with the term 'development'. It is used either to describe what has happened, or it is used to describe changes that are positively valued. The latter usage is more appropriate to us from the methodological or heuristic point of view. Colm and Geiger[9] say, "development means change plus growth." Thus we may say that such qualitative and quantitative transformations as have been/are being desired may be termed 'development'. These changes may, however, be such as are made known to us only indirectly through consequential transformations of some concrete structure. However, since the symptoms of Development may be the same in some cases as that of modernization, it would be appropriate to emphasize the difference between the two. Modernization is a time-bound concept, referring to post-industrial revolution conditions (or the modern era), 'development' is not so and has taken place (will do so) throughout time. Modernization is multi-dimensional, development may, though not necessarily, be uni-dimensional.

'ADMINISTRATION' DEFINED

To define 'administration' is slightly more difficult. Traditionally one differentiates between the decision-makers (political) and the executors of decisions (administration). The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines it as "the performance or management of affairs . . . it is also used generally for 'government' or the executive ministry, and . . . as the administration (administering or tendering) of." Some people even tend to erroneously identify 'administration' with the 'bureaucracy'. I prefer to follow Riggs[10] who suggest that the 'political' and the 'administrative' may both be mingled in that any decision or function may involve both the selection of alternative values (the political) and the invocation of means required to implement the chosen goals (the administrative).[11] But since in actuality the same people indulge simultaneously in what Riggs calls the administrative and the political functions, it becomes difficult to define 'administrative' except in relative terms, as a variable of the 'degree of administrativeness'. Thus an administrative system would be definable as that persistent sub-unit of any social system which comprises people committed, trained and equipped to utilize available resources in an optimum manner so as to achieve predetermined goals; and who may also contribute, in small measure, to the determination of goals, which function is normally the task of the political system in any given society.[12] Thus the administrative system is by definition subordinate to and linked with the political

system (though at times the two tend to become identical, leading to stress in the political and social systems).[13] Such an administrative system can never be fully autonomous, but it should still remain free from excessive interference from the "sovereign" political system.[14]

It is with such a perspective in mind that I am trying to explore changes, along the developmental scale, in the administrative system.

IMPLICATIONS OF STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION

As already hinted, structural and cultural changes in the administrative system may be termed Administrative Development.[15]

Such development may be looked at from the points of view of structural and sectoral differentiation, institutionalization, Parsonian pattern variables and the point where power is concentrated (including the group which wields this power), in other words the location and composition of the political elite (inside or outside the administrative system).

Sectoral (or occupational) differentiation is commonly called occupational specialization and involves different people following different trades. Related, but more significant from the developmental viewpoint, is the concept of structural differentiation which may be termed as "a process whereby each of the stages in decision-making gains recognition as a distinct procedure and, to some extent at least, different roles become specialized for the performance of one or more of these stages."[16] Thus the more the structural differentiation in a system the more defined shall be the boundary between the administrative and the political systems (though it does not necessarily follow that the linkages between the two shall become weaker). Differentiation affects performance, but I propose to take that up later.

Stability is considered to be a part of development by some people and a prerequisite for development by others since it adds to the capabilities of a system. Other people, who feel that a revolution is essential for development in today's society, will also admit that some stabilizing will be essential for perpetuating the fruits of the revolution and making it possible for mankind to partake fully of those fruits. Institutionalization or institution-building, whether of formal or informal structures, is essential for stability.[17]

The level of institutionalization of any system may, following Huntington,[18] be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence of its organizations and procedures.

Adaptability is, in a rough sense, a function of environmental challenges and age. A rigid organization will not be able to adjust to new stimuli, hence only when a system has withstood changes in leadership-generations and in its functions can it be termed adaptable and stable. Thus mere functional specifity, which is a corollary of structural differentiation, is not enough for development; functional adaptability is equally vital.

Complexity, as opposed to simplicity, involves "both [the] multiplication of organizational sub-units, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational sub-units."[19] An organization that has many purposes is better able to adjust itself to a loss of one purpose. Similarly, the more and varied the sub-units, the greater the ability of an organization to secure and maintain the loyalty of its members.

Autonomy and subordination have to be looked upon in a manner slightly different from the conventional while talking of the administrative system. The administrative system is clearly in a position of, at least, quasi-subordination to the political system. Autonomy would here imply insulation from non-political groups, and even political ones if they try to exercise influence through non-established, or extra-constitutional channels. Thus, it is essential that the administrative system maintain its integrity and follow its own, distinctly administrative, norms, while avoiding becoming the instrument of any one social group.

Coherence, and not disunity, is necessary not only for the efficient functioning but also for the survival of any system. Substantial consensus among active participants of the system on the functional boundaries of the system and on the procedures for acting and resolving disputes—all prerequisites of coherence are essential. The need for coherence is more apparent in systems where structural and sectoral differentiation is high.

A movement towards rationalization on the Parsonian scale also contributes to some extent in institution-building, as it does in capability-building. Since an ethos based on a sort of merit criterion, universalism and specialization comes into being, it helps in the development of the morale of the actors in the system, makes them more loyal to the systemic goals and adds to the coherence of the system; thus such a cultural change is always welcome.[20]

The location of the political elite is important because it (the elite) has a tendency towards using its power in its own self-interest. Hence, if the real power wielders are outside the administrative system, they are liable in their own, self-interest, to impose such

sanctions on the administrators as to induce them to apply administrative norms properly and to accomplish the tasks prescribed from them. Similarly, the composition of the elite determines whether sectoral, or wholistic, development of the entire system shall occur. Presumably, if the political elite belongs to a restricted social base and is, to a large extent, situated inside the administrative system, then the performances of the administrative, political and social systems, all shall suffer.

THE ASPECT OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

I have defined the administrative system as a sort of tool. Development, in this context, can be taken as the sharpening of that tool; the raising of its performance level. But what is important is not personal or organizational performance, but systemic or social performance. Performance can be measured from the point of view of endeavour. Riggs,[21] on whom I intend to base myself in this section, is concerned with the extent of endeavour, not of accomplishment.

But before taking up the Riggsian exposition let me take up the aspect of accomplishment (which is also the field of Development Administration). As mentioned earlier, accomplishment could be viewed from the perspectives of social change, political development, or economic growth. Each of these concepts can be defined in various ways. Political development has been described as institutionalization, State building, nation building, accommodating participatory and distributory demands, increasing the capability of the political system, increasing "equality" between sub-systems and making them autonomous, making the political system autonomous of all other systems, etc. Economic growth may be taken to mean quantitative increase in the economic systems' output, increase in the output-input ratio, capital formation, increased investment, or achieving self-sufficiency at the nation-State level. Social change involves cultural secularization, social mobilization,[22] structural differentiation, movement along Parsonian pattern variables and the adjustments (psycho-cultural changes and the like) that society has been forced to make by the changes brought about by industrialization and modernization. On the other hand, social change may be taken to mean societal revolution leading to liberty, equality, fraternity and social justice.

Is it possible for any type of system to simultaneously accomplish all this? Political scientists working on 'crises and political development'[23] do not think so. Thus administrative development

would also imply building up the capacity of a system to be able to avoid the simultaneous eruption of various developmental challenges and to be able to isolate such stresses and deal with thems equentially. This should be the matter of much future study as the administrative and political systems shall have to work in concert to achieve this.[24]

DIFFERENTIATION-PERFORMANCE LINKAGE

Now to return to Riggs's analytical construct. Riggs points out that the level of performance does not necessarily vary directly with the degree of structural differentiation since there might exist actors unwilling to, or ineffective in, carrying out assigned roles. In fact, Riggs points out, the greater the degree of differentiation, the greater the chances of very high, or very low performance levels, and the less the differentiation, the less is the possible range of variation of positive and negative performance. This is because greater differentiation leads to greater performance requirements, while also making it possible for very high performance levels to be achieved. Thus for undifferentiated systems the developmental goal is increased differentiation, but as our attention shifts to more diffrentiated systems, the question of different levels of performance at the same, as well as different, levels of differentiation becomes important.

We now have four variables to work with: high and low performance and high and low differentiation. A system which is both high on the differentiation and performance scales Riggs calls "differacted," and one that has high differentiation but low performance "prismatic."[25] Since development is linked with a movement towards high differentiation, a rise in the differentiation level accompanied by a drop in performance is termed "negative development," and a rise in both differentiation and performance levels "positive development." A fall in differentiation is described as "reversion," which might be positive if performance is high and negative if it is low. An increase in performance regardless of differentiation is improvement, and a decrease breakdown.

DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT

Now to turn to the dynamics of developmental and reversive changes as described by Riggs. Here he bases himself on the concepts of polarization, formality, rationalism and enculturation. Enculturation,

which includes socialization and social control, is the process by which individuals learn to behave according to the prescribed norms and practices of their own culture. Most decisions of a person are dependent solely upon enculturation, but there are also in any culture some spheres of action in which individuals (or groups) are free to choose among alternatives according to the appropriateness of different available means for the achievement of desired goals. This sphere of free choice may be called the area of rationality (as opposed to ritualism). As long as the problems facing any system are age-old, the culturally defined ways of responding to them are probably adequate. However, new problems, which may be consequent to industrialization and modernization or to increased structural differentiation which necessitates new patterns of structural inter-dependence, need new innovations to solve them. Thus, if one wants to avoid negative development, the more differentiated a system, the greater must be the area of rationality (as contrasted with conformity to precedent). The prospects of rational choice however shall also depend inversely upon the number of goals sought and not merely on being able to analyse cause-effect relationships of alternatives in a secular manner.[26] Structural differentiation serves the purpose of limiting the number of goals or objectives facing any one actor or structure and thus itself also contributes to rationalism.

The degree of rationality is related to the levels of polarization and formality. Polarization refers to the extent that sanctions, positive and negative, that make each part of a system function in the required manner, are institutionalized. Thus this is a means to co-ordination and the building up of inter-dependence between differentiated structures by authoritatively, or otherwise, cementing the system and making it conform to common norms. Obviously greater polarization shall be called for in more differentiated systems to maintain improvement. A lack of polarization in such cases shall lead to breakdown. Thus a diffracted system is one that is sufficiently polarized for its level of differentiation while a prismatic system is one that is not. An increase in the degree of polarization necessitates an increase in the area of rationality regardless of whether formal or informal modes of securing cooperation are employed. In so far as social control and formal means are employed, the society emphasizes authority and external sanctions as a means to polarization. In so far as socialization and informal means are employed, it emphasizes education and training. Both formal and informal means are normally employed together and the degree of formality does not enable us to explain the level of performance, but it may indicate why a

system is insufficiently polarized. Excessive formality may lead to ineffectiveness, excessive informality to inefficiency. Thus it has been suggested by Riggs that the scale of formality should be moderate to assist in development.

Riggs then goes on to point out that differentiation necessitates greater communication of both information and goals through introjection-extrojection relationships which need not necessarily follow hierarchically recognized channels. From this point of view "a highly diffracted society . . . probably requires not so much unity of command as multiplicity of communication, not hierarchy of authority, but polyarchy of assent."[27]

Thus Riggs concludes: "The raising of performance levels . . . seems to require the expansion of areas of rationalism in decision making, marked by an increase of extrojecting-introjecting relationships. It is this change . . . which makes possible and results from the increased polarization of sanctions for institutionalizing stable inter-dependencies, whether in terms of socialization or social control."[28]

IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON CONCEPTUALIZATION

It has been suggested that different countries may need different patterns of administrative development according to their starting point, their governmental systems, the capability of their administrative system, and their goals or ideologies. This seems a valid proposition, even though my preference throughout this article has been for the evolution of an absolute time-, space-, and value-free concept of Administrative Development. However, different meanings of Administration as well as of Development may be set forth by different people on the basis of differing needs and differing value-premises. To take but one example, this entire exercise undertaken according to a Marxian approach would have produced different results. One could perhaps have started with the factors and relationships of production and tried to ensure their use so as to end exploitation of one by another, as also to bring about the establishment of new patterns of belief and behaviour among the masses. Different Communist countries have tried this sort of cultural uplift in different ways, the common aspect always being a cadre based party of committed and aware people who use persuasion as well as coercion to achieve their ends. In the transitional stage party members compose both the political and administrative systems and they function not on the basis of abstract administrative norms or

bureaucratic rules which might be biased in someone social groups favour, but on the basis of social commitment. The ideal is responsiveness to the demands or needs of the people, though occasionally this ideal tends to get submerged in the self-interest of the cadres. It is hoped that later on the people shall be able to administer themselves without the help of an organized administrative system, because an organized administrative system as found in the West might be alienated, or removed from the people and thus ineffective from the point of view of social purpose. It is hoped that eventually the problem of government will be replaced by that of social administration in a classless society in which all economic antagonisms have disappeared. Thus, according to Marxists, Administrative Development would involve some sort of administration through communes or through attempts at societal self-government as found in Yugoslavia. Introspection, self-education and self-criticism among socially committed citizens as advocated during China's Cultural Revolution might also conceivably be taken as a measure of Administrative Development, as could commitment of the masses to the cause. New Left writings also decry differentiation and specialization as leading to the dehumanizing of mankind since they advocate the ideal of the "complete man" as opposed to that of the "atomistic man". Thus one finds an almost total reversal of the concept of Administrative Development if the Marxist-Leninist Framework is employed.

This example tends to highlight a major problem of theorization in the social sciences. Conceivably Fascists could evolve a different concept of Administrative Development. Similarly, it is also conceivable that, in the feudal era, different standards of Administrative Development could have seemed correct. Considering all this is it possible to develop a universal concept? Because if one's vocabulary and normative perspective varies, one's understanding of a social process shall also be different.[29] It is not possible within this article to try and resolve this problem, or even to try and merge various ideological approaches so as to come up with one meaning of Administrative Development. More study may, or may not, provide an answer.

CONCLUSION

This still leaves the questions raised at the beginning of this paper, regarding the manner in which Administrative Development would take place, unanswered. While some hints emerge in the body of

the paper, I doubt if anyone can come up with more than a very simplistic analysis of the process.

At this stage, it will perhaps be appropriate to merely say that the direction, mode, and degree of development of any system depends upon the following seven factors:

(1) The functioning pattern of the system itself;

(2) The resources—material and cultural—that the system can draw upon under various circumstances;

(3) The response pattern of the political elite to system challenges;

(4) Development in other social systems (the environment) at the domestic and international levels;

(5) The type of problems facing the system;

(6) The system's goals; and

(7) The type of capabilities[30] a system has developed in absolute terms, as well as in relation to systemic goals.

To attempt more would be premature.

Notes and References

1. Recent examples include Ralph Braibanti and Associates, *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969); Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966): Fred W. Riggs (ed.), *Frontiers of Development Administration* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970); Irving Swerdlow (ed.), *Development Administration: Concepts and Problems* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963); Dwight Waldo (ed.), *Temporal Dimensions of Devlopment Administration* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970); James Heaphey (ed.), *Spacial Dimensions of Development Administration* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970); Edward Weidner (ed.), *Development Administration in Asia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970). Among Indian writings C.N. Bhalerao's *Administration, Politics and Development in India* (Bombay: Lalwani Publishing House, 1972) comes to mind.
2. The only exposition I have come across is Fred W. Riggs "Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept" in Montgomery and Siffin (ed.), *op. cit.*, henceforth cited as "Administrative Development".
3. See Gerald Coiden *Administrative Reform* (London: Alan Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970).
4. For example social change may be defined from the point of view of Sociology (cultural secularization, social mobilization, etc.) or of ideology (revolution, social justice, etc.).
5. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1960), p. 28.
6. Writing from the point of view of Political Development in La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Riggs has stressed the vital necessity of the bureaucracy being kept subordinate to the Political role-players.
7. Using Weberian terms one could describe this aspect of Ad-

ministrative Development as a movement away from a traditional or a charismatic bureaucratic system, and towards a rational-legal one. 8. "Administrative Development".

9. Gerard Colm and Theodore Geiger, "County Programing as a Guide to Development" in *Development of the Emerging Countries: An Agenda for Research* (Washington: Brooking Institution, 1962).
10. "Administrative Development".
11. For a discussion of how a decision involves both choice of values and the marshalling of facts and resources see Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behaviour* (New York: Free Press, 1947) and Harold Lasswell, *The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis* (Maryland: University of Maryland, 1956). For a discussion, in a different context, of how the valuational (which may partially be equated with the political) cannot be separated from the non-valuational (sort of non-political) in any decision see J. Rolland Pennock's "Political Science and Political Philosophy" in O. Garceau (ed.), *Political Research and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968).
12. This follows almost exactly David Easton's description of the function of a political system as "the authoritative allocation of vlaues". 13. See footnote 5.
14. See Almond and Powell, *op. cit.*, on the relationship between the degree of sub-system autonomy and the performance or capability patterns of a system.
15. 'Structural' and 'Cultural' would correspond to 'hierarchy' and 'values' in David Apter's two-fold classification of Authority types, *Some Reflections on the Conceptual Study of Modernization* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968). Also of Almond and Powell, *op. cit.*, on structural differentiation and cultural secularization.
16. Quoted from Riggs "Administrative Development," where it is suggested that Lasswell's list of the stages of decision-making in *The Decision Process. op. cit.*, or Almond's list of functional requisites Almond and Powel *op. cit.*, may be conveniently recognized as distinct processes for the purpose of measuring structural differentiation.
17. "Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Society* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1968). 18. *Ibid.* 19. *Ibid.*
20. Parson's pattern variables have been developed into the developmental concept of cultural secularization by Almond and Powell, *op. cit.* The concept is roughly what I have in mind

here. Parallel but different concepts have also been established, by researchers, following the Barnard-Simon motivational studies which suggest similar "reformatory" structural-cultural changes in administration. For the Barnard-Simon school see Herbert Simon, *op. cit.*, and Chester Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1938).

21. "Administrative Development".
22. K.W. Deutsch in the *American Political Science Review*, September, 1961.
23. For example, Leonard Binder (ed.), *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). These scholars feel that political development is possible best when the six crises of political development are faced separately. The implication to be drawn is that, with limited resources available, no country can simultaneously attempt manyfold development successfully. In fact it becomes imperative for a country to attempt piecemeal, step-by-step, development.
24. For a list of major government tasks that have to be accomplished jointly by the administrative and political systems see Milton J. Esman,"The Politics of Development Administration" in Montgomery and Siffin (ed.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change*, which also contains an analysis of the role of administration in government.
25. In his *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), Riggs has suggested that the introduction of functionally universalistic, and achievement-oriented norms in societies where functionally diffuse, particularistic and ascriptive norms retained a deep hold on social institutions produced the prismatic phenomena of heterogeneity, overlapping and formalism.
26. On rationality in decision-making, I still tend to favour the framework set forth by Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behaviour*. Knowledge of that framework is assumed throughout my summary of Riggs's analysis.
27. "Administrative Development," p. 252.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Carl Friedrich's attempt to discover "the highest good" from the point of view of "Political Development and the Objectives of Modern Government" in Braibanti (ed.), *Political and Administrative Development* highlights this point.
30. Almond and Powell's typology of the extractive, regulative 'distributive' symbolic, and responsive capabilities could serve as a good starting point for studies in this direction. Capability is dependent upon the other six factors listed above.

10

Administrative Development: Some Conceptual Premises

Kumud Sogani

SINCE World War II considerable attention has been paid to the task of analysing the dynamics of administrative systems and their conjunction with the environmental structures in which they operate. Although from a systemic perspective the administrative system may be considered as a sub-system of the political system, yet it may be contended that this sub-system also operates in close interaction with the technological, economic, social and cultural systems of the society. Further, from a conceptual angle, it is possible to consider an administrative system as an independent variable, an intervening variable or even as a dependent variable. Those who adopt an "environmental" approach to the study of Public Administration are likely to misconstrue the administrative system as one which is wholly dependent upon its environment for its survival and health. This approach has the limitation of considering the administrative system as a "captive" of its environment.

THE ECOLOGICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL ORIENTATIONS

The second and the more popular approach—attributed primarily to Fred W. Riggs—is the "ecological approach" which considers the administrative system as one of the systems of the society. Accordingly, the administrative system, like other systems, is continually interacting with the rest of the society. In other words, it is constantly influencing the functioning of its environment and, in turn, is being influenced by it.[1]

Another set of writings in the field of Public Administration pertain to "development administration". In simple terms, development administration means a goal-oriented and an action-oriented administration. Thus the concept refers to the dynamics of an administrative system which is engaged in the process of achieving social, economic and political goals. Another concept which is intimately related to development administration is that of "administrative development," which, in turn, generally refers to the

"capacity" of an administrative system.[2] Understandably, this capacity relates to the goals which are prescribed for the administrative system to achieve. Thus, the "administration of development" and the "development of administration" are closely inter-twined and inter-dependent processes. Their relationship has rightly been compared to the proverbial chicken and egg syndrome—making it difficult to assert as to what follows what. This short paper is designed to analyse some of the basic premises, ramifications and facets of the process of administrative development.

CONCEPTUALIZING ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Administrative development has generally been defined as "a pattern of increasing effectiveness in the utilization of available means to achieve prescribed goals."[3] As already observed, the goals to be achieved are those which pertain to higher and desirable levels of social change, political development and economic growth. Leonard Binder includes "increases in size, in specialization and division of tasks, and in the professionalization of its [administrative] personnel" as attributes of administrative development.[4] Clearly, thus, in Binder's conceptualization emphasis is on structural and functional differentiation within an administrative system. On the other hand, Riggs is of the opinion that administrative development takes place when bureaucracy becomes more and more responsible for the implementation of policies formulated by institutions outside the bureaucracy. In this sense, administrative development is a counterpart of political development—a corollary to the institutionalization of rule-making institutions capable of imposing accountability on public officials.[5] It may be interpreted to mean that the more politically advanced a nation, the more would be its pace of administrative development. Thus it may be hypothesized that administrative development is the growing capacity of an administrative system to take decisions in order to meet the ever-increasing demands coming from the environment and with the objective of achieving larger political, and socio-economic goals.

It may be suggested that administrative development is the growing *efficiency*, *capacity* and *capability* of the administrative system to achieve prescribed political, economic and socio-cultural goals. No doubt the structure of the administrative system involving role-differentiation is important, but of equal significance is the behavioural orientation of the bureaucrats, particularly towards the tasks of development. It may be suggested that the administrative

capacity is the ability to get "desirable" task performed after utilizing the limited resources that are at the disposal of the administrative system, thus resulting in minimum waste of manpower, money and material. Administrative capability, on the other hand, is a broader concept which includes the ability to take a long-range (as against short-range) and a comprehensive (as against narrow) view of the problems of change.

At this stage, it might be pertinent to distinguish among some of the concepts allied to the idea of administrative development.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE

Administrative reform is generally considered as the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance.[6] It is artificial because it is man-made, deliberate and planned. It is induced because it involves persuasion, argument and the ultimate threat of sanctions. Certainly, it is not universally accepted as the true course. On the other hand, change is natural, and tends to stress consensus, conformity and general acceptance of the people. Although change is planned, yet a large portion remains unplanned. Even with the area of planned change, there are intended and unintended results of such a change. The ability of any administrative system to achieve directional growth and systemic change is severely restricted. It should be clear that modernity, socio-economic progress and nation-building are not the only major values sought, they compete with many others.[7]

According to Ralph Braibanti most developing systems have an ideological doctrine by which they seek to change popular beliefs as well as to render them uniform. As ideological manipulation is impractical, therefore change through institutions is perhaps the only means available at the disposal of the aid-giving nations. Moreover, institutional change appears to be increasingly more effective than attitudinal manipulation even as an internal means.[8] This is because it is difficult to bring about attitudinal change among bureaucrats. Institutional changes, on the other hand, can be brought gradually or even at a large scale.

A pertinent question which arises is whether change takes place for the betterment of available political and administrative conditions or can it result into administrative *status quo* or administrative decay as well?[9] In other words do all changes follow an upward trend or do they sometimes reflect a downward trend as well? Evidence from various developing countries reveals that change

need not produce positive results under all circumstances for there may be undesired results in certain areas of planned change.

SOME DIMENSIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Two major areas which are generally influenced by and which, in turn, influence the process of administrative development, are:

(a) the structure of the administrative system; and

(b) the behaviour pattern of bureaucrats.

The process of administrative development involves a restructuring of the administrative system in the manner that would increase the effectiveness of the system to achieve the pre-determined goals. The structural dimensions of administrative development are closely related to the process of innovation in an administrative organization. Somehow, in most developing countries, organizational restructuring has come upon to be accepted as the easiest and most practical mechanism for effecting administrative development, while in reality, the results of this approach have not proved to be entirely satisfactory.

In development administration, much would depend upon the orientation of the bureaucrats towards the processes of change within and outside the organizations. Several empirical studies conducted of bureaucratic behaviour in developing countries reveal that the bureaucrats generally develop a tendency to cling to their traditional outlooks and behaviour and thus they normally do not appear to be too keen to adapt themselves to the growing challenges coming from the environment. It should be clear, however, that no process of administrative development can be effective unless it establishes a congruence between the structural reorganization and bureaucratic behaviour.

MEASURING ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Developing of indicators to measure administrative capacity is a difficult task and as such there is no universally accepted index for the same. However, Milton Esman has suggested the following categories of indicators which appear to be pertinent to the measurement of development administration as well as administrative development.[10]

(a) *Input Indicators* reflect the amount of resources at the disposal of an organization in the form of men, money and material.

(b) *Output Indicators* represent the utilization of these resources to achieve prescribed socio-economic and political goals.

(c) *Efficiency Indicators* measure performance or output in proportion to inputs that enter the administrative system. If the inputs entering the system are far out of proportion to the outputs, then it means that there is less efficiency.

(d) *Administrative Capacity Indicators* represent the ability of the organization to mobilize resources, (entering the system in the form of inputs) and converting them into activities (in the form of outputs) in conformity with the environment.

It may be mentioned that these indicators can no doubt be of considerable utility to us, provided concomitant techniques are developed to measure input, output, efficiency and administrative capacity of the system. Similarly, measuring the total capacity of an administrative system appears to be all the more difficult.

The second category of indicators are those which enable the measurement of effectiveness and performance of an administrative system. Effectiveness may be defined as the degree of goal-achievement or objective achievement and is appraised in accordance with the extent to which the output of an organization has fulfilled the desired goal(s) and objective(s).[11] Performance is a broad concept which generally includes the following components:

(a) The acquiring of inputs from the environment by the organization;

(b) The manner in which the organization converts the inputs into outputs;

(c) The various effects (beneficial or harmful) of the output;

(d) The side effects and ultimate results of the activities involved.

The evaluation of performance in its totality may also take the form of appraising the overall administrative capacity or administrative capability of the system. The difficulty that may arise here is how to ascertain the total performance of the administrative system in concrete and measurable terms.

Despite these attempts to evolve indicators for measuring administrative capacity and performance, it becomes difficult to rely on any single set of indicators under all circumstances. We may have to adopt input-output, efficiency and administrative capacity indicators on one occasion, while performance indicators may prove to be of utility under certain other conditions.

Notes and References

1. For a distinction between 'environmental' approach and 'ecological' approach, see Fred Riggs, "Idea of Development Administration," in Edward W. Weidner (ed.), *Development Administration in Asia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970).
2. For a pioneering exploration of the concept of administrative development, see Riggs, "Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept" in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).
3. John D. Montgomery, "A Royal Invitation: Variation on Three Classic Themes," in Montgomery and Siffin (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 230.
4. Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 57.
5. Riggs, "Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept," pp. 252-53.
6. Gerald Caiden, *Administrative Reform* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969), p. 65.
7. Weidner, "The Elements of Development Administration," in Weidner (ed.), *Development Administration in Asia*, p. 11.
8. Ralph Braibanti, "External Inducement of Political and Administrative Development: An Institutional Strategy," in Braibanti (ed.), *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969), p. 67.
9. For a parallel concept in the literature on political development, see Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
   Also see Rakesh Hooja, "Administrative Development: The Concept Re-explored," *Administrative Change,* I (June, 1973), pp. 78-91.
10. Milton J. Esman, "Indicators for Development Administration: A Summary Review," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration,* XVII (July, 1973), pp. 369-71.
11. C.Y. Wu, "Refining Concepts of Performance in Development Effectiveness, Profitability and Productivity," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration,* XVII (July, 1973), pp. 287-311.

11
Administrative Development: The Debate Continued

Rakesh Hooja

EARLIER in this century it was believed that economics was on the way to becoming an exact science and thus the science of society. Hence it was the economist who was looked upon as a sort of magician who would overcome all sorts of social problems and help usher in the millennium. As more and more colonies achieved independence, and as contending government systems arose, the Political (either the leader(s), or ideological beliefs and "ways of life") replaced the Economic, at least in a number of African, Asian and South and Central American countries, as the factor that was expected to bring about desired changes in the human or social condition. There are also those who talk of a mass popular upsurge (and this need not necessarily be violent, or sudden, nor in the form of a movement, i.e., the upsurge may or may not, but need not, be an upheaval) as the means to societarian salvation.

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AND SOCIAL CHANGE

In the first two cases the economist, or the leader and his ideology, both are dependent on the persons who would administer the necessary programmes and schemes, and in the third instance certain doers and motivators are needed to stimulate and then canalize the people's energies. Thus, whatever the political system advocated, or in existence, the main burden of transforming society in any desired manner (or of keeping society from undergoing transformation if that be the accepted goal) vests on a sub-system which comprises people committed, trained and equipped to utilize available resources in an optimum manner so as to achieve predetermined goals and who may also contribute, in small or large measure, to the determination of those goals. Thus the administrative sub-system in any society or social group becomes vital and consequently administrative development becomes of great relevance and interest.

All the three articles cited have concentrated, at least implicitly if not explicitly, on administrative development apropos the national

political system, and looked upon administrative development in smaller administrative institutions only in the light of its impact upon the national system's capabilities. However, it is being recognized more and more that even the club, family, school, or any other peer or superior-subordinate group is also a political and a social system and is liable to have a rudimentary administrative system also. Administrative development in these systems may thus need to be analyzed not only because along with that of the systems of the traditionally recognized administrative institutions, it may affect the national administrative capabilities, but also because healthier families, clubs, peer-groups and the like may be desirable in themselves.

NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

If we accept this proposition, then it becomes clear that the administrative system cannot always be considered to be a separate interacting sub-system of the political system (which may be completely dominated by, or may dominate, or have a healthy give and take with, the political system). For in the family, or peer-group the political and the administrative systems may coincide with the same people performing both roles, perhaps simultaneously. If this nexus is carried up to the national level, then party-cadres, other volunteers and technocrats as well as bureaucrats (or those who may be both say technocrats and party-cadres) may all be considered to be part of the administrative system with their relations with each other being determined by the prevailing political system. This point of view may upset the thinking already done in the three cited articles which I consider to form earlier parts of this debate because they basically tend to look upon only technocrats and bureaucrats as jointly forming part of the administrative system. Also, rethinking may be needed to develop theoretical constructs that could explain administrative development in both macro and micro types of systems (and in the varying forms of both types of systems).

LATENT DYSFUNCTIONS

Now to turn to Kumud Sogani's article and set forth reactions to it as they come to mind.

Montgomery has been quoted as emphasizing "a pattern of increasing effectiveness in the utilization of available means to achieve prescribed goals." This does not take into account latent dysfunctions that may result even though the prescribed goals may

simultaneously have been maximally achieved through the utilization of the available means. It is interesting to look at a paper "Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy" presented by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago in which while talking of technology in conjunction with modern formal organization, they point out that, in addition to the benefits that can and do accrue from it, "irrationalities, inefficiencies and dysfunctions and . . . unintended and undesired consequences . . . Counter cultures, ideologies and social arrangements. . . (for good or evil)" may be generated. Thus the socio-economic costs, if any, incurred in sectors besides those that form part of the prescribed goals, become worthy of consideration while considering administrative development.

Leonard Binder has been quoted to the effect that "increases in size, in specialization and division of tasks, and in the professionalization of [administrative] personnel" are attributes of administrative development without pointing out the possibility that there can be an excess of any or all of the attributes so mentioned and that surfeiting may in actuality lead to administrative stagnation or decay.

BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS

Riggs has been quoted as "of the opinion that administrative development takes place when bureaucracy becomes more and more responsible for the implementation of policies formulated by institutions outside the bureaucracy. While I admit, in the interests of development, that the bureaucracy should not become self-centred and self-serving and that if it started questioning every policy formulated by the political leadership, or set forth as an agreed upon demand by the people, the polity could collapse due to the administrative system ceasing to execute while it played as the conscience keeper, or the Socrates of the nation. It has to be remembered that this theory can easily be used, and has been used, by administrators to absolve themselves of all responsibility to think up policies on their own, or to try and persuade the policy-makers to correct wrongly formulated policies. The administrative system's experience, if used, up to a certain limit, to assist in policy formulation, may contribute to the increase in efficacy of the entire system. Riggs's opinion also seems weighed in favour of one type of a political system, even though a system in which the political and adminis-

trative systems are identical or in which all people constitute a part of some sort of the administrative system, may also be equally capable of delivering the goals. No one type of policy has yet been definitely proved to be superior to any other sort of system. These comments are not however meant to decry the importance of accountability and/or responsiveness to the needs of the people and of the entire system.

INSTITUTIONAL VERSUS ATTITUDINAL CHANGE

To Ralph Braibanti has been attributed the idea that institutional change is more effective than attitudinal manipulation. Here one wonders whether institutional change is being confused with organizational change? In any case, institutional changes may be nullified by attitudinal or cultural factors as is evidenced by many developing countries where a "modern idiom" of functioning exists on paper, but the "traditional idiom" is the one that functions behind the scenes and is the "actual" idiom. Further, it is possible to conceive of situations in which it may be almost impossible to change the institutions that exist. An interesting related issue is: can an institution change without change in either its formal or informal structures? Say due to changes in its goals? Here attitudinal changes will perforce become the only means to induce development. Of course, Braibanti is more concerned there in the export of "political and administrative development" as he even admits in the title of his article which has been referred to.

The structure of the administrative system, and the behaviour pattern of bureaucrats, have been listed as the two major areas which influence and are influenced by the process of administrative development. I would think that the goals of the administrative system would be a third such area which may contribute to the type of administrative development that occurs, or fails to occur.

MEASURING ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Milton Esman and C.Y. Wu have been referred to, to suggest indicators to measure administrative development and it has been rightly pointed out that it is difficult to quantify social, political and administrative factors and thus this approach may be inadequate. Reading for example David Halberstan's account (*The Best and The Brightest*, Connecticut: Fawcet, 1972) of American responses to the Vietnam war and of its administrative system, one realizes that unless the absolutely correct indicators and methods are employed,

the assessment of the administrative system may prove exceedingly erroneous and, by influencing future policy which is made in the light of this assessment, may in fact prove to be horrifyingly dangerous. Thus the search for perfect and measurable indicators may be called for, failing which this approach may have to be rejected.

TYPES OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES

I turn now to my own previous article, in an attempt to repeat what I did with Kumud Sogani's article.

While referring to fundamental structural changes I had set forth three alternate systems: a traditional customs oriented one, a tightly integrated hierarchical one, a loosely knit federative one. I should have made it clear that I did not preclude the possibility of other types of systems also being possible for administrative development, i.e., one where a combination of two of the abovementioned systems exist so that different spheres of the administrative system have different characteristics, or one based on ideological or personal bonds, or on a minimum of government. Different types of systems may suit different goals and situations; on the other hand the system may be independent of such situations.

POWER-AUTHORITY INCONGRUENCE

I have referred to the possibility of administrative development being that which brings about Parsonian social change as also to the possibility of it being that in which the administrative ethos itself is conditioned along rational lines. The relationship between the two may be worth investigating. Can one of these two situations exist without the other or not?

At the same spot I have accepted the superiority of the Weberian ideal type of a rational legal system. In this context the above cited paper of the Rudolphs sets forth the interesting alternate thesis that "patrimonial" and "neo-patrimonial" features mixed with the "rational bureaucratic" ones in proportions varying according to the environmental contexts may be better than the ideal "rational" type because of a "power-authority incongruence" that they claim is a fundamental feature of all administrative systems. This is certainly worth further examination in relation to our context.

To my section on the definition of "development" may be added the fact that we may have to forsake some of our desired transformations, and even suffer negative transformations for the

ake of other more significant transformations and thus fixing of riorities would also come within the ambit of my definition.

PHENOMENON OF STABILITY

lsewhere I have discussed stability in the system at all times, or in etween periodic revolutions (which may be necessary for over-all evelopment) as desirable and hence suggested that related institu-on-building may be desirable for administrative development. Such istitution-building may also include the institutionalization of perpetual" or "constant revolution" for that, in a way, may be a ate of "stability" at a different level—a level where continued igilance and struggle may be necessary to maintain the develop-nental acceleration already achieved. In this context the problem f administrative development is as follows: when would it be appro-riate to emphasize stability? When should a revolution be hindered, nd when assisted, by the administrative system? (And, I would ke to point out that revolutions may be either violent or non-iolent; sudden or gradual in nature, they may be generated by the olitical leadership and the administrative system, or be directed gainst them, they may be responsive to the needs of the people or nly to that of a small section etc.).

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND INSULATION

Vhile discussing institutionalization, I have advocated the prolifera-on in the number and types of sub-units of an institution without xamining the premise that a dysfunctional situation of over-omplexity may be the result. This seems to have been a mistake.

While some insulation of the administrative system from non-olitical groups and those political ones that try to exercise influence rough non-established channels is definitely desirable, there may e cases where the willingness of an institution to waive its autonomy necessary. This then becomes a question of developing a delicate ormative balance with regard to administrative autonomy without xcesses in either direction. The situation is further complicated by ie fact that the ideal or actual fulcrum of the balance may be hanging continuously as circumstances change.

DIFFERENTIATION AND PERFORMANCE

Vhile talking of measuring performance, I have suggested the view-oints of accomplishment and of endeavour. It would also be iteresting to study whether performance measurement in absolute nd in relative terms shall lead to different conclusions.

I have also attempted to summarize Riggs's model of administrative development which is based on the four variables: high and low performance and high and low differentiation. It now appears to me that I was dazzled by the model because I viewed it as a whole. For example a system in which low differentiation and high performance exists has been defined as that having "positive reversion". Is this concept relevant? High performance without much differentiation seems fully adequate for a concept of administrative development unless low differentiation can be positively correlated with short-term performing ability, or with an inability to adapt to a change in the environment. And this relationship has not been established. Similarly one wonders now at the relevancy of the concepts of the Prismatic and the Diffused which are described as situations of high differentiation differing on the basis of level of performance. This is not to deny that the rest of Riggs's thesis is useful.

One point which I did not touch at all in my previous article is that of the types of comparison one can make for the purposes of assessing administrative development. One comparison can obviously be with the same system at different points of time. Another can be with different systems at the same point of time and a third can be with different systems at different points of time. While comparing with different systems one can compare with systems of the same genre (i.e., national systems with national system), or of a different one (i.e., national system with multinational corporation system or with village system, or even joint family system). Comparison may also be made between various levels or sectors of the same system.

A NON-CONCLUSION

I have deliberately tried to avoid offering conclusions. I had offered some in my previous article and since I have not found cause to denounce them yet, I have not mentioned them in this paper. However a lot more collective thinking and empirical study may be needed before valid conclusions may be offered.

Notes and References

*This paper is, as the title suggests, loud thinking in the light of the following three writings: Fred W. Riggs, "Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept," in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (ed.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); Kumud Sogani, "Administrative Development—Some Conceptual Premises," *Administrative Change*, III (July-Dec. 1975), 109-13; and Rakesh Hooja, "Administrative Development: The Concept Re-explored," *Administrative Change*, I (July-Dec., 1973), 78-91. In the light of further thinking, reading and writing, as well as a change of profession, from academic to administrator, since I wrote the above article, I might come up with new ideas that might stimulate more thinking by others which in turn could contribute to the further understanding of the "Administrative Development" concept. Hence instead of a conventional note, or article, I intend, after a brief introduction, to comment on Kumud Sogani's, and then my article and leave a number of issues for further thought by interested readers. Some previous knowledge of the three above cited articles shall be assumed throughout this paper.

12
Resistance to Change

Mohammad Mohabbat Khan

RESISTANCE to change, as a topic, has aroused considerable intellectual discussion. This is evident in the writings of the people who can be termed as organizational theorists and long-term observers and participants of change efforts in large organizations. Most of them readily agree to the existence of inherent conditions which cause resistance to change in organization. Organizations are great resisters of change.[1] They are conservative in nature, resisting change and the introduction of new patterns which can be attributed to the relatively static systems which operate within an organization. Resistance to change is a universal phenomenon.

Thompson emphasizes this fact emphatically and says, "With regard to resistance to change, it should be noted that this phenomenon is not uniquely related to bureaucratic organizations but is a characteristic of all organizations."[2] Almost every change introduced sets up a countervailing force to resist it. Change is always confronted by strong forces holding it in check and sharply circumscribing the capacity of organizations to react to new conditions.[3] Resistance to change in organizations has many sources.[4] Change often endangers careers and disturbs vested interests, generating resistance against it. As the historian of industries, Alfred Chandler indicates, change seems to require a crisis or a change of management.[5]

RESISTANCE DEFINED

The concept of resistance has been borrowed from psychotherapy. When a therapist is attempting to change the behaviour of the patient, he expects resistance from him. Resistance is the manifestation of behaviour which is intended to protect an individual from the effect of real or imagined change. Resistance, in short, is the most characteristic individual and group reaction to change.

Resistance to change is a complex phenomenon with multifarious dimensions. Many factors contribute to its emergence and sustenance. Resistance occurs at three levels:[6] individual, group,

and organizational.[7] It is imperative for anybody who is interested in introducing change to understand and analyze carefully the reasons which lead to resistance at all three levels. More importantly, interactions between and among these levels must be understood as factor or factors which cause resistance to one level and may do the same for another level.

CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO RESISTANCE

In order to fully appreciate the phenomenon of resistance, it is not only essential but imperative to look at the conditions which are conducive to it. Alvin Zander, in a classic article, provides some potent reasons for the emergence and abatement of resistance at individual and group levels. These are:

1. Resistance can be expected if the nature of the change is not made clear to the people who are going to be influenced by the change.
2. Different people will see different meaning in the proposed change.
3. Resistance can be expected when those influenced are caught in a jam between strong forces pushing to make the change and the strong forces determining them against making the change.
4. Resistance may be expected to the degree that the persons influenced by the change have pressure put upon them to make it, and will be decreased to the degree that these same persons are able to have some "say" in the nature and direction of the change.
5. Resistance may be expected if the change is made on personal grounds rather than impersonal requirements or sanctions.
6. Resistance may be expected if the change ignores the established institutions in the group.[8]

Lippitt and others present four cogent reasons, paying particular attention to human ego, as to why change is resisted:

1. Reluctance to admit weakness.
2. Fear of failure or awkwardness in trying to initiate a new practice or behaviour pattern.
3. A fatalistic expection if previous attempts to change were unsuccessful.
4. A fear of losing some current satisfaction.[9]

Herbert Kaufman has provided a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the literature in this area, which not only examines resistance at individual and group levels, as has been the case in most past efforts, but at the same time includes the organizational level for consideration and places special emphasis on it.

The causes of failure to change the behaviour and/or structure of organizations when such rigidity turns out to be disadvantageous or fatal can be grouped into three categories with several sub-categories within some of them:

1. Acknowledged collective benefits of stability.
2. Calculated opposition to change:
   (*a*) Prevailing advantage
   (*b*) Protection of quality
   (*c*) Psychic costs of change
   (*d*) Tunnel vision
   (*e*) "Brave New World".
3. Inability to change:
   (*a*) Resource Limitations
   (*b*) Sunk cost
   (*c*) Accumulation of official constraints on behaviour
   (*d*) Unofficial and unplanned constraints on behaviour
   (*e*) Interorganizational agreements.

Looking beyond individuals, groups, and organizations to trace the reasons behind resistance, a few have been interested to discern and analyze the impact of social systems and cultural heritage on the individual which may lead him to resist change efforts. Goodwin Gatson finds it more intriguing to critically examine variables like norms, culture, sacrosanct elements, and vested interests in order to say something meaningful about resistance. Watson cites numerous examples from published sources to bring home the point that all these variables significantly mould one's attitude toward resistance.[11]

MINIMIZING RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

Once the causes are known which trigger off resistance to any change of the status quo or the existing system, then the obvious next step that follows is to seek for clues which will ultimately result in the minimal amount of resistance. In other words, we have to create an environment in which changes can be introduced by carefully neutralizing the resistant elements within an organization.

The theme that has been floating in the literature to overcome resistance to change is participation.[12] It has been said repeatedly over the years, especially after the late forties, that if people are given the opportunity to take part in change efforts, then the extent of hostility toward a new programme will considerably lessen. The two most well-known proponents of participation are Koch and French[13] and Paul Lawrence.[14] Their two classic articles contained

results of several experiments which showed that participation works better than imposed changes. The proponents of participation believe that it is only logical that those who will be affected by the change must not only be heard from but also be listened to. In this way many misconceptions and misunderstandings regarding the nature and extent of change will be clarified in the minds of affected individuals. At the same time, contacts between change agents and the changees will also help to establish a rapport between the two which is one of the crucial preconditions of any successful change programme.

But recently the theme of participation, as used in literature relating to industry, has been under attack from several directions. One group[15] of people argue that management manipulates the workers and other employees to agree to the preplanned changes already decided upon in advance, through the use of small meetings and group sessions. The other group[16] contends that there are several cases where reorganization efforts were successful without participation by the employees affected by the change.

FACTORS IN THE INTRODUCTION OF CHANGE

It has been suggested that changes which call for far-reaching alterations in the power, position, and status of the individuals in the organization should be introduced slowly.[17] This will to some extent save the affected individuals from the trauma of a sudden change and will give them some time to think about the proposed change without being unnecessarily edgy about it. One of the principal reasons for hostility to anything new is that it comes as a threat to security and status. To overcome the feeling of fear of the unknown in the individual mind when change is introduced, one must proceed with care and caution.

Resistance to change will be minimal if there is support for the change from within the organization. To gain the support of the individuals, several things can be done. The benefits accruing from the said change can be elaborate and explained at length. Support of the top officials is also crucial in this regard. As far as possible, changes should be introduced by individuals working inside the organization. There are evidences that people tend to reject changes easily which are either planned or introduced by "outsiders" not belonging to the organization.[18]

Any change effort which threatens the long-established norms, values, and ideals of an organization will encounter resistance of a

high magnitude. It must be understood that a particular change may not be suitable for all cultures. The role of culture in any change effort is crucial as it moulds the norms, values, and ideals of individuals. These individuals, in turn, man organizations and, through their socialization process in the work environment, form and sustain values and norms which greatly influence their work habits and patterns. It has been rightly pointed out that most of the resistance has its origin in social factors rather than technological. Human associations are probably the most important reasons for resistance to change.[19] Chapple's interaction theory[20] would surely point in the direction of resistance to change because of human association. If the change agents take time to understand the context in which the change is introduced, then there is a greater probability for the successful initiation of the change within an organization.

The recurring theme in the literature is that resistance to change arises because of social and human considerations. People strongly object to any change which ignores institutionalized patterns of work, i.e., which consists of doing the work or certain relations among the workers, and abruptly attempts to create a new state of affairs which demands that these customs be abolished forthwith. The change agent must recognize the extent of influence the small groups, cliques, or individuals wield and how they feel about the proposed change before going any further. The change agent will have to recognize the resistant factors in the process of change. The knowledge of resistant factors will put the change agent in a better place to contain the development of resistance or use approaches to overcome the resistance when it does develop.

BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

The negative connotation of the term "bureaucracy" is widely accepted both by the scholars and laymen, which indicates the emotional colouration given to organizational unresponsiveness toward change.

Bureaucratic resistance to change is discussed here in relation to specialization, communication system, and bureaucratic personality. But any discussion of these three aspects must be preceded by some reference to authority within a bureaucracy. The bureaucratic organization is a complex structure of technical interdependence superimposed upon a strict hierarchy of authority. It is a system of superior and subordinate role-relationships in which the superior is the only source of legitimate influence upon the subordinate.

Specialization can become a source of resistance to change in two ways. Individuals and groups within particular specialities may have a fear not only of loss of prestige but of decreased usefulness after the change. Also specialization requires some guarantee of stability to flourish.

Bureaucratic organizations, like other organizations, over a period of time, induce members to become socially specialized. They become specialized in working with another. Any suggestion for change may come as a threat to his social cooperative relationship and may not be welcome. That is why bureaucratic organizations plan and control changes.

In typical bureaucratic organizations, communication networks have limited usefulness to foster change, as these are mostly one-way, top-down directive carriers and have less tolerance for the opinions of people in the downstairs. Naturally, as Chester Barnard observed, resistance primarily grows out of fear of disrupting organization communications.[21] He also cautioned that organized communication comprises a complexity of subtle habits, attitudes, and standardized expressions whose smooth and more or less unconscious employment is essential to effective and comfortable collaboration. A new plan disrupts all these, making elaboration difficult and encouraging misunderstanding.

Lawrence and others[22] and Tannenbaum and others[23] assume that individual and group goals and values are similar, if not identical, to organizational goals. They see resistance arising out of poor communication. They feel that people just do not understand the real situation; if they did, they would not resist changes. This may not be true in its entirety, but the fact remains that communication, if utilized properly, can play a more meaningful role to bring about change within an organization.

Bureaucratic personality has been viewed as developing around ritualistic behaviour. This is implied in Merton's call for a study of the relationship between bureaucratic structure and personality.[24] In Merton's categories, ritualism is characterized by emphasizing the institutionalized means while ignoring or rejecting the overall goals.[25] Certain personal behaviour patterns can also be detected among the bureaucrats which arise as a result of specialization and become ingrained with their personality characteristics. Victor Thompson discusses the symptoms of such behaviour: "The growing imbalance between the rights of authority position, on the one hand, and the abilities and skills needed in a technological age, on the other, generates tensions and insecurities in the system of

authority. Attempts to reduce such insecurity often take the form of behaviour patterns which are dysfunctional from the point of view of organization, although functional enough from that of the insecure official. From the standpoint of the organization such behaviour is pathological and can be referred to as bureaupathologic behaviour.''[26]

It can be said in line with the previous analysis that in a bureaucratic organizational context dominated by the need to control, change is dangerous because, by definition, it is not controlled behaviour. It creates risks of errors and therefore invites sanctions. Change is facilitated by a secure non-competitive group, administrative efforts dominated by a professional outlook. Since this kind of situation is rare in modern bureaucracy, some people might think of excessive resistance to change as an inherent feature of bureaucratic organization, rather than as a form of bureaupathology. It is felt by some, however, that excessive bureaucratic inertia is much less widespread than is supposed. In a State employment office and a federal enforcement agency, Blau found little evidence of resistance to change.[27] The cases he did find were based upon the fear of a superior and the fear of loss of security in relations with subordinates or clients. He found that new employees and less competent employees were more resistive to change than others.[28] He also found that ritualistic compliance with rules and regulations stemmed from personal insecurity and important relationships at work.[29] Secure officials welcomed change because it made their work interesting by providing new challenges.

Because of their nature and functioning, bureaucracies are considered to be conservative structures oriented toward maintaining the external as well as internal status quo.[30]

In fairness to bureaucratic organizations, it should be pointed out that change always upsets an organization, irrespective of its nature. Some may welcome the upset because they found prior conditions restrictive or oppressive. But change in the status quo is likely to be opposed by many who do not want to be disturbed and who are uncertain of what the future may bring in its wake.

A basic factor in determining the success of the organization in resisting change is the amount of power the organization has in its environment. Individuals play leading roles to mould the internal environments in such a way as to make it difficult to introduce change. Individuals in the organization are reinforced by their consistency in behaviour in relationship to organizational norms. Organization's procedures become fixed and valued. Precedent is the part of the organizational legal system. All these factors conspire to make organizations major resisters of change.

Yet organizations do change,[31] both with respect to their external relationships and to their internal configurations. The pressure of the external environment necessitates the organization to change. Moreover, when most organizations become internally static and obsolete due to lack of change, thereby creating a problem of incongruence[32] between the expectations of the employees and the requirement of the job, change of one type or another is introduced.

Stresses inherent in bureaucratic structures can lead to "dysfunction" and ultimately to change.[33] March and Simon have concluded that it is possible to internalize the spirit of innovation within an organizational environment which will cause sufficient pressure to create frequent corrective changes.[34] Lippitt and others categorize the ways in which an organization becomes either externally or internally incongruent and hence must change.[35] The external situations are poor communication existing between internal and external reality, and it may be severely distorted to external society. The internally incongruent areas are power systems, communication, and energy mobilization.

To minimize resistance to change in the bureaucratic organization, several elements should be given considerable attention and emphasis. These are leadership, communication, participation, and training.[36]

Without leadership support,[37] no amount of effort on the part of others will make any change effort successful. The commitment and dedication of the leadership is one of the essential prerequisites for the success of any change programme. The importance of effective communication needs hardly any more emphasis as an effective instrument for overcoming resistance. Earlier we elaborated on the role of participation to bring about change. Change necessitates abandoning old ways and taking on new ones. This will arouse anxiety among some people; periodic consultations with them may prove helpful. In this regard, training may become crucial. Training can prepare individuals to accept and perform adequately in different jobs which require not only new skills but, more importantly, a different outlook and positive attitude. Training will be meaningful if it can ease the tension of transition and positively orient individuals to adopt to change.

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13

A Psycho-Behavioural Systemic Approach to Management Development

Jaideep Singh

THE second half of the twentieth century is witnessing a conceptual revolution in the field of behavioural sciences. Management Development is one of the many areas where our new behavioural insights are having an important impact.

Our conception of management development for an organization is a broad one which involves not only the arrangement of a few training programmes but also the adoption of an entirely new set of assumptions about human behaviour. It thus results in the creation of new modes of operating, new policies and practices throughout the organization thereby making the organizational climate more conducive to the development of managers. We shall first mention some basic assumptions and convictions and then explain how they can be applied in an operating organization.

PSYCHO-BEHAVIOURAL ASSUMPTIONS CONDUCIVE TO MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

For our present purposes, we shall emphasize the psycho-behavioural assumptions made by Professors Douglas McGregor and Abraham H. Maslow—two of the most distinguished contributors to the field.

Professor McGregor has listed his assumptions as follows:

1. The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest.

2. External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for bringing about effort toward organizational objectives. Man will exercise self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed.

3. Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their achievement. (The most significant of such rewards, e.g., the satisfaction of ego and self-actualization needs, can be direct products of effort directed toward organizational objectives.)

4. The average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility.

5. The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the solution of organizational problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in the population.

6. Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of the average human being are only partially utilized.[1]

Further, Professor Maslow summarized his assumptions as follows:

1. There are at least five sets of goals which we may call basic needs. These are briefly: physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization. In addition, we are motivated by the desire to achieve or maintain the various conditions upon which these basic satisfactions rest and by certain more intellectual desires.

2. These basic goals are related to one another being arranged in a hierarchy of prepotency. This means that the most prepotent goal will monopolize consciousness and will tend of itself to organize the recruitment of the various capacities of the organism. The less prepotent needs are minimized even forgotten or denied. But when a need is fairly well satisfied, the next prepotent (higher) need emerges, in turn to dominate the conscious life and to serve as the centre of organization of behaviour, since gratified needs are not active motivators.

Thus man is a perpetually wanting animal. . . . The hierarchy principle is usually empirically observed in terms of increasing percentages of non-satisfaction as we go up the hierarchy. Reversals of the average order of the hierarchy are sometimes observed. Also it has been observed that an individual may permanently lose the higher wants in the hierarchy under special conditions. There are not only ordinarily multiple motivations for usual behaviour but, in addition, many determinants other than motives.

3. Any thwarting or possibility of thwarting of these basic human goals, or danger to the defences which protect them or to the conditions upon which they rest, is considered to be a psychological threat. With a few exceptions, all psychpathology may be partially traced to such threats. A basically thwarted man may actually be defined as a "sick" man. . . . If we were to use "sick" in this way, we should then also have to face squarely the relations of man to his society.

One clear implication of our definition would be that (1) since a man is to be called sick who is basically thwarted, and (2) since such basic thwarting is made possible ultimately only by forces outside the individual, then (3) sickness in the individual must come

ultimately from a sickness in the society. The "good" or healthy society would then be defined as one that permitted man's highest purposes to emerge by satisfying all his prepotent basic needs.

4. . . . [A] healthy man is primarily motivated by his needs to develop and actualize his fullest potentialities and capacities. If a man has any other basic needs in any active, chronic sense, then he is simply an unhealthy man. . . .[2]

THE INTERACTING SYSTEMS

It is not easy to put these assumptions into practice. To facilitate explanation of how this can be done, we may consider any organization to consist of three interacting systems: the Technical System, the Responsibility System, and the Evaluation System.

The Technical System is the technology through which the organization can be made to facilitate the process of management development. Thus the technical system can be considered to consist of:

A. The organization climate and its components.

B. (i) A management consisting of specific, self-made objective programme and a positive programme for performance appraisal, and

(ii) specific programmes for management development.

The Responsibility System is the organizational division of responsibility for the purpose of maintaining the desired technical system. The responsibility system can be further sub-divided into two major units for the purpose of discussion:

A. All managers in the organization including those in the personnel department but excluding those in the management development group.

B. Managers in a group specifically designated as the management development group.

The Evaluation System is the use of criteria to evaluate how well the management development effort achieves its objectives.

THE TECHNICAL SYSTEM

Unless the organizational climate is conducive to management development, the specific programmes for management development (to be taken later) will have little or no effect. The most important causal force for the creation of a healthy, synergic organizational climate is the psycho-behavioural intelligence of the top management. Other important forces are mentioned below:

(*a*) *Organizational Policies*: Policies should be created more as

guidelines for enabling individual managers to steer in the desired directions rather than to serve as authoritarian directives. Enough flexibility should be developed on the part of managers to tackle individual situations. It this were not so, managers would slowly lose their greatest asset, i.e., the ability to deal with unique, unprogrammed situations.

(*b*) *Organization and Manpower Planning*: In order to prevent a sudden shortage or excess of managerial talent in the organization, it is advisable to plan in advance the kind and number of managerial personnel required by the organization. This can be done after giving due consideration to expected organizational growth and change, and then synchronize the management development efforts accordingly.

(*c*) *System of Selection*: Careful and constant selection of superior managerial talent is a *sine qua non* for the actualization of the organization's desire to develop and maintain a top flight management team. Research shows that on the whole, previous accomplishments are the best guide to future performance.

(*d*) *Wage and Salary Administration*: It seems important to point out that compensation should be based on the present and perceived future value of the individual to the organization. In other words, performance and potential should be decisive factors along with seniority.

Extra compensation should be paid to those individuals who take great interest in the development of other individuals.

(*e*) *Fringe Benefits*: The word 'fringe' is really a misnomer because these benefits could amount to 50% or more of the total compensation in some cases. As far as some of these benefits in the form of bonuses are concerned, the employer generally has a choice as to whether the bonus should be associated with superior performance or not. There exists little motivating value in giving bonuses for Diwali or Christmas as it seems far preferable to associate them with periods of high achievements. Yet not many organizations give enough thought to this and allow paternalistic practices to linger on.

(*f*) *Motivation*: It is extremely important to aid personnel in the satisfaction of their higher needs. In part this can be accomplished by treating them as adults, giving them as much responsibility as possible, and showing that you have genuine faith in your men.

Frederick Herzberg[3] in his theory of human motivation expresses that some factors do not serve as motivators, on the contrary if they are not maintained at a rationally expected level, they serve as dissatisfiers. These can be termed as factors of hygiene. He says that the real motivators are factors such as work itself, achievement, respons-

ibility, recognition and advancement. Surely, it is in the interests of the organization to ensure that these inherent job satisfactions are available to its managers.

(*g*) *Position of the Management Development Group in the Organization Structure*: Professor Alva F. Kindall of the Harvard Business School has repeatedly emphasized the danger in having a management development group as an entity being separate from the personnel department. This is a sure method of ensuring the failure of any programme that the group may face owing to the rivalries that may invariably arise between the personnel department and the management development group. The group's rightful position is clearly within the personnel department.

B. (i) A Management by Specific, Self-made Objectives Programme and a Positive Programme for Performance Appraisal

This combination programme is so overwhelmingly important as a programme for management development that we have decided to keep it distinctly separate from the other programmes which are titled—'Specific programmes for management development'.

On overviewing the status of the present literature on 'management by objectives' and 'performance appraisal', we find that a combination programme has been outlined in a well-fashioned manner by Professor Alva F. Kindall and James Gatza.[4]

In capsule form, the programme is stated thus:[5]

Step 1: The individual discusses his job description with his superior and they agree on the content of his job and the relative importance of his major duties—the things he is paid to do and is accountable for.

Step 2: The individual establishes performance targets for each of his responsibilities for the forthcoming period.

Step 3: He meets with his superior to discuss his target programme.

Step 4: Check-points are established for the evaluation of his progress; ways of measuring progress are selected.

Step 5: The superior and subordinate meet at the end of the period to discuss the results of the subordinate's efforts to meet the targets he had previously established.

The programme assumes that organizational and departmental objectives have been established and communicated in the form of specific targets to the subordinate levels. We will reach new heights in this respect when the department and organization-wide specific objectives are based, to a larger extent, on a synthesis of the specific targets set by the subordinate levels.

Though the authors feel strongly about the need for such a programme in most organizations yet they end the article with the following words of caution "Don't rush it" and "Don't force it".

B. (ii) Specific Programme for Management Development

Considering the fact that a manager's job consists of achieving organizational objectives while working with and through other people, yet a useful programme is to give a manager a challenging responsibility which requires interaction with other people, thus enabling him to achieve the necessary results. The process of doing so will encompass the practising of all aspects of what a manager does (and if the problem is broad or more difficult, of what a senior manager does) leading undoubtedly to considerable development of the manager.

Now we shall briefly comment upon some other prevalent programmes.

1. Academic Teaching: Unless the student has the motivation to learn the material presented, academic teaching loses much of its value.

If we conceptually divide students into two groups, namely:

(i) The few who are motivated to work for the satisfaction of the work itself; and

(ii) The many who are motivated to work for affection and esteem, then our predictions are: (a) members of both groups would gain immensely under the case or discussion method; (b) group (i) would gain, to some extent under the straight lecture method but those in group (ii) would be more or less total losers under the straight lecture method.

"Education", said Whitehead, "is the acquisition of the art of the utilization of knowledge. This is an art very difficult to impart."[6] The participative methods of instruction enable the individual to develop this art, and also simultaneously help him to develop his ability and motivation for interacting and getting things done with the people.

2. Short Training Programmes: These range from sensitivity training programmes lasting for a few days, to the two-week Executive Development Programmes offered to middle and senior level government executives by the Indian Institute of Public Administration, to the thirteen-week Advanced Management Programmes designed by the Harvard Business School for managers who are involved or are shortly expected to be involved in strategic policy decisions of their organizations. The value of these programmes depends greatly on the organization which offers them.

3. *Special Project Programme*: This has the advantage that it can be specially tailored to the developmental needs of the individual.

4. *Apprenticeship Systems*: The senior executive plays the key role in the development of the trainee. It is only when the superior is willing to take considerable interest in the subordinate that this programme has much value.

5. *Junior Management Board*: A group of junior managers is elected to a second board of directors and they are expected to analyse organization problems and present their recommendations to the senior board. This gives them practice in the functions of management and also enables them to observe how men operate in groups.

THE RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM

We had originally divided the managers in the organization into two groups, viz., managers external to the management development group and managers in the management development group. Though it is quite evident that any action by any manager has some effect on almost all aspects of the technical system, yet those in group of the responsibility system can be given specific responsibility for the proper implementation of group (A) of the technical system, i.e., of the creation of the appropriate organizational climate. While group (B) of the responsibility system can be specifically held responsible for proper implementation of group (B) of the technical system, viz., the administration of a management by specific self-made objectives programme combined with a positive programme for performance appraisal and the administration of specific programmes for management development.

THE EVALUATION SYSTEM

The Evaluation System may be considered as the definition of criteria, changes in which are a function of the management development effort, and the measurement of these changes.

We might mention here that in order to appreciate in a better fashion the extent to which the changes are due to the management development effort, it could be arranged that a control group which does not take part in the developmental effort is used for comparison.

The substantial advantage of the evaluation system is that the results can be fed back into the responsibility and technical systems in order to tune the development efforts, to achieve more exactly the results desired, and thereby to increase the effectiveness of the management development efforts.

As regards the criteria on which changes can be measured, Dr. John R. Rizzo[7] has provided a list which is both comprehensive and useful. It is reproduced below with only one alteration, i.e.,

the word *company*, wherever it has occurred, is replaced by the word *organization*.

The following changes could be measured as far as changes in knowledge, attitude, ability, job performance of the participant and his subordinates and end-operational results are concerned: changes in human relations principles and practices, management principles, methods, organization goals and policies, and technological advances are essential for obtaining significant results in knowledge attainment. Further, changes in attitude toward the practices, philosophy, policies and goals of the organization, immediate supervision or top management, and attitude toward co-workers, subordinates, and their views on development efforts are required. Moreover, changes in ability to achieve such human relations skills, as communication, interpersonal skills, leadership ability, work skills such as communications, planning, coordination, control, budgeting, decision-making and reduction of poor habits are essential. Again changes in job performance of the participant are needed for actual management practices required in the application of human relations and work skills to the job situation, technological innovations, to provide a number of profitable suggestions, to enable the management to function well, and for turnover and absenteeism. As far as changes in the relationship of the participants and subordinates are concerned, suggestions for innovations, productivity improved performance, satisfaction and morale, turnover, absenteeism, grievances and scrap records can be given.

Lastly, changes in end-operational results may reflect all those mentioned above, as they are mirrored in organizational policy changes, technological advances, personnel and production records, cost reductions, and activity changes, so as to help in spending more time in planning and coordinating and for attaining structural changes in the form of new staff services.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYSTEMIC APPROACH

The need for management development in an organization can become evident primarily because of one or both of the following considerations:

(a) the needs of the organization.

(b) the requests of individuals concerned as far as their development is concerned.

The management development group should serve as the catalyser of the management development effort and should be accountable for results. This statement assumes that top management has had the foresight to set up such a group.

INTERACTION WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM

After preliminary interaction with the proposed trainees, the management development group should discuss the purposes and prospects of the development effort with those members of the responsibility system who may be crucial to the success of the overall effort. These could be: (1) the job associates of the trainees; (2) the immediate superiors of the trainees; and most importantly (3) the top management.

In a large number of cases, development programmes have failed because they have been limited to lower levels of management only. Some arrangements should be worked out whereby managers at higher levels understand and support the proposed development efforts. This may entail anything from sample demonstration of some of the possible programmes to arranging full-fledged training programme for these managers first. For achieving success, the essential point is to get senior managers deeply involved and committed to the purposes and values of the management development effort.

INTERACTION WITH THE TECHNICAL SYSTEM

After having attained such involvement and commitment, these managers can be motivated to maintain the part of the technical system which they directly influence, viz., the organization climate that is conducive to the positive reinforcement of the learning provided for the trainees.

The combined management by objectives and positive performance appraisal programmes is such a major project that implementation of this should only be attempted after genuine commitment exists at the top management level.

As regards the other specific programmes for management development, these should be designed after ample discussion with the concerned trainees, where the management development group serves more as a consultant and guide. Because of their greater professional knowledge regarding the programmes the group has an important role in the decision making process so as to assure which combination of programme should be selected.

We use the word "combination" because another common reason for disappointing results from a management development effort has been the utilization of a single development programme rather than an entire system of programmes. Before mutually deciding the combination of programmes that the trainees should undergo,

careful analysis of each individual situation is necessary after giving particular emphasis to the objectives of the management development effort, the nature and needs of the trainees, the financial, administrative and other constraints, the strengths and weaknesses of various programmes, etc.

INTERACTION WITH THE EVALUATION SYSTEM

In the past, another reason for getting disappointing results was that development programmes did not include 'operational specifications' of expected changes in participant's "behaviour as a result of the programme." The management development group should discuss the possible results of the development effort in terms of the various criteria noted earlier while the trainees should collaborate in drawing up the list of expected changes. This process will itself help in the attainment of attitudes and skills which are considered desirable.

The frequency and character of the measurement process should be discussed. The measurements can then help in fine tuning of the management development effort as previously discussed. In this respect, the importance of having effective interaction between and within each of the three systems cannot be overestimated.

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14

Conflict, Compromise and Cooptation: A Model of Organization Theory

Edwin O. Stene

MY purpose in this essay is to present a theoretical framework depicting the roles, conflicts and systems of conflict resolution that develop in virtually all social systems, ranging from international organizations to small social groups such as fraternities and sororities. Of course, I do not propose to explain all of the conflicts that develop, nor how to solve them. In fact, I make no predictions as to the usefulness of this theoretical content.

NATURE OF MODELS IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

These ideas are presented in the form of a model—the fashionable term of the day—, and so I should say just a word about what is meant by models. Very often a model is presented in the form of a spatial diagram, and I shall follow that pattern, although other forms of presentation are also used. The mathematical form will be avoided, partly because I consider its usefulness rather limited at the present time, and partly because my model is not sufficiently refined for such applications.

To come back to definition, a model is essentially a perspective—a way of looking at a phenomenon and of selecting out what are considered the most relevant elements for inquiry. It always starts with a set of definitions that support and clarify the perspective, an enumeration of the principal variables to be searched out and measured, and a statement of the probable relationships among these variables.

A model, in other words, is a theoretical framework that is judged by its proponents to be susceptible to operational measurement.[1] Actually it would be possible to present in the form of a model the ideas and rationale of almost any classical theorist, including Aristotle, Hegel, John Locke, Karl Marx, and others. The trouble is, however, that when someone tries to depict a model in retrospect, it is usually for the purpose of criticism; and criticism is always facilitated

by a narrow and selective interpretation. Perhaps the most common models in retrospect are those that present Max Weber's views on bureaucracy and so-called "principles of administration" developed by proponents of administrative reorganization in the early decades of the twentieth century. In both instances the reconstructed models involve rigid interpretations and usually a lack of historical perspective.

I said that a model represents a perspective. No model builder can avoid a limited perspective. In fact, the more comprehensive the model, the less susceptible it is to precise application and measurement. That is another reason why I avoid all attempts to quantify my models.[2]

Before presenting my own triangular model, I want to note some weaknesses that characterize most models of social organizations, and that cannot be avoided completely in the social sciences. One weakness lies in the definition of terms. If we remember that words are nothing more than sounds (or written symbols of sounds) designed to communicate ideas, we can see that no word has a right or wrong meaning—except as usage makes it so. Thus, when tempted to define words in order to prove conclusions or interpret data, we may incorporate the desired conclusion in the definition itself. On the other hand, definitions may serve to clarify our thinking as well as to convey ideas to others.

A second weakness of model building is the temptation to categorize, and especially to dichotomize. How often have writers on public administration repeated the discrediting of the politics-administration dichotomy and then gaily proceeded to institute new dichotomies that are even less defensible? I am reminded of the fact-value dichotomy expounded by Herbert Simon.[3] But note also the categories of management styles, the attempts to explain when one has or does not have authority, and the input-conversion-output categories of systems analysis. Variables and processes do not lend themselves to sorting into separate compartments. Yet, for purposes of communication and analysis, some kind of categorization is virtually unavoidable.

Thirdly, even when variables are treated as such and no as categories, the analyst is too often tempted to line them up on linear scale. Note, for example, Rensis Likert's four categories management styles, and the attempts of others to rate management techniques from authoritarian to participative.[4] The assump- implied if not expressed that the variations cluster along or single straight line of differentiation. While I have attempt depart from obvious application of categorization and scale ev-

tion, I plead guilty to an inability to escape from any of these faults completely.

Let me then proceed with a description of my own model which I might call "trinity".

THE "TRINITY" MODEL: ITS PREMISES

To begin with, I accept as axiomatic the premise that every social system is faced with conflict, more or less serious, between the desire to promote and maintain a common purpose and the diverse interests of its members or sub-systems. I should add also that while this discussion focuses on the internal system, every system is constantly adapting to its environment in that it is a sub-unit of a larger system.

I found in my search for a starting point that the social contract theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were most useful. It is not necessary to accept literally their idea of a contract. Suffice it to point out, as they did, that no man can enjoy perfect freedom from his fellow men and that to enjoy the most essential freedoms, he surrenders other freedoms to the common interest—basically the interest in security.

The problem of this common interest in security arises in that it must be administered by men. We like to speak of government by law, but the fact is that in our social system there is no law except as it is enacted, interpreted and administered by men. Who, then, represents the common interest? How shall those men be selected? What shall be their powers? And how and under what conditions shall they be replaced? Here lies the difference between the Hobbes Model and the Locke Model (to use contemporary terminology); and I will add a commentary on the Karl Marx Model.

Hobbes held that the contract was a *fait accompli* when the spokesmen of the common interest (which I will refer to as the central authority) had been selected. There was no higher appellate authority. Hence the advocates of diverse interests are compelled to submit to the judgment of the central authority or themselves reject the contract. John Locke held that those responsible for the maintenance of the common interest were themselves parties to the contract, and hence they might justifiably be thrown out for failure to comply. Just how this was to take place he did not specify, except that he justified the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

Karl Marx presented an interesting interpretation of this thing that we call the "common interest". Somehow he saw the central

authority—up to his time—as representing a special interest, whereas the common interest was found among those who opposed the central authority. The "good people" were on the wrong side of the contest, and so his revolt of the masses would be necessary to place supporters of the common interests in control. Once the dictatorship of the proletariat would be established, the conflicting diverse (special) interests would be suppressed and ultimately would disappear. The same idea characterized Sukarno's "guided democracy" in Indonesia. He held that so long as the five principles—"Pancha Sila"—were recognized as non-negotiable, people could come to consensus by rational discussion. In brief, neither Marx nor Sukarno recognized the validity of significant diverse interests once the "right people" were in control of the common interest.

The model here proposed is built on the premise that conflict always and inevitably exists between forces that seek to define and protect the common interests and those that see the existing common interest forces, whatever they may be, as inimical to their own values and plans. The common interest inevitably restricts the freedom of a number of diverse interests; unity of purpose impinges upon freedom of choice; and the enforcement of established policies denies to some the rights of exception. As population density increases and people become more interdependent, the demands for united action grow, and new areas of conflict are generated. There is no final solution. Even by total domination of the central forces only the outward evidence of conflict is suppressed. In fact by the simplest definition totalitarian government is one in which all forces in conflict with the central control of common interest are denied the opportunities of organization and expression.

Nor do I subscribe to the view of some of the "now public administration" theorists that open discussion will resolve basic conflicts and permit greater diversity within our purposeful systems. Separatists of this day know too well the effectiveness of one man's dissent in a jury system; and the oft cited system of small group consensus that was relied upon in early societies of the East Indies is not adaptable to national democracy. Rather the consensus becomes artificial and consequently a tool of authoritarian government. Silence induced by threats of coercive action, or by lack of understanding, can readily be interpreted as consensus.

Instead of a search for the elimination of conflict, therefore, the questions relate to how the central authority responds to dissent, how the diverse interests seek to limit or check the plans of the central authority, and what may result from opposing courses of action.

The extremes of action can be disposed of rather quickly. On ıe part of the central authority they are total suppression and issez faire. The first is possible only in totalitarian political systems. he second is built on the premise that the conflict is not important ter all. It is no longer tenable as a general practice in our urban dustrial societies.

On the part of diverse interests the only counteraction to ppression is revolution. And in accordance with my earlier refe- nce to Marxian theory, revolution, if successful, is apt to be follow- by suppression by the new central authority. It does not provide means of living with conflict. The counterpart of *laissez faire* is ceptance of the "common purpose," again on the assumption that issue is not important enough to warrant conflict.



Figure 1

CONFLICT RESOLUTION—SOME OTHER ALTERNATIVES

other alternatives are compromise, either by mutual concessions y modification of plans, and the mobilization of support in order lemonstrate a clear dominance of the decision-making forces. ponement of new proposals is not an infrequent temporary onse—one that brings out the point that the most overt conflicts narily arise out of changes or impending changes in social ionships.

Compromise, like postponement, is often a temporary resolution nflict. Its weakness—so forcefully emphasized by Mary Parker tt—is that it comes after the contending parties have reached respective conclusions, and it requires concessions on the part ıch. The anticipation of compromise may lead to demands in s of acceptable solutions to be sure; but the technique is extre- difficult to apply on the part of a central authority that is faced diverse interests on both right and left. Moreover, as suggested,

direct compromise tends to become overly complex if relied upon as a continuing device for the resolution of conflict. It becomes a response to specific conflicts, nor a device for the coexistence of diverse interests. Yet the art of compromise was cited by T.V. Smith as the essence of politics, which he listed along with art and science as the three great disciplines of mankind. As will be noted later, compromise is a common device for gaining success in other techniques of conflict resolution.

Mobilization of support is another technique commonly associated with political struggles. The central authority seeks to gather around itself those who agree with its objectives in a conflict, and often to compromise with them in order to strengthen its support. Such mobilization involves a practice known as cooptation—the attempt to win support of some of the diverse interests in order to more effectively mobilize against others. Dissenting interests likewise seek to win the support of other special groups, not infrequently bringing together a collection of diverse interests that have little in common except their opposition to the current central proposals. This kind of opposition has sometimes served to immobilize the central authority until a more ruthless group takes over and resorts to the techniques of direct suppression.

The third method of dealing with conflict—often involving an extension of cooperation—is to reorganize the process of decision-making by bringing a new element into the system. This element is a participative organization in which the major diverse interests are represented. Often the system is supported by both the central authority and the diverse interests, because each may envision a devise for strengthening of its own voice. In fact, this system appears to have been the initial step in the development of parliamentary government. History indicates that the British king called upon the communities to send delegates to Parliament in order that he might explain the financial needs and gain support for taxes that he was about to levy. The king's purpose, and probably the immediate effect, was to strengthen his own hand. By coopting the commons he was able to weaken his principal competitors for power at the time: the great nobles.

Contenders for diversity likewise seek to mobilize their strengths through representative or participative bodies wherein they can present their views and strive to gain support through discussion. Thus the initial establishment of parliamentary bodies in which members of an organization or representatives of its sub-units participate in discussion of plans and programmes is not a technique that falls on a straight line between central control and *laissez faire*, nor is it an extension of either one.

UNITY, DIVERSITY AND PARTICIPATION

[n Figure 2 the participative element in conflict resolution is as the :hird vertex of a triangle, wherein the relationships depict the com- non interest element striving for unity, the opposing forces seeking liversity (as long as they are not in control), and the third force epresented by participation.



Figure 2

The Triangular Model of Conflict Resolution

As noted before, the base of the triangle represents conflict veen forces of unity and of diversity. From the point of view of conflicting entities, the other two sides of the triangle represent ed for cooptation on the one hand and a desire to be heard on other. In practice neither of these objectives will be fully satisfied use the participative element will soon develop objectives and udes of its own. In one sense the establishment of a participative m is a compromise; in another sense it represents a new arena ı new technique for conflict resolution.

The means to unity is necessarily control. Hence, the lower ertex is designated externally as *control*. As against that the se interests seek to maintain autonomy—or even more appro- :ly, *autogeny*—while the participative element becomes concerned

with *distribution* of satisfactions and decision-making power, or in a sense the establishment of workable agreements. As it becomes institutionalized, this element becomes increasingly concerned over its own power to limit the voices of the other contending elements. Hence a new type of conflict may develop.

Thus I have added another set of identifying labels to the triangle to represent the institutional forces involved: central authority, diverse interest and participative assembly.

We still do not have much indication of operative developments that may result from this triangle of roles and goals. And possibly we cannot reach one. But I shall carry on to note some of the probable developments as the system becomes more complex. And systems do tend to grow in complexity, both as a result of environmental forces and in the struggle for justification of competing interests.

As noted earlier, the need for control develops as a way to protect the common interests as seen by the forces of unity. But control for what purpose? In a static society the common interest tends to remain constant; but in a dynamic system the justification of a degree of unity requires a constant search for new common objectives. Even the diverse interests are demanding services and standards that were relatively unimportant in the past.

Hence, we justify controls by defining and striving for *goals*. And since goals of a system relate to common purpose, they become an extension of common interest and unity. This concern of the central authority for goals and common purpose is depicted in Figure 3 by the addition of a few triangles at the lower left hand vertex of the original triangle. The outer vertex is labelled *goals*.

What then are counterbalancing interests—of the forces of diversity and of participation? As an interesting triangle is drawn at the lower right-hand vertex of the central diagram, I see the diverse interests concerned with benefits that they may derive from the system's operation. Hence the label of the outer vertex is *benefits*.

And proceeding to the participative role we find immediately the existence of multiple goals. Those who seek benefits are concerned not with a common goal but with number of conflicting and overlapping goals; and even the central authority cannot go far in its search for goals before it too encounters conflict of values and of objectives. But the force most directly concerned with a balancing of conflicting goals and the distribution of benefits is the participative or parliamentary element. Its function becomes, therefore, the establishment of *policies*, which are in effect norms designed as com-



Figure 3

Trinity: A Model of Conflict, Compromise and Cooptation

nises among conflicting goals. Note, for example, that a design-l speed limit for automobiles is a compromise between the goal ıfety on the one hand and convenience of transportation on the r.

We now have a triangle balanced on each vertex of the original ıgle of common interest, diverse interests, and participation. So, eeping with the initial design, labels will be assigned to the other ers of these triangles.

As already noted the participative forces of the system are erned with distribution of influences and benefits with and the blishment of policies. Here we can expect to have the most ısive discussion of alternatives and anticipated consequences of m; and so the matter of procedures becomes important—edures, not only for the establishment of policies, but also with

regard to their implementation. Hence, the designation of one vertex—the one nearest the forces of unity—as *procedures*. The other concern related to distribution is that of *equity*—in the sense of equitable distribution of sacrifices necessary to a compliance with policies. Here we have the label for the third vertex of the upper triangle.

It should be noted here that when a policy has been decided upon, it becomes a goal for those engaged in its implementation. But not even a simple policy such as a speed limit can become a simple goal unaffected by other goals. Hence, the building triangles might continue *ad infinitum*. But I shall stop with these four.

Turning once more to the forces of unity, it becomes rather clear that once policies or programmes have been agreed upon, the concern turns to their fulfilment. This brings to the fore the *performance* of tasks necessary to carry out policies. As against the forces of diversity, the fulfilment of policies and the attainment of goals will call for the establishment and maintenance of *standards*. So the bureaucracy tends to occupy itself with rules and regulations, standardized forms, and elaborate records of operations. All of this activity is related to the concern for common interests, unity and goals. But we must not forget that within each of these three forces depicted on the triangle, there are also subsystems and sub-subsystems in which all of the forces of common interest, diversity and participation are operating.

As against standards the diverse interests would naturally seek freedom of *choice*; and at the same time, as against equity, they would strive for *security*—security of their group and individual interests and security in the exercise of choice. Therefore, the three vertexes of the diversity triangle are designated *Benefits*, *Choice* and *Security*.

Finally, writers on conflict in organizations, from the human relations approach of Elton Mayo and others to the more recent systems analysts, often speak of the need to maintain equilibrium. I have always questioned the idea that every change produces a tendency of the organization to return to its prior state of equilibrium. However, in the triangular model here presented, we might define *equilibrium* as a state of balance in which each of the three forces will accept the roles of the other two to the degree that the conflicts do not involve destructive violence or major attempts at disruption. Yet, the term equilibrium remains relatively meaningless, because the accepted relationships may vary from extremely limited permissible diversity to a *laissez faire* type of central control. The

participative role may likewise vary from a mere formality of approving proposals submitted by the central authority to a gathering so deeply split among competing segments that no agreements can be reached.

I shall close with this point, however. While I have made no statistical analyses, it is my observation of history that violent conflict between the central authority and diverse interests almost inevitably results in a defeat of the latter. Even when the leaders and personnel of the existing central authority are overthrown, they are replaced by a new group that permits less, not more, diversity and free participation. Advocates of the use of violent confrontation or the forceful obstruction of representative system, if they are sincerely in search of means to increased popular participation in government, might well consider the history of 19th century Europe, where the advancement of parliamentary processes and peaceful equilibrium were most pronounced in Great Britain and other nations in which revolutions did not take place.

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15

ɪe Concept of Role and Administrative Change in Organizations

Marston M. McCluggage

dynamic world the administrator of necessity must be sensitive demands for change in the functioning of an organization. eed for survival requires that the administrator be constantly or ways of making the organization more effective in goal ient and more efficient in the use of scarce resources.

'oo often, however, the efforts to produce organizational have focussed upon individual or psychological factors rather on the social structure of the organization itself. Attempting ige the entire organizational structure may be beyond the ity of any one administrator, but the more limited goal of role performance both on behalf of himself and that of his iates is well within the range of the behaviour of most trators.

ROLE—A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT

y treat the sociological conception of role as a socially-lized, socially-transmitted pattern of behaviour, consisting ocal attitudes and activities of the interacting persons, which s selective aspects of their total behaviour, with reference n goals. The role is played by means of interaction with the ts of reciprocal roles. The actor of the role has obligations role partners and has a rightful claim upon them for help. ory has three integrative aspects: (l)it has psychological, e elements associated with role performance, (2) it involves onal relationships, (3) it has socially defined patterns of r specified by the social structure. Thus the concept has the on of psychological and sociological elements so necessary standing many forms of organizational behaviour.

is the role intervenes between the psychological characteri- the actor and his actual behaviour. By redefining the and desired role performance associated with a particular

position in an organization, it is possible to change the overt behaviour of actors without making basic changes in their personality structure, which is difficult to do, even if the need is seen for it, which is often not the case. Different kinds of roles provide alternative routes of varying difficulty and desirability toward attaining desired goals and values. For example, one may obtain wealth in a society either through roles that may be legally defined as legitimate or illegitimate.

It is important to recognize that roles are reciprocal in that they involve both rights and obligations for the actors in a situation. Organizations consist of a network of social positions, the active side of which is the activity the incumbent engages in. Hence the actor acts within a network of role expectations and obligations frequently involving many persons. The administrator must take account of this "role-set" and the demands its various members are making rather than trying to introduce change by manipulating one role alone.

Role theory helps explain how it is that many different types of personalities may play successfully a single kind of role. Likewise it may explain how it is that not all actors respond in the same way to a similar social situation, because role performance is also affected by personality variables and interactional patterns as well as by social determinants. Thus the theory guards equally well against either psychological or sociological determinism in explaining social behaviour and social change.

NEED FOR A SYSTEMIC VIEW

Because an organization is a social system of interdependent parts, the administrator must recognize that whenever he succeeds in changing role performance in one part of the system that he is very likely to create stresses in other parts of the organization, and thus his task of diagnosing strains and attempting to retrain actors into the performance of changed role behaviour is a never ending one. The work of administration requires continuous examination of the role structure of an organization and how the various roles relate to each other. The failure of many efforts at organizational change can be attributed to the effort to change one key personality, or one central role, without recognizing that reciprocal parts of the system will be affected. Thus organizations sometimes send their executives off to training sessions, which may be valuable to them personally, but have little effect on the reciprocal activities of others in

their "role-set" who have not had such experiences. Training activities are more likely to have long run effects toward change if they focus upon "organization variables" such as role structure and role performance rather than upon the personality of the individual actor.

Targets of organizational change are frequently not clearly defined but it is obvious that they may operate upon three levels—that of the individual actor, that of the group and that of the social structure of the organization as a whole. Sociologists are most likely to emphasize that the latter two levels will have more pay-off for the change agent, although changes at the level of the whole organizational structure may be difficult to execute, involving as they do many interrelated parts.

The administrator must recognize that carrying out roles involves a complexity of performance inasmuch as (1) multiple activities may be combined into a single role, (2) multiple roles into a single office, and (3) multiple offices may be held by a single person. Attempting to introduce change into an organization involves working upon all three of these aspects of role performance.

Furthermore, one's position in the organization affects his conception of his own role performance and often leads to a misconception of the attitudes of others in reciprocal roles. For example, Floyd Mann reports in Likert's *New Patterns of Management*[1] that 76 per cent of the supervisors in a public utility said that they sought subordinates' ideas, but only 16 per cent of the workers involved said they were consulted. Likewise, case studies from prisons indicate that there is much misinterpretation between inmates and custodial personnel, and between custodial personnel and treatment personnel of conceptions of one's own roles and the way that role performance was perceived by the others involved. The clarification of role performance, both as ideally perceived, and as actually carried out, is an aspect of organizational functioning that is manageable and well within the capability of administrators to attempt to manipulate.

ROLE CONFLICT

The concept of role conflict can be a very useful tool for the administrator because a large number of organizational problems can be diagnosed by means of this frame of reference. Role conflict consists of the simultaneous occurrence of two or more role sendings so that compliance with one makes it difficult to meet the expectations of the other. Some common situations of role conflict are:

(1) Personality-role conflict—where a person's psychological characteristics make it difficult to carry out the role satisfactorily,

for example, a shy person in a role demanding aggressive behaviour. Or the role prescription may violate the needs, values, and capacities of the role recipient.

(2) Person-role conflict—where a person may want to do something contrary to the shared expectations of what is "proper" for a person in his social position to do, for example, the hourly employee may think he should have the same freedom to enter and leave the plant as the top executives.

(3) Intra-sender conflict—where the role sender makes conflicting demands upon the role-receiver. For example, management wants workers to exercise judgment and responsibility and yet punishes for deviation from rules.

(4) Inter-sender conflict—where an employee has two or more supervisors that send contradictory role instructions. For example, a staff specialist may make suggestions to improve role performance that deviate from the line foreman's instructions. Or workers may have family demands made upon them that conflict with organizational demands. Or the worker's peers may make demands for the restriction of production while supervisors are demanding more output.

(5) Inter-role conflict—where the sent expectations from one role are in conflict with another role played by the same person. For example, the demands made upon the time of an executive may conflict with his responsibilities as husband-father, so that it is very difficult to play both roles satisfactorily and simultaneously.

(6) Conflict in changing roles where the retired executive or employee finds it very difficult to accept his new role of little authority where he has been accustomed to a role of responsibility. Or in penal organizations the paroled prisoner finds his new role as parolee difficult to fill because of community role definitions given to the ex-convict. A universal role conflict, in and out of organizations, that is difficult for many to accept, is that of the shift from adolescent to mature adult, and from active responsible adult to the more dependent less prestigious role of an aged retiree.

(7) Role overload—many executives find that they are subject to excessive role-taking demands. The organization structure may require that one person send roles and receive roles from too many persons. Decentralization of administration with more autonomy given to subordinates is an increasingly common response to this dilemma. The top executives of an organization must not be the recipient of so many role-sendings that they sacrifice quality of performance for quality of role interaction.

Regardless of how one classifies the various types of role conflict rvasiveness in organizational functioning is of high significance. 964 Robert Kahn and his colleagues in an extensive study of ican workers found that 48 per cent were caught between two f people who wanted different performances from them and cent reported this to be a serious and frequent problem. -eight per cent of the role conflicts reported in this study ed the perception of pressures from above and in 57 per cent of ases the source of pressures were given as "Management" or ompany".[2]

Thus, role conflict is to a great extent an organizational n, created by the characteristics of the organization and the erformance of the persons who administer the organization. ictors as closeness of supervision, the pressure for the formation s of performance and the policing of such rules, the drive for ment and output, the degree to which supervisors take an in their subordinates and recognize the necessity of relation-ing tempered by particularistic factors, rather than complete on general universalistic standards applied to all alike adjustment for personal circumstance, all affect the degree conflict found in an organization.

dministrators need to re-examine the rule structure of their ation, to restudy the content of the role demands made upon bordinates, and to make the necessary adjustment in role n and role expectation to lessen the strains and conflicts out-ove.

CONCLUSION

conclude with an optimistic note about organizational and rative change. If the problem is approached from the pers-hat what is really involved is a change in role prescription performance rather than in deep-seated and long-continu-nality factors, then there are grounds for hope. Roles and ms are not inherent but are creations of man. As such they ect to modification, simplification, change of content and nipulations. While this is not simple or easy because of the ing and interdependent relations between role-senders and vers, it is nevertheless possible. Compared to alternative of change such as altering the personality structure of extensive modification of environmental structures within ganizations operate, it is well within the range of managerial nd offers grounds of hope for realistic and practical ional change.

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16

Coping with Role Stress: A Framework

Udai Pareek

THE concept of 'role' is the key concept in understanding the integration of the individual with the organization. It is through role that the individual interacts with, and gets (or does not get) integrated with the organization. Role has been defined in several ways, and a distinction is often made between role and office positions. For the sake of convenience we shall use the word 'role' for any position a person holds in a system (organization) as defined by the expectations various significant persons, including himself, have from that position. We shall use the term 'function' to indicate a set of interrelated expectations from a role. Used in these meanings, while sales manager is a role, developing his sales force and customer contact are his functions.

ROLE SPACE AND ROLE SET

As suggested by Katz and Kahn, an organization can be defined as a system of roles.[1] However, role itself is a system. From the point of view of an individual, two role systems are important, the system of various roles the individual carries and performs, and the system of various roles of which his role is a part, and in which his role is defined by other significant roles. The first we shall call 'role space'. The second is known in the literature as 'role set'.

Each individual occupies and plays several roles. A person is a son, a father, a salesman, a member of club, a member of a voluntary organization, and so on. All these roles make up his role space. In the centre of the role space is the self. As the concept of role is central to the concept of organization, the concept of self is central to the concept of role. Various roles the person plays are around the self. These roles are at various distances from the self and from each other. These relationships define the role space. Role space, then, can be defined as the dynamic interrelationship both between the self and the various roles an individual occupies, and amongst these roles.

The distance between a role and the self will indicate the extent to which the role is integrated with the self. When we do not enjoy

a particular role, or do not get involved in it, there is distance between the self and the role. We shall use the word *self-role distance* to denote this. Similarly, there may be distance between one role and the other role a person occupies. For example, the role of club membership may be distant from the husband role, and conflict may



FIGURE 1 : ROLE SPACE

The figures 9 to 1 for the various circles represent distance from the self—9 denoting the least distance and 1 the most distance.

exist between the two roles. This we shall call inter-role distance or inter-role conflict. Role space map of an individual can, then, be drawn by locating the self in the centre, and various roles he occupies at various distances from the self, and from each other. Figure 1 presents a diagrammatic model to prepare the role space map. The figures 9 to 1 for the various circles represent distance from the self—9 denoting the least distance and 1 the most distance. The various roles may be located in the four quadrants, to indicate distances between them. For example, if roles A and B are both at a distance of 8 from the self, but have maximum distance from each other, they can be located in the circle marked 8, but one can be written in the

upper part of the circle, and the other in the lower part. Each person can prepare a map of his role space by locating significant roles in the circular diagram suggested in Figure 1. Self-role and inter-role distance are important parts of personality. Some psychologists define personality as systems of action arising out of interplay of self and role.

Some classification systems of roles have been proposed. Banton has proposed the concepts of basic, general and independent roles. Basic and general roles are related (e.g., husband is a basic role, and a working woman's husband is a general role). The term 'role repertory' is used to indicate a collection of such roles. Ruddock uses the term 'role tree' to indicate a branching network concept.[2] The trunk corresponds to the basic role, the main branches to the general roles, the secondary branches to special roles and the leaves to the transient roles.

The individual's role in an organization is defined by the expectations of significant role senders in that organization including the individual himself. The expectations from the role by the individual himself are termed 'reflexive role expectations' by Kahn and Quinn.[3] Katz and Kahn use the term 'focal person' for the individual who occupies the role, and 'role senders' for persons in the role set of the individual.[4] We shall use the term *role occupant* for the individual who occupies a particular role, and *other roles* for all other roles in the role set of the individual. The concept of role set was proposed by Merton who defined role set as the "compliment of role relationships which persons have by virtue of occupying a particular social status,[5] and has been widely used in the literature. Role set is the pattern of relationship between the role being considered and other roles.

The role set map for an individual's role can also be prepared, on the same lines as suggested for preparing a role space map. In the map, the role of the role occupant will be in the centre, and all other roles can be located in various points in the map. Using a circular model, the roles can be located in the circulars marked 9 to 1—9 indicating the nearest roles to the role occupant's role and 1 indicating roles at the most distance from the role. We shall use the term *role-role distance* to indicate the distance between the role of the role occupant and other roles. The lower distance indicates higher role linkage which can be defined as the reverse of role-role distance. Role linkage is an important concept in role satisfaction and role conflict.

ROLE TAKING AND ROLE PERFORMANCE

The process of role taking in the organization is the process of establishing identification by the individual with the organization.

There are two aspects of role taking. One aspect relates to the individual's self-concept and the way he responds to the various expectations of other roles from his own role. He may react very positively and with great satisfaction to the expectations, and fulfil these expectations to the best of his capability. The reactive approach will help the individual take the role effectively. In contrast, another individual may use the expectations he himself has from the role he occupies (what Kahn and Quinn say 'reflexive role expectations') and develop role behaviour in which his own expectations play a major role. This is a pro-active approach to role performance. Some authors have contrasted these two approaches calling the first as 'role taking' and the second as 'role making'. The main difference is made by the use of one's expectations in defining the role and determining one's own role behaviour.

The other aspect of role taking is concerned with the identification of the self with the role. If the role is so different from the self, that the expectations conflict with the self-concept, it may result in what we have called self-role distance. This aspect of role taking may be called 'role acceptance'. Even when there is no evident self-role distance, the degree of role acceptance may be low or high. Sarbin and Allen have proposed seven levels of intensity of role taking, defining this in terms of how much the individual is able to get into the role. These range from casual roles to the emergence of a moribund person.[6]

Katz and Kahn have proposed the concept of role episode to explain the process of role taking.[7] The role occupant and the other roles (role senders) constantly interact, and the process for role sending and role receiving influence the role behaviour of the individual. The role senders have expectations on the basis of their perception of the role occupant's behaviour. The role occupant acts on the basis of his perception of the role being sent to him. His behaviour influences the expectations. Thus, role episode has a feedback loop. Katz and Kahn have elaborated this concept to include interaction between role senders and role occupants as well as interpersonal and personality factors. Their model appears in Figure 2.

THE NATURE OF ROLE STRESS

In the role behaviour of an individual, several variables are involved—the self, the other roles (role senders), the expectations by the other roles, expectation by the self, and other roles undertaken and performed by the individual. It is extremely difficult to imagine situations

in which there is no conflict amongst these variables. The very nature



FIG. 2: A MODEL OF THE ROLE EPISODE

of the role has built-in potential for conflict and stress. So conflict is a natural variable in role performance. Conflict and stress need not necessarily be negative in their effects on the individual and the organization. Some amount of stress is necessary for the effective working of an individual and the organization. It is not the presence or absence of stress that makes the individual or organization effective or ineffective but it is the way in which this stress is managed which is a crucial factor for individual and organizational effectiveness.

The concept of stress has been popular in psychology. Several terms have been used which are synonymous with or similar in meaning as stress. There are four common terms used in the literature: 'stress', 'strain', 'conflict', and 'pressure'. Lazarus has defined stress as any force directed at an object.[8] Saly has referred to the sources of such stress or damaging stimuli as stressors, and the reactions of the organisms as stress.[9] Kahn and Quinn have proposed a response inferred definition of stress as "an experiment or noxious stimulus with general results in certain psychological change, behavioural change, perceptual cognitive change, affective change and in both overt and intrapsychic coping efforts."[10] 'Role conflict' has been defined in terms of conflicting expectations. The main characteristic of conflict is the incompatibility of some variables relating to the role of an individual which may have some consequences for the individual's role performance. The word 'strain' has been used in the literature to denote the effect of stress on the individual. The word 'pressure' has also been used. Buck defines 'job pressure' as the resultant psychological state of the individual when he perceives that (1) conflicting forces and incompatibility commitments are being made upon him in connection with his work; (2) at least one of the

forces of demands is an induced one, and (3) the forces are recurrent or stable over time. Several studies have shown that role stress or pressure is very bad for the mental and physical health.[11] The physical health hazards of the role have been discussed by Saly.[12]

Although distinction is made amongst related concepts like conflict, stress, strain, and pressure, it may be useful to use these interchangeably in order to understand the incompatibility of certain role-related variables, their effects on the individual's behaviour and the efforts he makes in dealing with them. In this note we are not, therefore, making distinction amongst these related terms.

Several systems of classifications have been used to discuss role conflict and stress. Kahn and Quinn have classified role stress under three main headings: expectation generated stress, in which they include role ambiguity and role conflict; expectation resource discrepancies, in which they include role overload, responsibility-authority dilemma and inadequate technical information; and role and personality.[13] We find it more functional to use the two main role constellations as areas of conflict and stress.

ROLE SPACE CONFLICTS AND STRESS

The main fields in which role is significant to the individual are the role space and the role set. Role space (the dynamic relationship amongst various roles the individual occupies and his self) has three main variables: self, the role under question, and other roles he occupies. Any conflicts within this field are referred to as role conflicts. These conflicts may be the following:

1. *Self-Role Distance*: We have already discussed this as the conflict between the self concept and the expectations from the role as perceived by the role occupant. If a person occupies a role which he may subsequently find conflicting with his self concept, he feels the stress. For example, a usually introvert person, who is fond of studying and writing, may have self-role distance if he accepts the role of a salesman in an organization, and comes to realize that the expectations from the roles would include his meeting people and being social. Such conflicts are fairly common, although these may not be so severe.

2. *Intra-role Conflict*: Since the individual learns to develop expectation as a result of his socialization and identification with significant others, it is quite likely that he sees some incompatibility between the two expectations from his own role. For example, a professor may see incompatibility between the expectations of teach

ing students and that of doing research. These inherently may not be conflicting but the individual may perceive these as incompatible.

3. *Role Growth Stress:* As the individual grows physically, he also grows in the role he occupies in an organization. With the advancement of the individual, his role changes and with this change in role, the need for his taking his new role becomes crucial. This is the problem of role growth. This becomes an acute problem especially when an individual has occupied a role for a long time, and he enters another role in which he may feel less secure. However, the demand of the new role is for the individual to outgrow his previous role and occupy the new role effectively. This produces some stress in the individual.

4. *Inter-role Conflict*: An individual occupies more than one role. There may be conflicts between two roles he occupies. For example, an executive often faces the conflict between his organizational role as an executive and his family role as the husband and the father. The demands from his wife and children to share his time may be incompatible with the organizational demands on him for spending a lot of time on organizational problems. Such inter-role conflicts are quite frequent in modern society when the individual is increasingly occupying multiple roles in various organizations and groups.

ROLE SET CONFLICTS

The other field which is important for the individual's role is his role set which consists of important persons who have different expectations from the role he occupies. The conflicts which arise as a result of incompatibility amongst these expectations by significant other roles and by the individual himself, are referred to as role set conflicts. These conflicts are as follows:

1. *Role Ambiguity*: When the individual is not clear about the various expectations people have from his role, he faces the conflict which may be called role ambiguity. Role ambiguity may be due to lack of information available to the role occupant, or due to lack of understanding of the cases available to him. Kahn and Quinn have suggested that role ambiguity may be in relation to the activities, responsibilities, personal style and norms.[14] They have suggested three loci of role ambiguity: the expectations the role sender holds for the role occupant, the expectations sent by the role sender to the role occupant, and the expectations the role occupant receives and interprets in the light of prior information and experience. They

have suggested that four different kinds of roles are likely to experience ambiguity: roles new to the organization, roles in expanding or contracting organizations, roles in organizations exposed to frequent changes in demand, and roles on process. Role ambiguity may result in various other conflicts.

2. *Role Overload*: When the role occupant feels that there are too many expectations from the significant roles in his role set, he experiences 'role overload'. This term has been popularized by Kahn *et al.*[15] They measured this stress by asking questions about the feeling of people whether they could possibly finish work given to them during the modified work day and whether they felt that amount of work they did might interfere with how well it was done. Most of the executive role occupants experience role overload. Kahn and Quinn have suggested some conditions under which role overload is likely to occur. According to them, role overload is likely to occur more in the absence of mechanism of role integration, in the absence of power of role occupants, in the large variations in the expected output and when delegation or assistance cannot procure more time.[16]

3. *Role-role Distance*: In a role set, the role occupant may feel that certain roles are psychologically near to him, while some other roles are at a distance. The main criterion of role-role distance is frequency and ease of interaction. When linkages are strong, the role-role distance will be low. In the absence of strong linkage, the role-role distance may be high. The role-role distance can, therefore, be measured in terms of existing and desired linkages. The gap between the desired and the existing linkages will indicate the amount of distance between the two roles.

4. *Role Erosion*: A role occupant may feel that some functions which he would like to perform are being performed by some other role. The stress felt may be called 'role erosion'. Role erosion is the subjective feeling of an individual that some important role expectations he has from his role do not match with the expectations other roles have for him. Role erosion is likely to be experienced in an organization which is redefining its role and creating new roles. In several organizations which were redefining their structure, the stress of role erosion was inevitably felt. In one organization, one role was abolished and two roles were created to cater to the executive and planning needs. This led to a great stress in the role occupants of both roles who experienced role erosion.

Some factors associated with role stress have been identified in some research studies. Snock has reported that the larger the role

a role occupant, the greater the strain he is likely to experi-
[17] Age (younger), experience (less), size (medium) of the de-
ıent have been found to be significantly associated with role
.[18] Lack of empathy and creation of new roles are two important
s contributing to the stress. However, role variety, i.e., number
mpletely dissimilar occupational categories in the organization
)een found to be associated with the ability to cope with
tainty. Role variety (Tyler has developed a co-efficient of
ılization to measure it) and role specificity[19] have been found
two important factors preventing role stress. But the fact
ns that the various forms of role stress, as discussed in this paper,
problem for the individual and the organization. However,
have already said, it is not the presence of these stresses that
affect the working of the organization, but it is the way in
these stresses are managed. The coping behaviour of the
dual and the organization is important in this respect.

When an individual and an organization experience role stress,
adopt some ways coping with the stress. Individuals and the
izations cannot remain in a continuous state of tension. Even
leliberate and conscious strategy is not taken to deal with the
some strategy is adopted; for example, this strategy may be
ıve the conflict and stress to take care of themselves. Even this
rategy, although the individual or the organizations may not be
of this. It is useful for the individuals and the organizations
ımine what strategy they are using to cope with the stress. If
)ing strategy is adopted, it may lead to lack of effectiveness.
has reported that coping as opposed to non-coping itself is
l to satisfaction.[20] He found coping itself being important
than a particular coping strategy.

There are various ways of coping with stress. However, we
oadly classify these into two kinds. Some strategies are used to
the stress, in the hope that time will take care of the stress.
may be called avoidance strategy. Such a strategy does not
bute to problem solving and, therefore, is dysfunctional. Most
ıidance strategies would use defensive behaviour and reduce
ı without resolving the problem. Using the term suggested by
biewski, these may also be called as 'degenerating strategies'
hey lead to lack of effectiveness both on the part of the indi-
and the organization. The other set of strategies use con-
ion as the main approach. Instead of avoiding problems, these
ies help the individual and the organization face the problem
ork out a solution for it. These strategies are functional, as

they contribute to the solution of the problems. In Golembiewski's language they may also be called 'regenerating strategies' since they help the individual and the organization become more functional and increase their self-renewing capacities.

Based on this broad classification of strategies into two kinds, we can think of the two ways in which any role conflict or role stress is managed. Figure 3 summarizes the two main ways of managing different conflicts discussed earlier.

FIGURE 3

Two Types of Coping Strategies

Role Conflict	*Avoidance, Dysfunctional, Degenerating Strategies*	*Confrontation, Functional, Regenerating Strategies*
A. *Role Space Conflicts*		
1. Self-role Distance	Self/Role Rejection	Role Integration
2. Intra-role Conflict	Role Shrinkage	Role Linkage, Creativity
3. Role Growth Stress	Role Fixation	Role Transition
4. Inter-role Conflict	Role Elimination & Rationalization	Role Negotiation
B. *Role Set Conflicts*		
1. Role Ambiguity	Role Prescription and Role Taking	Role Clarification and Role Making
2. Role Overload	Prioritization	Role Slimming
3. Role-Role Distance	Role Boundness (Efficient Isolation)	Role Negotiation
4. Role Erosion	Fight for Rights and Rules	Role Enrichment

ROLE-SPACE CONFLICTS

1. Self-Role Distance : When the stress in the form of self-role distance is experienced, the individual may deal with the stress in two ways. In the extreme form, the individual may choose either his self concept and, in turn, reject the role, or he may choose his role, and in turn reject his self. Many individuals who find a conflict between their self concept and the role they occupy in an organization, may

nply play that role in a routine way to earn their living. They ke no interest in their role, and this is indicative of self role stance. They have rejected the roles. On the other hand, some her individuals may seriously occupy their roles and in due course time, completely forget their self concept and play that role fectively but reject their self One important personality character- ic that may influence the decision of the individual to reject the lf or the role is inner or other directedness. Dunnain has reported at self oriented individuals deal with incompatibility by being nsistent with their needs while other directed individuals manage by being consistent with prevailing socially induced forces. Both ese approaches are dysfunctional. If an individual rejects the role, is likely to be ineffective in the organization. However, if he jects the self, he is likely to lose his effectiveness as an individual d it is likely to be bad for his mental health.

A functional strategy of dealing with this stress is to attempt le integration. The individual may analyze the various aspects of e roles which are causing self-role distance and may begin to quire skills if these may help him to bridge this gap, or carry his vn self into the role by defining some aspects of the role according his own skills. In other words, an attempt both to grow in the le and make the role grow to use the special capabilities of the rson would result in role integration, where the individual gets e satisfaction of occupying a role which is nearer to his self concept. ich an integration is not easy to achieve but with systematic effort, is also not very difficult to attain.

2. *Intra-role Conflict* : When the expectations from the individual ncerned from his role conflict with one another, role stress may velop. One way to deal with this stress is to eliminate those pectations from the role which are likely to conflict with other pectations. This is the process of 'role shrinkage'. Role shrinkage the act of pruning a role in such a way that some expectations n be given up. Role shrinkage may help avoid the problem but is dysfunctional approach since the advantage of a larger role is lost. istead of role shrinkage, if the role linkages are established with her roles, and the problem is solved by devising some new ways of hieving the conflicting expectations the individual can experience th the process of growth as well as satisfaction. If, for example, professor who is experiencing conflict between two expectations om his role, that of teaching students and doing research and con- lting work, he may find that the conflict is basically because he es not have enough skills for doing research. Usually because of

lack of relative skills he may take recourse to role shrinkage. However, one way to deal with this problem is to develop the role relationship with other persons who are good in research and work out an arrangement whereby research is not neglected. A better way of resolving the problems may be to find ways of doing things in a more non-traditional and productive way.

3. Role Growth Stress : When individuals get into new roles as a result of their advancement in the organization, or as a result of taking over more challenging roles, there may be a feeling of apprehension because the role is new and may require skills which the role occupant may not have. In such a situation, a usual way is to continue to play the previous role about which the individual is sure, and which he has been doing successfully. In many cases this is the tragedy of the organizations that even after advancement, people at the top continue to play the role of the lower level managers. A foreman, for example, in due course, may become General Manager, and still he may continue to play the role of the foreman with consequent frustrations to the new foreman and to others who expect him to devote his time to more productive aspects. In one organization, after several self-searching sessions, it became clear to many persons at the senior management level that their tendency to have close supervision was really a tendency to continue to play their old roles. This is specially so if the individual role requires more new skills which have to be developed. For example, planning roles and the role of scanning the environment require altogether new skills. In the absence of such skills, usual tendency is to fall back on the old tried out roles. This is 'role fixation'.

As it is necessary for an individual to grow out of his role, as a boy into that of an adolescent and out of adolescence into adulthood, similarly it is important for people to grow out of their old roles into new ones and face up the challenge. A more functional way to resolve this conflict is that of role transition. Role transition is the process by which a previous role, however successful and satisfying it may have been, is given up to take a new and more developed role. The word 'role transition' has been borrowed from Burr.[21] Burr has suggested that role transition is helped by various processes, including anticipatory socialization, role clarity, substitute gratification and transition procedure. In order to make role transition more effective, it is necessary to have anticipatory socialization, i.e., preparation for the taking of the new role. This would also include delegation of responsibility and functions to people below one's own role, so that the person can be free to experiment and he

ıke help in such experimentation from others. Such a process ; transition may be very useful.

4. Inter-role Conflict : The individual may experience stress due nflict between two roles he occupies, and which conflict in tations. The usual approach to deal with this problem is either tition the roles clearly so that a person is a husband or father he is at home, and an executive when he is in his office, or may be role elimination, i.e., accepting one role at the cost of ther role. In such a case, the individual takes recourse to alization. For example, an executive who neglects his family ne and who in this process eliminates his role as father and as nd rationalizes the process by thinking that he makes a unique bution to the company and, therefore, can afford to neglect his , or he earns enough for his family who should pay the price ng him as a husband and as father. Such rationalizations are of the process of role elimination. Hall has used the words ioning' and 'elimination' in the sixteen specific behavioural gies he has identified in dealing with role conflicts.[22] He ıts that these strategies are dysfunctional because they only the problem and do not help individuals confront and resolve ıues.

A more functional approach to the problem is 'role negotia- Role negotiation has been developed as a technique of dealing various problems of role conflict by Harrison.[23] The process of egotiation is the process of establishing mutuality of roles and g necessary help to play the roles more effectively, and giving n turn to the other role. For example, an executive, who is not to find time for his family, may sit down and negotiate with fe and children on how best he can spend time meaningfully ı the given constraints. One executive in the largest nation- bank solved the problem by discussing with his family and ng out an arrangement whereby he would not normally accept tions to dine out unless both the wife and the husband were d. This negotiation was highly satisfying because neither of les had to be sacrificed and eliminated.

ROLE SET CONFLICT

ıis area four conflicts have already been identified. The various g strategies are discussed for each category.

1. Role Ambiguity : When the role is ambiguous because of lack nmunication, or because of gap between role sending and role ing, the usual approach is to make the roles clear by putting

various things on paper. This is role prescription. The various expectations are defined more clearly. Or the individual may remove ambiguity by fitting into the role as described in some expectations. This is the process of role taking. A more functional approach may be to seek clarifications from various sources and to define the role in the light of such clarifications. In contrast with role taking, a more creative way is to define the role according to one's own strength and to take some steps in making the role more challenging. This is the process of role making.

2. *Role Overload* : To deal with the problem of role overload, i.e., a feeling of too many expectations from several sources, the role occupant usually prepares a list of all functions in terms of priorities. He gives top priorities to those functions which are important. This kind of prioritization may help put things in order of importance. However, the problem may be that the functions with which a person is less familiar and comfortable may tend to be pushed lower down the priority list, and may be neglected. Those functions which a person is able to perform without any effort get top priority. Those which are in the lower level of priority always remain neglected and in this sense, this approach may be dysfunctional. A more functional approach may be to redefine the role and see which aspects of the role may be delegated to other persons who may be helped to develop take on these functions. This may help the other individuals also to grow. This may be called 'role slimming'. The role does not lose its vitality in the process of delegating some functions, in fact the vitality increases with decrease in obesity.

3. *Role-role Distance* : When there is tension between two roles in an organization, the distance between these roles is likely to be large. The linkage in such a case will be weak. The usual tendency in such a stress situation is for each role occupant to play the role most efficiently, and avoid interactions. The role occupant confines himself to his own role. This we may call 'role boundness'. He voluntarily agrees to be bound by the role. In several organizations we find individual executives and managers who are highly efficient in their own roles but who do not take corporate responsibility and whose linkages with other roles are very weak. There is a kind of isolation into which an individual withdraws. He gets satisfaction out of playing the individual role effectively and efficiently but dces not contribute as much as he could have done to the overall responsibility for the organization. This is likely to be dysfunctional as it does not help the individual play his role in the larger interest of the organization. A better described method of approach is role negotiation. Harrison

as described in detail the process of role negotiation which can be sed for resolving such conflict.[24]

4. *Role Erosion* : When an individual feels that some important ınctions which he would prefer to perform are being performed by ɔme other roles, there is a feeling of role erosion. The usual react-ɔn in such a situation is to fight for rights of the role and to insist larification of roles. The solution is to make structural clarifications. Iowever, this is not likely to be functional and helpful since the asic conflict continues. A better approach may be that of 'role nrichment'. Like job enrichment, the concept of role enrichment ; the concept of vertical loading of the role. Cummings and Elsalmi ave proposed the idea of 'role diversity'.[25] According to them, role et diversity is measured in terms of the number of roles with which he role occupant maintains work relationships. They have reported hat highly diversified role set provides the executive with varied ɔurces of stimulation and, therefore, leads to managerial satisfaction. 'hey found that this variable contributed more to satisfaction than he company size or sub-unit size. The concept of role diversity is imilar to the concept of the role enrichment. Role enrichment can e done by analyzing the role systematically and helping the ndividual to see the various strengths in that role and the various hallenges which the role contains but which might not have been pparent to the individual when he occupies it. Significant role nembers can help make the role more challenging and satisfying to he role occupant.

The various coping strategies outlined above make it clear hat confrontation strategies are more functional and contribute to egenerating process. However, in order to use these strategies it vould be necessary to work out systematic ways of implementing hese strategies. This requires a lot of work, and some organization levelopment (OD) effort can give good results.

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Bureaucracy and Work Motivation: An Empirical Assessment of the Conceptualizations of Max Weber and Warren Bennis

Tej K. Jain

ORGANIZATIONS are goal-oriented collectivities designed to maximize production. Viewing historically, it becomes evident that at different times, one particular means of production becomes more important than the rest. First, in the Scientific Management era of Frederick W. Taylor, the primary goal of industrial organizations was to increase production by means of rigid, technologically grounded principles of organizational management.[1] As March and Simon observe, in the Taylorian scheme, the organization members were perceived as "primarily passive instruments, capable of performing work and accepting directions, but not initiating action or exerting influence in any significant way."[2] Secondly, the human relations approach era viewed organizations as organic social systems in which human and social elements were coordinated into a functioning whole.[3] Certainly, Taylor had emphasized the coordination of physical processes and subsequent adjustment of human workers to these processes,[4] but it was human relations approach which highlighted variables such as worker participation, satisfaction and cooperation.

The contemporary administrative theory contains a synthesis of scientific management and human relations approaches. This integrated approach, further buttressed by empiricism, is generally termed as 'behaviouralism'. It focuses upon the behaviour of people in organizational settings.[5] In search of administrative theories to solve and explain the problems confronting modern organizations, a number of traditional theories have been criticized by various scholars. One of the traditional theories that has come in for severe criticism at the hands of modern administrative theorists is that of bureaucracy and its relationship with work motivation.

THE DEMISE OF BUREAUCRACY

arly 1960s the demise of bureaucratic types of organizations licted. Warren G. Bennis had observed:

:his form of organization [bureaucracy] is becoming less and tive, it is hopelessly out of joint with contemporary realities, new shapes, patterns and models—currently recessive— rging which promise drastic changes in the conduct of the tion and managerial practice in general."[6]

nnis had predicted the demise of bureaucracy on two : (1) reciprocity, and (2) adaptability. By reciprocity, Bennis that a bureaucratic organization cannot keep a balance the needs and satisfactions of the participants on the one id of the organization on the other, and therefore, motivation employees and thereby the effectiveness of the organization s. According to Bennis, there is a congruence between the d individual's need for meaningful, satisfactory, and creative d flexible structure or autonomy. In other words, a highly ed bureaucratic organization is negatively related to the work ion of its employees. Further, by adaptability, Bennis referred bility of a bureaucratic organization to conform to pressures nges in its environment.[7]

ireaucratic organizations have been labelled as impersonal, inizing, and unresponsive to the needs of the individuals. ing to Meyers, "Employee participants in these organizations racterized as feeling alienated and personally unfulfilled of the limitations which the organization's efficiency places free and creative participation in the production process."[8]

WEBER'S POSITION

y, there are two theoretical positions and one empirical which depict the relationship between bureaucracy and notivation. Max Weber is the master theoretician of the of bureaucracy—the demise of which was predicted by According to Weber, "Bureaucracy is by far the most t instrument of large scale administration which has ever eveloped, and the modern social order has become overwhel- dependent on it."[9] Weber maintained that a purely bureau- ype of administrative organization was capable of attaining hest level of efficiency. Weber had studied several industrial, l, and military organizations and had attempted to develop

certain organizational characteristics which would help make organizations "most efficient". In the process of identifying these characteristics, Weber introduced the now well known concept of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was seen to be efficient because it did away with irrational and emotional biases in administrative decision making process, primarily because; (a) the bureaucrats were highly trained experts in their jobs, and (b) bureaucracy was orderly, disciplined, and based on clear written policies. Weber, however, did not elaborate as to what 'efficiency' of an organization really meant. However, it can be surmised that in Weber's bureaucratic model, a bureaucrat has a defined position, salary, and status, and therefore he cannot be held responsible for the acts outside the sphere of his authority. Here an important question that arises is whether a bureaucrat is motivated under the given circumstances to perform his job. Weber seems to think so. Bennis, on the other hand, proposes that increase in work motivation of the employees will increase the efficiency of an organization. Thus, Weber and Bennis agree with the position that high motivation of the employees of an organization will result in higher efficiency. The problem is whether bureaucracy is an appropriate type of organization to adopt when the organization's primary purpose is to increase the motivation of its employees. Weber's response seems to be positive while in the case of Bennis, it is negative.

According to Weber, bureaucratic structure is positively related to work motivation. This theoretical position is supported by some research in educational administration. Meeller and Charters' findings suggest that teachers connected with highly bureaucratic organizations have a high sense of power compared to those in an organization low in bureaucratic structure. Their research concluded that highly bureaucratic organizations tend to seek employees with a high sense of power.[10]

OTHER RESEARCHES

Blum has contributed to the development of a more inclusive understanding of the relationship between bureaucracy and work motivation by adding to his analysis the dimension of job selection. He posits that the desire for security may dictate a person's choice of job situation and, coincidentally, his work motivation. Blum's contention is that the difference exists among individuals with respect to the degree of importance placed on security as a factor in the choice of occupations. Some people may choose a job where elements

of security are high while others may be less concerned with security and therefore might choose vocations in which opportunities for responsibilities, achievement, recognition, and advancement are high.[11]

In an investigation of organizational structure and student alienation, O'detola, Erickson, Bryan, and Walker found that students in traditional type classroom settings are less alienated than students in the modern, team-teaching classroom settings. The traditional type classroom was more structured (bureaucratic) than the modern type.[12]

George and Bishop investigated the relationship between organizational structure and personality characteristics of teachers. They found that in a smaller, less bureaucratic, innovative district, teachers exhibited low anxiety and perceived low organizational structure. In the larger, traditional and more bureaucratic district, the teachers perceived more independence and were brighter. They also tended to reveal a higher level of organizational anxiety.[13]

Robert J. Coughlan examined the ways in which the teachers' work values affected their job satisfaction within relatively closed and open school organizational systems. Coughlan's research failed to support the hypothesis that work values would mediate differentially between the organizational system and level of job satisfaction depending upon whether one's dominant values coincided with those of the formal organization.[14]

ORGANIZATIONAL V. INDIVIDUAL GOALS

Since 1935 there has been considerable increase in research to assess the effect of human factors on production efficiency. Elton Mayo and his associates were among the first to view human affiliation as a motivating force.[15] This viewpoint has been supported, among others, by Warren Bennis.[16] Bennis argues that Weber's bureaucracy does not have the capacity to manage the tension between the individual and management goals, because employees in the present-day organizations will be more intellectually committed to their jobs and will probably require more involvement, participation, and autonomy in their work.[17] In other words, a bureaucratic organization will become ineffective where there is a conflict between the goals of the individuals and those of the management. Bennis perceives a congruence between the educated individual's need for meaningful, satisfactory, and creative tasks and flexible structure or autonomy of an organization.[18]

It may be pertinent to mention that Owens has pointed out four criticisms of bureaucracy. The essence of these criticisms is that in a bureaucratic organization an individual becomes a cog in a wheel. The result is that an individual becomes a drab, colourless, routinized "organization man".[19] These criticisms are also supported by Chris Argyris. Argyris maintains that bureaucracy is negatively related to work motivation. He studied the individuals in organizations with the purpose of researching the relationship between bureaucracy and work motivation and developed a model of motivation along a continuum with the low end called 'infant' and the high end labelled 'adult'. His findings suggest that certain aspects of organization, for example, hierarchy and rules and regulations influence the motivational level of the individual in an organization. Argyris has argued that high formal organizational structure obstructs the self-actualization process of attaining adult motivation.[20] Weber, on the other hand, had argued that a bureaucratic organization eliminates corruption, favouritism, partiality, and intuitive judgment and thus lays the base for work motivation in accordance with the rules and regulations of the organization. Weber had suggested that if an individual is aware of his responsibilities, duties and rights and his limitations, he will be motivated to perform his job.

Notably, the theoretical position of Bennis and Argyris that bureaucracy is negatively related to work motivation, has also been supported by some research in educational administration. For instance, Carpenter has found a relationship existing between formal structural type of school organization and the perceived job satisfaction of classroom teachers. He reported a declining level of satisfaction with an increase in the level of bureaucracy. Thus, flat organizational structures tended to have higher levels of job satisfaction among their employees than did tall structural types.[21]

The Hawthorne experiments had demonstrated that the organization did not function in accordance with the formal organizational chart. A structure other than the formal one had a significant influence on the behaviour and sentiments of its employees. The Hawthorne experiment had demonstrated that the informal organization caused costly reductions in organizational performance.[22] Weber did not take the informal organizational factor into account in his bureaucratic model, primarily because his ideal typical conceptualization was based on the formal structural aspects of bureaucracy and their interrelationships.

In his research, Argyris has found that in a low bureaucracy and low control situation, the employees feel happier, freer, and are

motivated intrinsically. The opposite was found in a high level of bureaucratic organization. If there were many controls and the level of bureaucracy was high, the individuals did not feel happy, free, and were motivated by factors such as job security, hygiene factors, climate and so on.[23]

However, there is a third position in the explanation of the relationship between bureaucracy and work motivation. This position is not just theoretical, but has been empirically demonstrated by Patton and Miskel who found no significant differences existing across extrinsic, intrinsic, and work propensity attitudes when teachers were grouped by degree of bureaucracy existing in nine school districts.[24]

RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

There seems to be an agreement that modern, complex organizations have some of the bureaucratic characteristics as suggested by Weber. Scholars such as Gouldner,[25] Udy[26] and others have considerable agreement on the characteristics of bureaucracy, and yet there seems to be an increasing disagreement with Weber on his position that bureaucracy is positively related to work motivation.

Growing out of the controversy of the relationship is the concept of designing work so that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivational needs of employees can be met. Weber had probably suggested that a bureaucratic organization is able to meet both these motivational needs because such an organization gives job security to its members; promotion in these organizations is based on technical competence; and the rights and duties of their employees are well-defined. Here the basic assumption is that if an organization is able to meet both motivational needs, it will become more efficient and effective. Herzberg, on the other hand, has argued that extrinsic motivation factors are largely met by factors aside from the actual job an individual is given to do, but the needs of the intrinsic motivation can only be met by giving an individual a challenging and interesting task to do.[27]

Because of the differing theoretical positions of the Weber School and the Bennis School regarding the relationship between bureaucracy and work motivation, there is need for further studies based on empirical research in this area. The present study addresses itself to this fundamental question.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

For the purpose of analysis, certain questions have been asked which reflect the existing theoretical controversy. As there is a common

agreement that organizations have some characteristics of bureaucracy, the first research question deals with this important dimension. The second question deals with the level of work motivation, and finally, the third question deals with the relationship between bureaucracy and work motivation.

More specifically, the following research questions were asked:

1. Are the levels of bureaucracy in the school districts of the State of Kansas (United States) as perceived by superintendents significantly different when samples differentiated on bureaucratic level are compared?

2. Are the levels of work motivation of superintendents of Kansas significantly different when motivation levels differentiated by level of bureaucracy are compared?

3. (a) Is there a predictive relationship between the bureaucracy of Kansas school districts as perceived by the superintendents of Kansas and the level of intrinsic motivation of school superintendents of Kansas ?

(b) Is there a predictive relationship between the bureaucracy of school districts of Kansas as perceived by the superintendents of Kansas and the level of extrinsic motivation of school superintendents of Kansas?

THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Bureaucracy: Weber saw three types of organizations in existence: (1) charismatic organization, (2) traditional organization, and (3) legal-rational organization or bureaucratic organization. In a bureaucracy, the organizational structure is designed to make maximum use of administrative specialists who possess a high level of expertise. Positions are created on functional basis and office holders are recruited to fill them on the basis of their technical competence to do the work in those positions.

According to Victor Thompson, a bureaucratic organization is a particular ordering of human behaviour which is a combination of many elements. From his point of view, modern organizations attempt to accommodate specialization within a hierarchical framework. A hierarchy creates a system of role relationships such as subordination and superordination. As an individual assumes a role in the organization, the role prescribes an organized pattern of behaviour in accordance with the expectations of other individuals and the organization.[28]

According to Weber, bureaucracy is that form of organization which is designed to achieve efficiency of operation through rational-

ization of organizational behaviour. Weber suggested six characteristics of an ideal typical bureaucracy:

(1) specialization of work;
(2) hierarchical authority structure;
(3) rules and regulations;
(4) personal detachment;
(5) employment based on technical qualifications; and
(6) a system of procedure.

Personal and Demographic Variables: In addition to bureaucracy, other independent variables included were superintendent's age, experience, and education. Data were also collected on the size of the school districts of Kansas.

The Dependent Variable: Work Motivation: Neither Weber nor Bennis has elaborated the concept of work motivation. The concept of work motivation has been systematically refined, clarified, and documented by Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman. Herzberg *et. al.* have hypothesized that better motivation might result if jobs were restructured so as to increase the maximum ability of workers to achieve meaningfully related goals and if the creative push for some workers capable of controlling their own tasks were made freer.[29]

Herzberg *et al.* contend that a person has two sets of needs. One set of needs relate to intrinsic motivation. These are the needs that satisfy his desire for achievement, recognition and growth, and development of whatever capabilities he has. The other set of needs is called extrinsic motivation or hygiene factors. These needs are associated with the side of man's nature that wants to avoid pain.[30]

INSTRUMENTATION

Bureaucracy: The instrument used in this research to measure bureaucracy, as perceived by superintendents, is the "Organizational Inventory" developed by Hall and confirmed by Punch.[31] Accordingly, bureaucracy was measured along the following six dimensions:

(1) a division of labour based on functional specialization;
(2) a well-defined hierarchy of authority;
(3) a system of rules and regulations covering rights and duties;
(4) a system of procedures for dealing with work situations;
(5) impersonality of interpersonal relationship; and
(6) selection of employment and promotion based upon technical competence.

The "Organizational Inventory" contains sixty-two items to measure six dimensions. Each sub-scale is measured by ten items,

except for number one, which is measured by twelve items. To measure bureaucracy, superintendents' responses to the sixty-two items were pooled. Since Weber treated the concept of bureaucracy as a unitary concept, in the present research also, therefore, bureaucracy was treated as a unitary concept. Hall had applied the Spearman-Brown formula, for split-half reliability coefficients were greater than 0·80 on each sub-scale. Hall validated the instrument by the use of expert judges who correlated their subjective observations with report of instrument measures for each sub-scale.[32]

Work Motivation: Herzberg *et al'.s* two-factor theoretical framework was used to measure work motivation attitudes of the superintendents of Kansas.[33] Borgatta, Ford, Bohrnstedt[34] had originally developed the Work Component Study questionnaire to merge and operationalize Herzberg *et al.'s* two-factor theory of work motivation. Miskel and Heller[35] had modified the Work Component Study for use in public schools by re-wording the original items and replacing the words pertaining to an industrial setting with words relating to the education work situation. Miskel had re-analyzed the Educational Work Component Study data and had identified thirty-six items with the highest orthogonal factor loadings. The reliability estimate of the Educational Work Component Study questionnaire with thirty-six items ranged from 0.72 to 0.84. In the present study the Educational Work Component Study questionnaire, developed and modified by Miskel, has been used.[36]

The Educational Work Component Study questionnaire contains six sub-scales, three of which assess intrinsic and three of which assess extrinsic motivations. The three intrinsic motivation sub-scales assess the following kinds of information:

1. Potential for personal challenge and development—to measure the desire in job situations where there is opportunity for creativity, responsibility, and emphasis on individual ability.

2. Competitive desirability and reward for success to measure individual's keenness for accomplishment, competition, and determination of salary by merit.

3. Tolerance for work pressure—to measure attitudes where work load might be excessive or where a person might have to take work home.

The three extrinsic motivation sub-scales assess information of the sort described below.

1. Conservative security to measure whether an individual wants safety of job with well-defined guidelines for promotion.

2. Willingness to seek reward in spite of uncertainty versus avoidance of uncertainty—to measure whether the individual is

willing to do interesting work even though he might get fired easily or it might be a short-run-job.

3. Surround concern—To measure individual's concern with hygiene factors.

Each sub-scale of the Educational Work Component Study questionnaire was measured by six questions, for a total of thirty-six questions. The responses of individuals were pooled under one of two factors: (1) intrinsic motivation, or (2) extrinsic motivation.

SURVEY

A survey method was used to collect data. Two questionnaires, the Organizational Inventory and Educational Work Component Study, were sent to the 308 superintendents of public school districts in the State of Kansas. The two instruments were mailed with a cover letter to each subject with a stamped, self-addressed envelop for returning the questionnaires. The first mailing of questionnaires to 308 superintendents resulted in 166 responses. Nineteen of those were incomplete. The first mailing brought in 46.7 per cent (147) usable questionnaires. The second yielded an additional 47 for a total of 194 usable responses (63.6 per cent).

DATA ANALYSIS

In the study bureaucracy was treated as a unitary concept (following Weber's theoretical framework) and therefore a pooled mean score for six sub-scales was used to report the level of bureaucracy. Twenty-four of the 62 items in the Organizational Inventory were reverse scored, that is, scored 5 to 1 as "very well" to "very poor." For the purpose of creating an overall mean bureaucracy score for each superintendent, the reverse-scored items were converted so that the directionality for all items ran from 1 (high bureaucracy) to 5 (low bureaucracy). From Weber's theoretical position, it was decided that if a superintendent's perception of bureaucracy had a mean of more than three, the level of bureaucracy was to be considered low. Conversely, for those superintendents who reported a mean response of less than three, the level of bureaucracy would be considered 'high'. Out of 194 cases of perception of bureaucracy by superintendents, 100 were found to be "more bureaucratic" and 94 "less bureaucratic".

As the first research question was concerned with whether there was a significant difference in the levels of bureaucracy as perceived by superintendents, a T-test was applied to the two means of the differentiated sample. The T-test was used because: (1) the samples

being compared were drawn from a population whose response size justified the assumption of normalcy, and (2) the response scale had interval strength.

Work motivation was measured by the Educational Work Component Study instrument. The concept of work motivation in terms of the Educational Work Component Study has two parts: (1) intrinsic motivation and (2) extrinsic motivation. Each of these two parts has three sub-scales. For the purpose of data analysis, intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation were treated as unitary concepts, using Herzberg *et al.'s* theoretical framework. The items on the Educational Work Component Study questionnaire ran from 1 (extremely undesirable) to 5 (extremely desirable). If the superintendent's perception of work motivation had a mean score (on each of two sets of the sub-scales) of more than three, the level of work motivation was considered as 'undesirable', while those superintendents who scored less than three were considered to be at a 'desirable' level of work motivation.

The second research question was concerned with whether there was a significant difference in the level of work motivation when motivation levels differentiated by level of bureaucracy were compared. T-test was used to evaluate the difference in intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for the high and the low groups found in bureaucracy. T-test was used because: (1) the samples being compared were drawn from a population whose response size justified the assumption of normalcy, and (2) the response scale had interval strength.

The third question was concerned with the predictive relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Stepwise multiple regression analysis was used to predict the relationship between bureaucracy, age, experience, education, size of district and intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Three stepwise multiple regression analyses were done: (1) In the first stepwise multiple regression analysis, first intrinsic motivation, and then extrinsic motivation were the dependent variables, and low bureaucracy, high bureaucracy, age, education, experience and size of district were the independent variables. (2) In the second stepwise multiple regression analysis, first intrinsic and then extrinsic motivation were the dependent variables and high bureaucracy and low bureaucracy were the independent variables. (3) In the third stepwise multiple regression analysis, first intrinsic and then extrinsic motivation were the dependent variables, while the independent variables were the six sub-scales of bureaucracy, age, education, experience, and size of school districts.

Multiple Regression Analysis: Multiple regression analysis is a method of analyzing the collective and separate contribution of two or more independent variables to the variance in a dependent variable. Kerlinger and Pedhazur have suggested three concepts for understanding multiple regression analysis. The first is that of beta weight which indicates the regression weight or the population regression coefficient, which is the slope of the regression line. To understand the predictive ability of multiple regression, residuals are needed. A residual is defined as the difference between the value of the dependent variable and the value predicted by a linear correlation of the independent variable. The third concept is that of assumption understanding. Kerlinger and Pedhazur have stated that the assumption of normal distribution and equal variance should be met to accurately predict the influence of several independent variables on a dependent variable.[37]

The stepwise multiple regression analysis helps in the selection of a minimum number of variables required to account maximally for the variance explained in a dependent variable. In the stepwise solution, tests are performed at each step to determine the significance of the contribution of each variable as it is added to the other predictors.

FINDINGS

The first research question asked whether the levels of bureaucracy in the school districts of Kansas as perceived by superintendents were significantly different when samples differentiated on bureaucratic level were compared. The T-test was used to answer this question. This test was used because the researcher was interested in discovering and evaluating differences in two groups. As it is probable that two samples from the same population may be different due to natural variability in the population, it is clear that a difference in the sample means of two groups does not necessarily imply that the populations from which they were drawn actually differ on the characteristics being studied. The goal of T-test is to establish whether or not a difference between two samples is significant.

To compute T values the following formula as suggested by

Edwards[38] was used:

$$t = \frac{(\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2) - m}{S_{x_1 - x_2}}$$

$$S_{x_1 - x_2} = \sqrt{\frac{\dfrac{\Sigma x_1^2 + \Sigma x_2^2}{n_1 + n_2 - 2}}{n_1} \times \frac{\dfrac{\Sigma x^2_1 + \Sigma x^2_2}{n_1 + n_2 - 2}}{n_2}}$$

$\bar{X}_1$ = mean of the First group
$\bar{X}_2$ = mean of the Second group
m = population mean
$\dfrac{\Sigma x^2_1 + \Sigma x^2_2}{n_1 + n_2 - 2}$ = pooled sums of squares divided by pooled sums of degree of freedom.
n_1 = Total number of cases in Group 1
n_2 = Total number of cases in Group 2

Table 1 displays the T-test results. The difference in the means of two groups was 0.2345. The computed T value (2.2631) was significant at the 0.01 level (to be significant at 0.01 level, a T value of 2.2632 was needed). The two groups when differentiated on bureaucratic level were significantly different. Therefore, the first research question was answered affirmatively. Kansas superintendents do perceive significant differences in the levels of bureaucracy associated with their districts when their perceptions are analyzed in terms of memberships in either "high" or "low" bureaucratic groups.

TABLE 1

T-Test to Determine Significance of the Difference between Mean Levels of Bureaucracy for High and Low Bureaucratic Groups

Variable	*Number of Subjects*	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*df.*	*T-Value*
High bureaucracy	100	2.8455	0.154	192	2.2601
Low bureaucracy	94	3.1700	0.152		

The second research question asked whether the levels of work motivation of superintendents of Kansas significantly differ when

motivation levels differentiated by levels of bureaucracy are compared. The T-test was used to answer this question. Again, this test was used because the researcher was interested in determining whether the two groups when differentiated by levels of bureaucracy were significantly different in their work motivation level. Notably, the T-test was used under the assumption that the response scale had interval strength, and that the populations being compared are approximately normal.

Tables 2 and 3 display the results of the T-tests. Table 2 displays the results for intrinsic motivation, and Table 3 displays the results for extrinsic motivation. In Table 2, the difference in the means of two groups is 0.0199. The computed T value (0.0671) was not significant at 0.05 level. To be significant, a T value of 1.972 was required. The two groups when differentiated by levels of bureaucracy do not differ significantly in their levels of intrinsic motivation.

Table 3 shows a difference in the means of the two groups of 0.0504. A T value was computed and was found to be 0.0325. The T value was not significant at the 0.05 level. To be significant at 0.05 level a T value of 1.972 was required. The two groups when differentiated by levels of bureaucracy do not differ significantly in their perception of extrinsic motivation.

Therefore, the second research question was answered negatively. Kansas superintendents do not perceive significant differences in the levels of either intrinsic motivation or extrinsic motivation when the groups are differentiated by levels of bureaucracy.

In order to explore the degree of predictive relationship between bureaucracy and work motivation, three stepwise multiple regression analyses were computed. In the first stepwise multiple regression analysis, first intrinsic motivation and then extrinsic motivation was the dependent variable and the independent variables were high bureaucracy, low bureaucracy, education, experience, age and size of district. In the second multiple regression analysis, the first dependent variable was intrinsic motivation, and the second one extrinsic motivation, while the independent variables were high bureaucracy and low bureaucracy. In the third multiple regression analysis the first dependent variable was intrinsic motivation, and then extrinsic motivation, while the independent variables were the sub-scales of bureaucracy, age, education, experience, and size of the school district. The purpose of the third regression analysis was to discover which of the six sub-scales contributed most to the predictive strength of bureaucracy on work motivation.

TABLE 2

T-Test to Determine Significance of Difference between Mean Levels of Intrinsic Motivation for High and Low Bureaucratic Groups

Variable	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*df.*	*T-Value*
Intrinsic Motivation (High bureaucracy group) n=100	2.7250	0.3827	192	0.06
Intrinsic Motivation (Low bureaucracy group) n=94	3.7051	0.3709		

TABLE 3

T-Test to Determine Significance of Difference between Mean Levels of Extrinsic Motivation for High and Low Bureaucratic Groups

Variable	*Mean*	*S.D.*	*df*	*T-Value*
Extrinsic Motivation (High bureaucracy group) n=100	3.1544	0.2673	192	0.05
Extrinsic Motivation (Low bureaucracy group)	3.1040	0.3323		

Tables 4 to 9 provide a summary of stepwise multiple regression analyses. Besides, these tables display stepwise squared multiple correlation coefficients, simple regression coefficients, beta weights, increment in R^2, and F values. The R^2 represents the per cent of variance in the depended variable accounted for by the linear composite of independent variables included at each step. The R^2 represents the per cent of variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the linear composite of independent variables included at each step. The R^2 increment shows the increase in total variance explained at each succeeding step.

The purpose of this section is to discuss and analyze the data collected for the third question. The question dealt with the possible

predictive relationship between bureaucracy and work motivation as perceived by the superintendents of Kansas.

Examination of Table 4, in which the predictive relationship between high and low bureaucracy, demographic data, and intrinsic motivation were regressed, revealed that of six independent variables, five entered the regression equation at a significant level. The five independent variables in the stepwise regression analysis are: Step 1, education ($F=7.6202$, df 1,192; $p<0.01$); Step 2, education, size of the district ($F=5.2944$, df 2,191; $p<0.05$); Step 3, education, size of the district, age ($F=3.8399$, df 3,190; $p<0.01$); Step 4, education, size of district, age, experience ($F=3.1335$, df. 4,189; $p<0.05$); Step 5, education, size of district, age, experience, high bureaucracy ($F=2.6005$, df 5,188; $p<.05$).

TABLE 4

Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis for Intrinsic Motivation as the Criterion Variable and High Bureaucracy, Low Bureaucracy, and Demographic Data as Predictor Variables

Predictor Variable	*Multiple R*	R^2	*Increment* R^2	*Simple R*	*Beta Weight*	*F Value*
Education	0.195	0.038	0.038	0.195	0.229	7.620*
Size of School District	0.229	0.052	0.014	0.032	0.127	5.294*
Age	0 239	0.057	0.004	0.136	0.112	3.839**
Experience	0.249	0.062	0.005	0.024	0.082	3 133**
High Bureaucracy	0.254	0.064	0.002	0.047	0.049	2.600**

* $p<0.01$
** $p<0.05$

Table 5 shows the predictive relationship between high and low bureaucracy, demographic data, extrinsic motivation. Of six independent variables, five entered the regression equation. However, the F values indicate that none of five independent variables were significant predictors of extrinsic motivation.

TABLE 5

Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis for Extrinsic Motivation as the Criterion Variable and High Bureaucracy, Low Bureaucracy, and Demographic Data as Predictor Variables

Predictor Variable	*Multiple R*	R^2	*Increment* R^2	*Simple R*	*Beta Weight*	*F Value*
High Bureaucracy	0.110	0.012	0.012	0.110	0.111	2.357
Size of School District	0.147	0.021	0.009	—0.098	0.071	2.116
Experience	0.168	0.029	0.006	—0.090	0.095	1.861
Education	0.172	0.029	0.001	—0.056	0.038	1.455
Age	0.173	0.029	0.0005	—0.030	0.008	1.160

Table 6 shows the predictive relationship between high and low bureaucracy and intrinsic motivation. Table 7 shows the predictive relationship between high and low bureaucracy and extrinsic motivation. According to tables 6 and 7, high and low bureaucracy were unable to predict at a significant level either intrinsic motivation ($F=0.4299$, df 1,192; $p<0.05$), or extrinsic motivation ($F=2.3574$, df 1,192; $p>0.05$).

In the third stepwise multiple regression analysis the six subscales of bureaucracy with the demographic data were used as the independent variables and the dependent variables were intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. All the ten independent variables were entered into the regression equation as shown in tables 8 and 9.

TABLE 6

Multiple Regression Analysis for Intrinsic Motivation as the Criterion Variable and High Bureaucracy, Low Bureaucracy as Predictor Variables

Predictor Variable	*Multiple R*	R^2	*Increment* R^2	*Simple R*	*Beta Weight*	*F Value*
High Bureaucracy	0.047	0.002	0.002	0.047	0.047	0.429

TABLE 7

Multiple Regression Analysis for Extrinsic Motivation as the Criterion Variable and High Bureaucracy, Low Bureaucracy as Predictor Variables

Predictor Variable	*Multiple R*	R^2	*Increment* R^2	*Simple R*	*Beta Weight*	*F Value*
High Bureaucracy	0.110	0.012	0.012	0.110	0.110	2.357

Examination of Table 8 in which the predictive relationship between the six sub-scales of bureaucracy with the demographic data, and intrinsic motivation were regressed, revealed that all the ten independent variables entered the regression equation. Of the ten variables, seven were found to predict intrinsic motivation at a significant level. The seven independent variables in the stepwise regression analysis were: Step 1, education; Step 2, education, size of district ($F=7.6201$, df1,192; $p<0.01$); ($F=5.2943$, df 2,191; $p<0.01$); Step 3, education, size of district, rules and regulations ($F=3.8683$, df 3,190; $p<0.01$); Step 4, education, size of district rules and regulations, impersonality of interpersonal relationship ($F=3.2680$, df 4,189; $p<0.05$); Step 5, education, size of district rules and regulations, impersonality of interpersonal relationship, age ($F=2.8169$, df 5,188; $p<0.05$); Step 6, education, size of district, rules and regulations, impersonality of interpersonal relationship, age, experience ($F=2.4850$, df 6,187; $p<0.05$); and Step 7, education, size of district, rules and regulations, impersonality of interpersonal relationship, age, experience, system of procedures for dealing with work situation ($F=1.8780$, df 8,185; $p<0.05$).

Table 9 shows the regression analysis of ten independent variables (six sub-scales of bureaucracy and demographic data) and one dependent variable (extrinsic motivation). Of the ten independent variables, nine entered the regression equation as shown in Table 9. All of the nine independent variables entered in the regression equation were unable to predict extrinsic motivation at 0.05 level.

The beta weights, which are shown in Tables 10 and 11, provide a way to compare the relative effect on the dependent variable of each independent variable. As none of the independent variables in all three multiple regression analyses were able to predict extrinsic motivation at a significant level, Tables 10 and 11 show the entry of

TABLE 8

Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis for Intrinsic Motivation as the Criterion Variable and Six Sub-Scales of Bureaucracy, and Demographic Data as the Predictor Variables

Predictor Variable	*Multiple R*	R^2	*Increment* R^2	*Simple R*	*Beta Weight*	*F Value*
Education	0.195	0.038	0.038	0.195	0.216	7.622*
Size of School District	0.229	0.052	0.014	—0.032	0.128	5.294**
Rules and Regulations	0.239	0 057	0.005	0.090	0.102	3.868*
Impersonality of Interpersonal Relationship	0.254	0.064	0.007	—0.037	—0.073	3.268**
Age	0.264	0.069	0.005	—0.136	—0.114	2.816**
Experience	0.271	0.073	0.004	—0.024	0 075	2.485**
System of Procedure	0.274	0.074	0.0009	—0.029	—0.044	2.147**
Hierarchy	0.274	0.075	0.0003	0.041	0.020	1.878
Division of Labour	0.274	0.075	0.001	0.009	0.015	1.664
Selection and Promotion Based on Technical Competence	0.274	0.075	0.0001	=0.064	0.011	1.492

* p 0.01 ** p 0.05

TABLE 9

Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis for Extrinsic Motivation as the Criterion Variable and Six Sub-Scales of Bureaucracy, and Demographic Data as the Predictor Variables

Predictor Variable	*Multiple R*	R^2	*Increment R*	*Simple R*	*Beta Weight*	*F Value*
A System of Procedure	0.133	0.017	0.017	—0.133	—0.188	3.468
Size of School District	0.171	0.029	0.011	—0.098	—0.103	2.909
Experience	0.192	0.037	0.007	—0.090	—0.097	2.438
Hierarchy	0.208	0.043	0.006	—0.100	—0.120	2.144
Division of Labour	0.218	0.047	0.004	—0.002	0.064	1.888
Selection and Promotion Based on Technical Competence	0.225	0.050	0.002	0.045	0.046	1.664
Rules and Regulations	0.228	0.052	0.001	—0.061	0.051	1.470
Education	0.231	0.053	0.0009	—0.056	0.038	1.303
Impersonality of Interpersonal Relationship	0 232	0.054	0.0009	—0.072	0.040	1.173

predictor variables in descending order. Analysis of Table 10 indicates that experience was a suppressor variable. Further, the analysis of Table 11 also indicates that experience was a suppressor variable. The two beta weight tables are based on the first and third stepwise multiple regression analyses respectively.

TABLE 10

Order of Entry and Associated Beta Weights of Predictor Variables—Low Bureaucracy, High Bureaucracy, and Demographic Data with Intrinsic Motivation as the Criterion Variable

Predictor Variable	*Entry Step*	*Increment R*	*Simple R*	*Beta Weight*
Education	1	0.038	0.195	0.228
Size of School District	2	0.014	—0.032	—0.127
Age	3	0.004	—0.136	—0.112
Experience*	4	0.005	—0.024	0.082
High Bureaucracy	5	0.002	0.047	0.049

* Experience is a suppressor variable.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Three T-tests were carried out to determine: (1) whether the mean of two groups—one high bureaucratic and one low bureaucratic—differed significantly; (2) whether the mean of the high and low bureaucratic groups differed significantly when the comparison was made for intrinsic motivation; and (3) whether the means of high and low bureaucratic groups differed significantly when the comparison was made for extrinsic motivation. The first T-test revealed a significant difference in the group means for superintendents whose overall bureaucracy score was either greater or less than three (low and high bureaucracy). The second and third tests for difference of these same groups on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation revealed no significant difference.

Three stepwise multiple regression analyses were computed to examine possible predictive relationships between bureaucracy and

TABLE 11

Order of Entry and Associated Beta Weights of Predictor Variables—Six Sub-Scales of Bureaucracy, and Demographic Data with Intrinsic Motivation as the Criterion Variable

Predictor Variable	*Entry Step*	*Increment R*	*Simple R*	*Beta Weight*
Education	1	0.038	0.195	0.216
Size of School District	2	0.014	— .032	—0.128
Age	5	0.005	—0.136	—0.114
Rules and Regulations	3	0.005	0.090	0.102
Experience	6	0.004	—0.024	0.075
Impersonality of Inter-personal Relationship	4	0.007	—0.037	—0.073
System of Procedures	7	0.0009	—0.029	—0.044
Hierarchy	8	0.0003	0.041	0.020
Division of Labour	9	0.0001	0.009	0.015
Selection and Promotion Based on Technical Competence	10	0.0001	—0.064	—0.011

work motivation. Based on the multiple regression analyses, a limited predictive relationship was found between bureaucracy and work motivation. The regression analyses indicated that when the level of bureauracy is high, it has limited strength to predict intrinsic motivation.

However, a high level of bureaucracy as perceived by superintendents failed to predict extrinsic motivation. In the first regression analysis, high bureaucracy entered the regression equation at step 5 and was significant at the 0.05 level. However, in the first regression analysis, bureaucracy entered the regression equation along with four demographic variables. Therefore, to examine the predictive relationship between bureaucracy and work motivation, all the demographic data were withheld from the second regression analysis. When the demographic data were withheld from the regression equation, high bureaucracy was unable to predict intrinsic

and extrinsic motivation at a significant level. Therefore, a third regression analysis was run in which demographic data were reintroduced, but instead of high and low bureaucracy as independent variables, the six sub-scales of bureaucracy were introduced in the regression equation. In this regression analysis three sub-scales of bureaucracy entered the regression on steps 3, 4 and 6 at a significant level. The three sub-scales entering the equation were: (1) rules and regulations, (2) impersonality of interpersonal relationship, and (3) system of procedures. The mean of each of the three sub-scales was less than 3 (high bureaucracy). No predictive relationship was established between any of the bureaucratic sub-scales and extrinsic motivation at a significant level.

In all three regression analyses, low bureaucracy was not found to predict either intrinsic motivation or extrinsic motivation at a significant level.

The results secured from the stepwise regression analyses demonstrated that demographic data had more strength in predicting work motivation than bureaucracy.

Education, size of districts, experience, and age were found to have a significant predictive relationship with intrinsic motivation. The demographic data also failed to predict extrinsic motivation.

DISCUSSION

The data analysis of this research supports Max Weber's theoretical contention that bureaucracy is related positively to work motivation, but this theoretical position is supported only partially. Weber was of the opinion that bureaucracy was related positively to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. An important finding of the data analysis of the present study was that a high level of bureaucracy was related positively to intrinsic motivation. This finding is contrary to the theoretical positions of Bennis and Argyris who theorized that low bureaucracy increases the level of intrinsic motivation. This research has, therefore, furthered our understanding of the relationship between bureaucracy and motivation.

Another important outcome of this research is that bureaucracy may not be an important variable in predicting the motivational level of superintendents. In the first and third regression analyses, bureaucracy and sub-scales of bureaucracy entered the multiple regression equation after one or more of the demographic variables had entered the regression equation.

IMPLICATIONS

The first implication of this study is that bureaucracy is not the most important factor in predicting the work motivation of Kansas superintendents. Education was determined as the most important demographic variable for explaining intrinsic motivation. It may be suggested from the data analysis that superintendents who have an advanced degree—for example, master's plus specialist, or doctorate—are more liable to be motivated intrinsically. Other demographic data that are important in predicting the level of work motivation are: size of the school, district, age, and education. As a matter of fact, in this research the four demographic variables entered the regression of a significant level. Thus those superintendents who are between the ages of 45-54, and have been superintendents for more than seven years are liable to be more intrinsically motivated than extrinsically motivated.

The second implication of this study is that neither the demographic data, the high and low bureaucracy, nor the sub-scales of bureaucracy can significantly predict the extrinsic motivation level of superintendents. This means that the theoretical positions of Bennis and Weber are rejected from the standpoint that: (a) Weber suggested that bureaucracy is positively related to intrinsic motivation *and* extrinsic motivation, and (b) Bennis argued that high bureaucracy is related positively to extrinsic motivation.

The third important implication of our analysis is that it supports Herzberg *et. al.'s* contention that the needs of intrinsic motivation may be met by giving an individual a challenging and interesting job.

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18

From Policy Outcomes to Administrative Theory

Alfred Wayne Penn

THE development of more adequate theory has long been of interest to students of administration.[1] The outpouring of theoretical efforts in the field offers good support for this assertion. To a degree, the construction and reconstruction of theoretical frameworks in the field can be attributed to waves of interest in changing groups of problems, which have swept through the field from time to time.[2] Recently an interest in the political and social consequences of administrative action has led students to look outward from the organization to consider its relevant environment.[3] This emerging focus has been associated with a number of theoretical approaches, one of which is "systems theory", an approach which often places public administration within the context of the political system as a whole.[4] It is my intention in this article to suggest a middle range approach to the construction of systems frameworks in public administration.[5] As this tactic runs counter to the methods usually associated with systems theory, it will be necessary to critique the theory briefly before beginning the discussion of a middle range alternative.

CRITIQUES OF SYSTEMS THEORY

During the last decade, *systemic* analysis has become increasingly important in the study of politics on the national, international, and subnational levels.[6] By viewing political action as involving webs of interdependent relationships, one can identify important causes of, and ramifications stemming from, discrete political events. Proponents of this approach to political analysis argue that it will enhance the development of a general empirical theory of politics.[7] It is suggested that earlier legalistic approaches were general in their focus, but deficient in regard to empirical grounding. Rigorous empirical studies, on the other hand, are too narrow, treating particular political phenomena in isolation from their environments. They argue that the systems approach will overcome the limitations of both approaches by providing an *empirical orientation* in the realm of general theory.

The systemic perspective has had a powerful influence in the study of parts of political systems as well. International systems have been broken down into regional subsystems.[9] National political systems have been seen in terms of their parts as well, including party systems, legislative systems. and administrative systems.[10] Thus, in the study of administration, systemic works have proliferated, focusing on the internal dynamics of administrative systems and upon the ecology of these systems, with particular emphasis on the general political system.[11] In general, there has been an interest in the contribution of administrative development to overall political development. What kinds of administrative organization contribute to political development? Some have emphasized the need for a relative balance of power between the administrative system and the other parts of the political system.[12] Others have emphasized the need for maximal administrative development in relation to the social problems to be met by the political system.[13] In the former studies, there is concern that the administrative system will overwhelm the representative political institutions and in the latter, that an underdeveloped administrative system will be unable to meet the problems of change. Thus contradictory views are to be found within the systemic literature on administrative development and on development administration. Perhaps the still early stage of work in the area is accountable for such fundamental conflicts in the literature. Some critiques of systems theory, however, suggest a different view.

Numerous critiques of systems theory have recently emerged to challenge the view that systems frameworks provide the necessary conceptual organization for the development of general empirical theory. These critiques have generally pointed to weaknesses of two kinds in the systems approach. First, it is often asserted that systems frameworks are *pretheoretical*, in the sense that they do not include logically interrelated propositions which have been derived from empirical research.[14] When frameworks are constructed which are logically tight, they are quite divorced from empirical findings.[15] Those frameworks which incorporate empirical findings, on the other hand, lack logical rigor. They are merely descriptive taxonomies of diverse findings.[16] These frameworks *may* be heuristically interesting, but they do not constitute empirical theories. Secondly, critiques suggest that systems frameworks have not been *organized around* empirical propositions.[17] Either they include abstract tautologies—extended definitions of politics in terms lacking clear empirical referents or they incorporate findings from empirical research without building their frameworks with the relevant propositions.[18]

In both cases, the frameworks do not suggest empirically testable propositions. Thus, the critics are concerned about the gap between systems frameworks and the empirical analysis of political action.

Some critics go on to suggest that systems frameworks may not provide useful approaches to the development of general empirical theory.[19] Most critics, however, recognize that systems frameworks have what may be called a "map-like" utility, in that they help give the researcher a feeling for where his research is situated in the realm of things political. The frameworks also suggest what concepts in the surrounding political landscape may be correlated on the specific terrain the researcher has covered himself. Thus *linkages* among different conceptual areas may be suggested by systems frameworks. For these reasons, most critics are willing to accept the heuristic value of systems frameworks, in a political science which is in a generally pretheoretical phase.[20]

However, some critics argue that the time has come to concentrate on middle range research efforts, which will provide evidence with which general theory may be constructed.[21] By middle range research, they mean studies which are close enough to empirical data to be built around empirically testable propositions, while, at the same time, theoretically significant in the sense that their propositions contain concepts which may be useful in systemic theory construction.[22] Specifically, some argue that political scientists should study "parts" of the political system.[23] But they fail to recognize that the parts, as presently conceptualized, are no better related to empirical theory construction than are the whole systems. The parts are likewise pretheoretical conceptual structures. If one begins with the administrative system as a part of the political system, one is in about the same theoretical empirical predicament as when one begins with the political system itself. Some general analysis is possible on this level, but it is very difficult to cast this in the form of tested empirical theory. Thus, some kind of middle range seems preferable.

MIDDLE RANGE POLICY STUDIES AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Policy studies are increasingly concerned with the *impact* of political action in society.[24] While much interest has traditionally been devoted to an analysis of policy-making (especially the institutions and processes involved), interest has now turned to the analysis of policy

outputs, or decisions.[25] Rather than asking only how policies get made, this analysis asks, "What policies get made, how are they implemented, and with what results?" Many of these new studies utilize the system framework of David Easton.[26] His focus upon the interrelated parts of the political system and upon the purposive character of political action is quite useful for policy study. His model envisions a political system which "authoritatively allocates values for a society" in response to social demands and with the aid of social support.[27] Purposive action is integral to his approach, in all phases of the policy process. There is a deficiency in his analysis, however, which is similar to that of many other whole system approaches. They focus primarily upon the topmost political institutions as the authoritative policy makers, and they neglect the reality of lower level policy making, and implementation, which may not always correspond to impressions created on the topmost level. That is to say, there may be serious *slippage* between official policy pronouncements and real policy outcomes.[28] The lower levels of public administration, where many serious problems of policy implementation are met, receive little attention in systemic analysis. The divergence between policy pronouncements and policy outcomes is relatively neglected in the process.

Of course, the neglect of policy outcomes is related also to the general lack of good performance indicators in many policy areas.[29] Goals to be sought are fuzzily defined as are measures of the degree to which these goals are attained. Political scientists join many other social scientists in facing a paucity of good performance indicators. While economists have been able to escape this problem and can refer to the state of the economy, political scientists are unable to document the state of the political system, much less society. The necessary measures simply do not exist. The impact of government policy has not been systematically recorded and analyzed.

There are, however, studies, particularly in public administration, which describe the results of selected governmental policies.[30] These studies are more empirically grounded than are the systemic approaches; however, they usually lack a broader theoretical perspective. Yet, by beginning analysis with a focus upon *policy outcomes*, and by building systemically from studies of policy implementation, it is possible to construct bridges between this work and frameworks for the study of administrative systems.[31] By building from this lower level perspective, we may come closer to founding systemic analysis upon empirical research. The most successful aspects of current political system frameworks exhibit this feature.[32] This process must begin, however, with concrete, theoretically significant policy questions.

ON THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY OUTCOMES

An analysis of policy outcomes may provide a starting point. But first, what is policy, and how can policies be categorized? Carl J. Friedrich's excellent definition of policy may answer the first question:[33]

"Policy is a proposed course of action of a person, group, or government within a given environment providing obstacles and opportunities which the policy was proposed to utilize and overcome in an effort to reach a goal, or realize an objective, or a purpose."

Policy is *political* to the degree that it is of public importance whether it is associated with publicly designated agencies, is recognized by participants to have public consequences, or is recognized by the researcher to have such ramifications. Alternatively, *public policy* involves the creation and pursuit of courses of political action designed to achieve envisioned ends. *Policy implementation* is that action which is ostensibly designed to achieve policy goals, while *effective policy action* is that action (whether public or private) which controls or fundamentally affects policy outcomes. These *policy outcomes* are the relevant results of the policy implementation process as it is modified by effective policy action. What is envisioned here is a proposed course of action, adopted by an authoritative public agency, to some degree achieved and to a degree also, altered in the process of its implementation. All those affecting the resultant policy outcomes (whether public or private) will be considered *significant actors,* whose significance is measured by their relative effect upon these outcomes.[34] The involved actors, then, have differing levels of power to affect the policy outcomes in question, some of which derives from recognized public authority and some of which from private sources.[35] Policy outcomes derive from the *net power* produced by various mixes of interacting public and private actors.

Thus, the researcher, by focusing on what are considered relevant policy outcomes, may work back through an analysis of the actors who have had a significant effect upon those outcomes. In this way he may describe the pattern of effective policy action which may be compared with officially established public policy. Just as some time ago, group theorists and others sought the informal bases of political action, so, from a similar perspective, we seek the informal influences upon policy implementation. But, unlike organization theorists who develop a *similar* perspective, we begin with policy outcomes in settings involving numerous interacting organizations and other actors. It is not possible in the initial phases of investiga-

tion to designate exactly which organizational, group, and individual actors will have significant power in the implementation process.[36] This strategy has systemic implications, in that the initial focus upon outcomes allows for progressive delineation of the functional effects of the political system in operation. The assessment of these effects moves close to the purpose of political activity, and thus involves a step toward informed evaluation of political performance.

Policy research of this sort requires the designation of *social problem areas*—that is, realms of related fundamental social problems, recognized as set apart (at least, conceptually) from other problem realms.[37] Initial attempts have been made by those studying public policy to categorize such policy areas, and while this process is still quite crude, increasingly sophisticated classification schemes should emerge.[38] Of importance initially is the analysis of policy action within somewhat arbitrarily designated problem areas, so that increasing stores of problem related policy actions accumulate. At a minimal level, some recognized problem areas will involve virtually no effective policy action at all. Beyond this level, there may be recognized weak, intermittent, or perhaps fragmented policy action. At some higher point, one may speak of the emergence of *policy arenas*, which involve relatively organized groups of somewhat interdependent actors, pursuing related sets of policy goals, in accordance with the norms of an associated subculture, with the use of significant resources.[39] The development of policy arenas is a relative matter. At the higher levels of development, these may be called *political subsystems*, while at lower levels, they are simply *emergent arenas*, exhibiting varying degrees of somewhat interdependent organization.

The conceptualization of policy arenas, then, may be likened to that of what are termed *fields of activity* (rather than systems), which exhibit varying levels of interdependent activity, matched by realms of autonomous action.[40] The degree of arena organization simply marks the level of arena development. Within an arena are *significant actors*, who exert substantial influence over major arena resources, and are most influential in determining, or affecting, relevant policy outcome (see Figure 1). On occasion, these actors will intervene to significantly alter arena activities and outcomes.[41] Beyond the arena periphery is a wider realm with a generally uniformed, although occasionally aroused public, a realm which shades off into distant regions of the totally uninvolved. Within an arena may be found diverse mixes of significant and peripheral actors in various patterns of interaction and independent activity, which will evolve, sometimes drastically, over time. Consideration of the structure of effective policy action is central to analysis of policy arenas.

Arena development is further related to the emergence of an arena subculture. To some extent, policy is routinized in customary forms of action which are upheld and defended by arena participants. Further activities will be allowed to vary within acceptable limits, while still another group of activities will be met with sanctions by those upholding arena conventions. Processes for determining the legitimacy of activities will have emerged, as will processes for socializing new actors within the arena. The capacity of the significant actors to meet new problems will be affected by the institutionalized interests and modes of problem solving dominant within the arena.[42] All of these cultural aspects should be seen to emerge in varying degrees; for, only in their most developed forms do arenas become highly organized subsystems.

FIGURE 1
POLICY ARENA DIAGRAM



*Conceptualize this diagram in n-dimensional space, with the cultural and physical environments as unrecorded dimensions of the diagram. Relevant outcomes should be seen as an additional aspect of arena activities, intersecting with all of the associated arena dimensions.

The viability of policy arenas at particular levels of organization is partially determined by the capacity of their significant actors and

their allies to meet some range of threats to the instituted organization of the arenas. *Core resources* are directly related to this capacity of significant actors to maintain the fundamental organizational character of the arena. The term, *significant resources*, may be seen to include core resources and others which are related to all non-critical policy action-less important routine matters, innovative activities, and peripheral concerns on the fringes of the arena. Policy arenas vary greatly in their resources and in policies for the use of these. Some arenas will barely survive in relatively low states of organization, while others will include highly organized core programmes and powerful innovative activities.[43] Nevertheless, all arenas have ranges of effective policy action and other areas of action beyond their capacity.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF POLYMODAL FRAMEWORKS

The analysis of policy arenas should increasingly define the various contours of effective policy action, highlighting diverse organizational mixes of formal and informal, public and private actors, affecting relevant policy outcomes within particular areas of public policy.[44] Such information will allow for the identification of *modal configurations* within and among policy arenas.[45] Analysis of these modal configurations will allow the assessment of political systems, and their administrative subsystems, from a realistic perspective, which links official policy pronouncements with relevant policy outcomes via effective policy action. This approach will include the analysis of the topmost political and administrative organization as integral to the policy-making process, but the importance of this level of analysis will be judged by a realistic assessment of power relationships within specific policy arenas. In some arenas top officials will be seen as central actors, while in others they will be peripheral to arena activities, no matter what their formal status. A system conceived in terms of the diverse configurations of a set of policy arenas may be called a *polymodal system framework*, in the sense that its structure will be organized in reference to diverse, partially coordinated and partially autonomous structures of political activity. (See Figure 2).[46]

FIGURE 2
POLYMODAL SYSTEM FRAMEWORK*



*Conceptualize this diagram in n-dimensional space. Three dimensions which intersect with it are: (1) the cultural dimension, associated with the various social elements in the diagram; (2) the extra-societal social environment; and (3) the physical environment. The implementation-outcome-feedback loop should be associated with each policy arena, and the policy arena should be seen to encompass its loop, although the loop is shown as external in the diagram. It should be further noted that the *outcomes* intersect with the n-dimensions of the diagram. These outcomes are the *products* of the political action.

This approach is predicated on the argument that political systems exhibit less coherent authoritative control than is implied by most system frameworks for analysis. Authoritative control from the top should be seen as partial and should be balanced conceptually by attention to the *relative autonomy* of formally subordinate actors in particular policy areas.[47] Likewise, the conceptualization of a coherent and coordinated administrative system should be balanced by the recognition of *policy fragmentation* as one looks across diverse policy areas.[48] Authoritative political control should be seen as only partially emergent among diverse and often contradictory policy processes, which to varying degrees undercut attempts at coherent political guidance. By focusing on relevant policy outcomes, determining the contours of effective policy action, and then distinguishing

among these modal configurations of political action, the student of politics and administration may capture the relative mixture of policy processes which make up the political system.

Students of public administration have a great deal to contribute to this process. Administrative elements are intimately involved in the arenas which control relevant policy outcomes in particular problem areas. Analysis of the contours of administrative activity is thus of central importance in policy analysis. But increasing attention must be given to the *ecology* of administrative action: to the problem areas addressed by administration; to the significant actors (public and private) within associated arenas; to the contours of effective policy action within these arenas; and to relevant policy outcomes. Further, these findings must be assessed in regard to the question of how to best achieve effective administrative organization within the political system. Answer to this question will illuminate our general understanding of the policy-making capacity of the political system and, more generally, its social relevance.

Administrative action is *purposive*: it is organized around policy programmes which are addressed to recognized public problems. In developing a systemic perspective upon administrative action, this essay has proposed that we begin analysis with the conceptualization of these problems themselves. We may then go on to conceive of particular administrative elements as actors in policy arenas in which these problems are dealt with by other significant actors as well. Assessment of administrative effectiveness will thus be related to: (1) a clear recognition of relevant policy outcomes, and (2) a conception of the effective organization of the policy arenas within which administrative actors must attempt to implement policy. This approach will hopefully capture the major dynamics of the social settings in which administrative activities do or do not achieve administrative goals. Thus, it will be possible to assess more carefully the effectiveness of administrative action in various social problem areas, and, by aggregating evidence in all areas of administrative action, it will be possible to assess the impact of the administrative system in society. Serious students of public administration seek to foster progressive administrative change. Internal organizational reforms are the concrete manifestation of such change and are, therefore, deserving of continuing study. Still, we must ask, "Toward what ends should administrative change be directed?" The external problem solving focus of administrative action is the critical realm in which the answers will be found.

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